Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

No impact to agroterror---its difficult and ineffective

Mauroni & Norton ‘20 [Albert Mauroni and Robert Norton, Mauroni is the director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. Norton is a professor at Auburn University and currently serves as coordinator of National Security Initiatives in the Auburn University Open Source Intelligence Laboratory and program director of the Futures Laboratory, a collaborative effort between Auburn University, Auburn University at Montgomery and Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, August 2020, “Agroterrorism: National Defense Assessment, Strategies, and Capabilities,” Air University https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CSDS/books/Agroterror%20book%20final.pdf?ver=VUan7LtQ1Dx2nHW0IQFWIw%3D%3D, St. Mark’s School of Texas, Ashrit Manduva ’24—Thanks Gautam]

Despite the many fears of agroterrorism, such attacks are uncommon and rarely cause significant damage when they do occur. The picture would not change greatly even if agroterrorism was broadly defined to include not just attacks on crops and farm animals, but also those aimed at forestry, food processing, and draft animals for use as transport. Nor does the picture change appreciably when the range of violent actors is extended to include state use in armed conflict, covert state terrorist-like attacks, and criminal acts for personal gain. As John Parachini noted in 2003, “There are surprisingly few historical examples of intentional attacks by subnational actors or states against agricultural production and food processing.” 1 Almost all known terrorist attacks on agriculture employing chemical or biological agents have been small scale, consisting of a single attack inflicting limited damage, or multiple small-scale attacks, generally ineffective.

There was only a single significant example of a country attacking agriculture using chemical or biological agents warranting closer examination: the development and employment of herbicides by the United States military before and during the Vietnam War. While the main goal was destroying vegetation giving cover to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, the herbicides also targeted crops used by the Viet Cong to support their operations. Accordingly, this survey of agroterrorism starts with a survey of state programs for attacking agriculture, followed by a short history of the U.S. program to provide insight into the complexities associated with mounting large-scale attacks on agriculture. Although other countries, such as the Soviet Union, certainly devoted effort to agricultural attack capabilities, extensive, publicly available archival records exist only for the U.S. program. Only following that is the incidence of agroterrorism reviewed.

State Covert Attacks on Agriculture

During the 20th century, several countries organized programs to use biological and chemical agents for attacking agricultural targets. Most of these programs sought to find means to covertly employ plant and animal pathogens, although not necessarily against food. France researched such capabilities during the First World War and subsequently during the interwar period. Discovery of this research after France’s defeat in 1940 led to similar endeavors in Germany, although no formal program resulted. Both Britain and the United States organized anti-agriculture programs during the Second World War. The only product of that work was a large number of anthrax cakes that the British kept for retaliatory 6 attacks if the Germans employed biological agents by releasing them over German farms, expecting that cattle would consume them and die from anthrax. Instead of relying primarily on pathogens, as will be discussed in more detail below, the United States focused increasing attention on chemical substances for killing plants. After the Second World War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq are known to have had components of their biological weapons programs targeted at agriculture.2

There are many claims that one country or another used biological agents to attack the agricultural resources of another. Most of these allegations are patently false, and many were deliberately crafted lies, components of disinformation campaigns. However, there have been a handful of incidents and campaigns for which there is credible evidence.

That people worried about the threat is evident from the beginning of the 20th century. During the Boer War, a 1901 London newspaper report, apparently based on rumors originating in New Orleans, claimed that Boer agents operating in the United States had deliberately infected horses and mules purchased for use by the British Army in South Africa with the organism responsible for glanders. A similar story circulated the next year.4 There is no evidence to support those claims.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.