Their no nuke war arguments posit nuclear colonialism in the periphery and ignores that nuclear is being perpetuated on the Fourth World.
Kato 93 (Masahide Kato, Political Science at the University of Hawai’I, Alternatives, Summer, 1993, p. 348-349)
Nuclear criticism finds the likelihood of “extinction” as the most fundamental aspect of nuclear catastrophe. The complex problematics involved in nuclear catastrophe are thus reduced to the single possible instant of extinction. The task of nuclear critics is clearly designated by Schell as coming to grips with the one and only final instant: “human extinction whose likelihood we are chiefly interested in finding out about.” Deconstructionists, on the other hand, take a detour in their efforts to theologize extinction. Jaeques Derrida, for example, solidified the prevailing mode of representation by constituting extinction as a fatal absence: Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or lets the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a “classical,” conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or text. At least today apparently. By representing the possible extinction as the single most important problematic of nuclear catastrophe (posing it as either a threat or a symbolic void), nuclear criticism disqualifies the entire history of nuclear violence, the “real” of nuclear catastrophe as a continuous and repetitive process. The “real” of nuclear war is designated by nuclear critics as a “rehearsal” (Berrick De Kerkhove) or “preperation” (Firth) for what they reserve as the authentic catastrophe. The history of nuclear violence offers, at best, a reality effect to the imagery of “extinction.” Schell summarized the discursive position of nuclear critics very succinctly, by stating that nuclear catastrophe should not be conceptualized “in the context of direct slaughter of hundreds of millions of people by the local effects.” Thus the elimination of the history of nuclear violence by nuclear critics stems from the process of discursive “delocalization” of nuclear violence. Their primary focus is not local catastrophe, but delocalized, unlocatable, “global” catastrophe.