PI provides incentives for non-productive sectors, meaning it won’t collapse the economy.

A fourth objection to PI focuses on the economic consequences of redistributive programme. The most important criticism is that PI could displace workers who would normally take those jobs. PI would work then as a mechanism to obtain people's labour at lower wages than the market rate (Evers 1990, xxxiii). In an answer to this objection, it should be pointed out that a PI programme should be designed to provide services that neither the market nor the government performs. This is, of course, highly contextual, as some tasks that are performed in Community A either through the market or through government services may be performed by neither of them in Community B. Care work is an example of a service that can be carried out through different mechanisms (public care support, private market agents, volunteers, etc.) that vary from society to society. This is true for a variety of services that can be provided through a PI programme. The key point, however, is that in some contexts many important services and activities are provided in only a limited way by either the market or the government. For instance, when the potential for profit is too small, markets may not be the most adequate institutions for addressing social needs. Moreover, even when the market provides some of those services, their costs can be unaffordable for those who need it most.

Addressing educational needs (e.g. literacy instruction, computer instruction, after school programmes for children), planting public gardens, performing neighbourhood cleanups and providing care for the elderly and the homeless are just some suggestions of the kinds of work that markets may not provide but that PI recipients could. In any case, the key for avoiding this type of problem is to find a proper mechanism to elaborate the list of activities that can entitle someone to PI. For example, a list that is designed via a mechanism similar to the participatory budget experiences should take into consideration the demands of union representatives and other stakeholders. As Fabre (2006, 68) points out, large-scale civic service programmes solve this problem by stipulating the participation of union representatives on the boards or commissions in charge of the services. As is the case with most civic service programmes, the feasibility of PI depends on its capacity to consider and accommodate the demands of various interests groups of interference.

To this day, we do not know nearly enough about Pi's potential economic impact. In contrast to other redistributive schemes, PI programmes have barely been studied.16 The experiences of civic service programmes can help us to better understand the main administrative and economic challenges that PI could eventually face. For example, different studies have shown that civic service programmes can be cost-effective. Communities can benefit significantly from volunteers' services (Perry and Thomson 2004; Frumkin and Jastrzab 2010, 217). There is a need for further debate about the economic impact of PI con- ceived as an extended civic programme, and in particular about its dynamic interactions with the labour market.