Discourse about the threat of bioterror problem marginalizes the culpability of whiteness – and the securitization of bioterrorism makes their impacts inevitable

As has been theorized by cultural studies scholars, discourse— or ways of speaking about the world—constrains and limits the way that knowledge is constructed. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall defines discourse as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed” (Hall 1992, 291). Dominant discourse marginalizes explanations—in this case the culpability of white masculinity—that do not fit its dictates. Discourse is connected to power: knowledge production promotes some power arrangements over others. Again I cite Hall, who draws on social theorist Michel Foucault to explain the connection between thought and action, between language and Introduction 3 practice: “Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But it is itself produced by a practice: ‘discursive practice’— the practice of producing meaning. Since all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect. So discourse enters into and influences all social practices” (Hall 1992, 291). Discourse, then, has material effects; it is in fact formative of the material. Failure to problematize white masculinity in the anthrax case supported existing arrangements keeping white men in power—in the high-level U.S. biodefense industry, and at the helm of the U.S. national security apparatus more generally.8 Discourse surrounding the anthrax mailings not only marginalized the culpability of white masculinity; it also carefully bounded discussions about the vast research industry from which the anthrax came. The biodefense research apparatus spanned government, university, and industry labs, where bioscientists, mainly microbiologists, toil away on dangerous pathogens—in the name of national security. Over the course of the nearly nine-year anthrax investigation, the mass news media brought attention to the industry’s ongoing lab accidents—accidental exposures, lab leakages, and unintentional shipments of live germs instead of dead ones. Media attention peaked in 2006, when several lab workers at Texas A&M University were exposed to and infected with Q fever and brucellosis, resulting in the lab’s temporary suspension of activities. In response, federal officials insisted that the gains for national security outweighed the costs; security pundits concentrated on better training for scientists to reduce accidents. Absent among the proposed solutions, however, was a deeper questioning of the merits of the industry itself: What purpose does an active U.S. biodefense program serve?