Ukraine only forces the issue due to alliance concerns – Taiwan would not be reinforced in the same way
Goldstein ’23 [Lyle Goldstein, director of Asia Engagement at the Washington DC think tank, Defense Priorities. He is also a visiting professor at the Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs at Brown University. Goldstein previously served 20 years as research professor at the US Naval War College, where he received the Superior Civilian Service Medal for his pioneering research on Chinese military development. 3-13-2023, "The trouble with Taiwan," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-03/the-trouble-with-taiwan/, St. Mark's School of Texas, Ashrit Manduva '24]
While the tragedy of the Ukraine war might well have injected some caution into Chinese thinking, it has also likely made the Taiwan question more acute in some respects. Beijing has had concerns about the NATO alliance going back well before the Ukraine war, but Chinese leaders are clearly quite sympathetic to Russia’s objections to the Western alliance developing further strong points in its immediate backyard.
For Beijing, an analogous logic and very similar sensitivity applies to Taiwan’s status. Yet, the analogy could also be misleading in some ways, including for Western strategists. After all, unlike Ukraine, Taiwan likely could not be reinforced during a war since it will almost surely be blockaded and thus completely isolated. The island is also about 15 times smaller than Ukraine, while China’s military budget is considerably larger than that of Russia. In short, the Ukraine war has likely not saved Taiwan.