PI avoids politics since it is perceived as more fair than unconditional policies.
Muñoz 18 [Dr. Cristian Pérez Muñoz, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida; “Participation Income and the Provision of Socially Valuable Activities”; 5/4/18; The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 2; https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-923X.12510]//dollinger
Atkinson believed that his PI proposal would be immune to the objections of reciprocity and exploitation made against UBI.5 These objections directly point to the unconditional character of a UBI. For example, according to Stuart White, an income that is paid unconditionally violates the principle of fair reciprocity. For others, the unconditional character of a UBI can lead to a situation whereby workers are exploited by people who live without contributing their fair share. Atkinson takes these objections into account and suggests that the political feasibility of UBI programmes depends fundamentally on the incorporation of some form of conditionality.6 More recently, Atkinson also embraced a normative objection against unconditionality.7 His concern here is not only with the political feasibility of UBI, but also with the possibility that unconditionality may produce dependence.
PI recipients are required to perform some socially useful or valuable activity in exchange for receiving this cash transfer. Atkinson does not offer a detailed list of the types of activities that should be included in the list of socially valuable activities. Rather, he provides a very broad and vague list. A key point in his proposal is that a PI does not compel its beneficiaries to enter into the formal paid job market as required by workfare programmes. Instead, a PI rewards socially useful activities that are often performed without any monetary compensation in return.