The discourse of the 1AC is rooted in the continuation of neoliberalism in order to guarantee the market takes precedent over localities

Despite the fact that industrial natural gas ¶ development is initiated at the national and ¶ global scales, land use decision-making and ¶ impacts are felt at the local scale where rural ¶ stakeholders (who often utilize diverse, resourcebased livelihood strategies) must compete for ¶ the same land and water resources as fossil fuel ¶ developers. This brings into focus why oil and ¶ gas firms aggressively try to control the discourse ¶ about the hydro-social cycle. Importantly, desires ¶ to expand local economic growth opportunities are ¶ ever-present, and landowners are often motivated ¶ to lease their property to extraction firms based ¶ on complex, multi-scalar arguments that center on ¶ this possibility. This has created strong tensions ¶ between proponents and opponents, particularly ¶ because water is both abundant in northeastern PA ¶ and is argued to be just another economic input in ¶ the broader picture. This is in opposition to water ¶ as a multi-faceted, multi-value resource that can be ¶ readily degraded, perhaps irrevocably in the natural ¶ gas industrial production process.¶ Harvey (2005) has broadly posited that neoliberal ¶ strategies are enacted to ensure the consolidation ¶ of capital into specific hands, and Bakker (2010) ¶ suggests that water is a ‘final frontier’ for capitalism. ¶ While we agree, this does not sufficiently explain why the multi-scalar, pro-fracking arguments are ¶ effective. We know, for example, that the arguments ¶ are intellectually weak: natural gas extraction is not ¶ “green” (Howarth et al. 2011); shale gas will not ¶ likely get the nation “off” of foreign oil (Tyndall ¶ Centre 2011); fracking poses serious risks to water ¶ quality and is in need of stronger regulations (Parfitt ¶ 2010; Jackson et al. 2011). Also the process is ¶ driven by specific interests (e.g., America’s Natural ¶ Gas Alliance). We suggest, then, the issue is less ¶ about the argument, and more about the way the ¶ hydro-social cycle is framed in support of fracking.¶ Fletcher (2010) suggests that neoliberalism is ¶ a “general strategy of governing human action” ¶ (171), or a way of ‘conducting conduct’ (Foucault ¶ 2008; Fletcher 2010, 173). In other words, ¶ neoliberalism is not just an argument, but also a ¶ strategy for reworking societies’ perception of, and ¶ relationship to, the non-human world (McCarthy ¶ and Prudham 2004; Heynen et al. 2007). Since, at ¶ the outset, environmental concerns are often seen ¶ in opposition to development, fracking proponents ¶ must co-opt, define, and control the meaning ¶ of environmental resources. This first means ¶ redefining the value of water as an economic input, ¶ so that its degradation makes sense in a broader ¶ benefit/cost framework. Thus the hydro-social cycle ¶ is less a relationship between people and water, ¶ but rather a commodity that can be monetized for ¶ global markets (Finewood and Porter 2010). One ¶ can observe the effectiveness of such a practice ¶ through the sacrifices that individuals are expected ¶ to make for their – and the nation’s – economic ¶ future. In other words, people must exchange their ¶ noneconomic resources for economic resources, as ¶ if they were simply interchangeable.¶ In this scenario, firms are the legitimate source of ¶ knowledge and information. Neoliberal approaches ¶ to environmental governance suggest “rolling back” ¶ environmental regulations (Peck and Tickell 2002), ¶ tacitly celebrating the knowledge and experience of ¶ private industry. In this case, with a lack of funding ¶ for regulatory agencies and a general disdain for ¶ environmental concerns when framed as opposing ¶ economic development, a knowledge vacuum is ¶ created for oil and gas firms to fill. Firms become ¶ the de facto expertise on the environmental impacts ¶ of fracking as well as the expert counterpoint to ¶ anti-fracking voices. In addition, as the fracking process happens up to a mile under the surface of ¶ the ground, in largely inaccessible and rural areas, ¶ and often on private property, the full spatial and ¶ temporal impacts of the process occur largely outof-sight, leaving stakeholders very few alternatives ¶ but to seek information from oil and gas firms.¶ Finally, as the neoliberalization of the hydrosocial cycle becomes taken-for-granted, or common ¶ sense, those who speak up for water resources ¶ as a human/non-human right are increasingly ¶ marginalized. The refrain of environmentalists ¶ as “anti-jobs,” “being out of touch with reality,” ¶ and/or “prioritizing nature over people” has ¶ become relatively common trope in U.S. society. ¶ Even those who may not consider themselves ¶ environmentalists, but seek to advocate for ¶ regional environmental resources, are marginalized ¶ within the broader debate. Further, not only does ¶ this tactic set the discursive stage for a rational ¶ group of economically minded people versus ¶ irrational environmentalists (i.e., economy versus ¶ the environment), but it also uses environmental ¶ perception as an arena for political and economic ¶ projects (Heynen et al. 2007, 12). Thus the ¶ legitimacy of a neoliberal environment discourse is ¶ reinforced while delegitimizing alternatives. Conclusion¶ Thus far we have argued that multi-scale ¶ neoliberal discourses do more than obfuscate ¶ comprehensive understandings of the impacts of ¶ fracking on water resources. They also create a way ¶ of conducting conduct that normalizes the impacts ¶ fracking has on water resources. In this vein of ¶ thinking, Castree (2003) has asked, why should we ¶ care about the capitalization of nature? We contend ¶ that the socio-environmental risks of fracking are ¶ potentially high and it is largely rural communities ¶ who are vulnerable to these risks. At the same time, ¶ these communities must make land use decisions ¶ based on incomplete and competing forms of ¶ knowledge. One or our goals is to bring attention ¶ to the potential impacts of fracking and to develop ¶ a better understanding of the ways stakeholders ¶ perceive costs and benefits in order to make land ¶ use decisions.¶ But more broadly, we are interested in ¶ contributing to a context-specific analysis of the ways neoliberalism is (re)defining the relationships ¶ between people and the non-human world. As ¶ market approaches to environmental regulation ¶ become a more accepted, and perhaps a dominant ¶ part of governance strategy (See Anderson and ¶ Leal 2001), places like northeastern PA are, ¶ “written off for environmental destruction in the ¶ name of a higher purpose, such as the national ¶ interest” (Scott 2010, 31). These “sacrifice zones” ¶ assume an ecological disconnect between people ¶ and their environment, normalizing environmental ¶ degradation in some places while protecting ¶ others, and also assume no alternative uses of land ¶ or energy resources. This can be viewed as a form ¶ of remote environmental exploitation and brutality ¶ where the scalar issues make these sacrifice zones ¶ almost invisible to the larger nation and world. We ¶ feel that these struggles to (re)define the nature/¶ society relationship is about the power to ensure ¶ capital flows into specific hands, which will ¶ likely result in greater costs to other people and ¶ their environments. Formally investigating and ¶ deconstructing pro-fracking discourses is part of an ¶ ongoing project to come to terms with the realities ¶ involved with the transformation of the hydrosocial cycle and with the water-energy nexus, and ¶ to strive for a more equitable future.