Bioterror is more feasible now than ever before thanks to more accessible infrastructure and knowledge.

The feasibility of designing and dispersing biological weapons varies in difficulty depending on the biological agent in question. For instance, Bacillus anthracis, an exceptionally deadly and versatile pathogenic bacterium that causes the disease anthrax, is naturally occurring in the environment and can infect humans and animals. Anthrax has recently emerged from thawing permafrost due to the effects of climate change, and manages to persist in harsh climates and environments demonstrating its versatility.

Acquiring anthrax is relatively easy and its highly infectious spores can enter the body through inhalation of aerosols or ingestion via contaminated water supplies. Consequently, anthrax is considered one of the leading potential bioweapons. In 2001, five people in the United States died after receiving mail contaminated with anthrax — no one was caught or charged.

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Conversely, the employment of synthetic biology to engineer novel bioweapons from pre-existing pathogens using CRISPR or DNA synthesis is far more demanding in terms of laboratory requirements and expertise.

The manipulation and handling of these agents have been made more accessible by biotechnology companies competing aggressively for the attention of academic, corporate and government funding.

With strict deadlines and finite resources, researchers value methods that provide reproducible and reliable results. This has been especially encouraging for the development of new technologies like CRISPR, whose competitive market has made gene-editing accessible and cost effective.

Researchers have also supplemented their laboratories 3D-printed equipment, making complex instruments that were once costly and out-of-reach easily accessible to anyone interested in biotechnology. This allows the convenient development of weapons to occur anywhere from stringent, regulated laboratories to remote facilities and even in one’s own garage.

While countries like the U.S. and Russia inherited advanced biological weapons programmes from the Cold War, rogue nations like North Korea and terrorist organisations like al-Qaida are actively seeking to develop programs and infrastructure for their own use and deterrence against foreign interference. With easily obtainable and simple technologies, the ability to invest in an underground bioweapons program is widely available.

All that is necessary to bridge the gap is talent.

A common myth appears to exemplify terrorist members as being uneducated individuals. However, at its peak, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) recruited a variety of educated professionals ranging from engineers to medical doctors. ISIS operated in the Middle East as any nation state would, with municipal bureaucracies, tax collection, road-building, infrastructural developments and hospitals.

Terrorist organizations tend to have the same infrastructural and scientific capabilities as modern industrial nations, allowing them to potentially develop biochemical arsenals. The infrastructure requirements for biological weapons programs are also made easier by being comparatively cheaper and more versatile than a nuclear arsenal. This is largely because they can be masked by developments in medical industry, health and agricultural research.