Islamophobia is inseparable from the worst kind of racism, actualizing structural and psychic violence.

Another debate surrounding Islamophobia is its consideration as racism like anti-Semitism. Some stakeholders resist its referral as racism because racism essentially deals with immutable, innate features such as skin color, whereas religion can be subject to change. One can move from one to another. Other interlocutors consider this viewpoint as limited in conceptualizing racism due to its multifacetedness and dynamism. In other words, it is not exclusively biological--there is cultural racism too. The ultimate determinant here is culture, to which religion is subsumable. Because of common religious practices/markers and similar physical features, Muslims, especially those from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Algeria, are often considered as an ethnic entity in most Western countries. That is why the spycams of the War on Terror and intelligence agencies target their homes more; they are stopped and searched by police on the street more; they are investigated at airports more etc (Bazian, 2018; Nazroo & Becare, 2017; Saeed, 2007; Sarwar & Raj, 2016; Alexander, 2017). Furthermore, Meer and Modood (2009) noted that what biological racism pundits miss is the fact that one has no choice in regard the religion of the family or country one is born into. Often orchestrated by far-right groups, this new form of racism saunters into the public sphere under the veneer of protecting national identity (English, white, Christian) and countering the negative effects of immigrant culture on the "superior culture"--here crime is often conflated with race (Perocco, 2018). Statistics about the level of antipathy against Muslims in both Europe and America are staggering and scary. A 2008 poll by Pew Research Center reveals that virtually one in every four Britons has a negative feeling about Muslims and Islam (see Pew (2008)). A follow-up survey by the same Center in 2016 found the pervasiveness of such feeling across Europe--where specifically 72% of Hungarian, 69% of Italian and 66% of Polish respondents revealed antipathy towards Muslims and Islam (see Pew (2016)). The picture is similar in the United States (see Pew (2017)). After 9/11, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia noticed a hike in violence and discrimination towards Muslims (Allen & Nielson, 2002). Specifically, Allen (2001, 2004) recounts how Muslim women were thrown off a moving bus or denied boarding, spat on and their hijabs torn publicly, or verbally assaulted on account of their faith in such countries as Germany, Italy, Denmark and the UK. Hasan (2015), on the other hand, discusses how Muslim men were repeatedly denied job and educational opportunities, particularly in Germany and France, while Power (2008) details their ordeals in workplaces, especially in France and Spain. The net effect is that Muslims become social anathema and pariah. Their participation in political space is consequently winnowed, if not blocked completely. On this basis, Dekker and van der Noll (2009) observed that Muslims generally have high poverty levels, below average education, live in poorer areas of towns and cities, are overrepresented in low-wage jobs and have little access to standard healthcare. They share these situations with other minority communities such as blacks, Irish, Hindus, Boers and Latinos (Fabregat & Kperogi, 2018; Halliday, 1993). However, what makes Muslims stand out according to Perroco (2018), is that theirs "is the deepest, most acute and widely spread form of racism" (p. 26); in the words of Nazroo and Becare (2017, p. 31), they "are repeatedly described as the social group most frequently discriminated against." The cumulative effects of all this bears on their mental and physical health (Nazroo & Becare, 2017). The duo's research and those of their peers found that "chronic exposure to everyday racial discrimination is associated with poor sleep, coronary artery calcification and hormonal stress responses such as altered diurnal cortisol patterns and a higher cortisol awakening response" (Nazroo & Becare, 2017, p. 32). When all these are taken into cognizance, in addition to stringent policies targeting Muslim communities, the chances of their vulnerability to radicalization are very high (Dekker & van der Noll, 2009). During the BBC program (of February 14, 2019) "Salman Rushdie radicalized my generation," Alyas Karmani, among others, recollected how social rejection by his white liberal friends following their disgust over the fatwa against Rushdie, had pushed his journey to the fringed radical politics of "Islamic" identity. In other words, there is nexus, in practice, between the thesis of frustration-aggression theory and the cyclic interaction of structural and physical forms of violence.