Even if reps do shape reality, policies shape the way we use language afterwards – they have it the wrong way around.

Postmodernism as Object and Attitude. The idea of postmodernism can be understood in two related but distinct ways: as object and as attitude (Cloke, Philo, and Sadler 1991:170- 201). As object, postmodernism is about ontol- ogy-a description of our world. It claims that "the modern world" has changed qualitatively in the last 25 years. The center has given way to a fragmented world of politics of difference: voices from the margin, pastiche in art and architecture, post-Fordist capital accumulation, rapid information technology, bewildering va- riety in the marketplace, and accelerated con- sumption (Young 1990; Lyotard 1979; Harvey 1989; Xenos 1989; Poster 1990).1 As attitude, postmodernism is a theoretical and repre- sentational mood (Waugh 1992)-a mood of skepticism with modern certainties. As atti- tude, postmodernism is about epistemology- how we know what we know. It questions the nature of reason, objectivity, truth, repre- sentation, and humanism. It questions the auThis content downloaded from 104.28.153.123 on Thu, 29 Jun 2023 19:07:07 +00:00 All use subject to https:/ 708 Yapa thority of social science to diagnose social ills and recommend policy (Roseneau 1992). It is this latter sense of postmodernism that is the concern here. Important and interesting as they are, I do not pursue ontological questions of the postmodern condition in this paper.2 Some may argue that the distinction be- tween postmodernism as object (ontology) and attitude (epistemology) is false because the postmodern mood is a reflection of underlying material changes in society. This is certainly the view of Jameson (1984), who sees postmod- ernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism. For Harvey (1989), too, postmodernity is a cul- tural condition reflecting the new economic logic of flexible accumulation and the disori- enting sense of accelerated compression of space and time. Without contesting the validity of these theses, I contend that postmodern attitudes raise important questions about the nature of signs, representation, language, power, and policy. Their relevance does not depend on the empirical status of postmoder- nity as condition. Postmodernism as epistemology argues that social science cannot serve as "a mirror of so- ciety." Knowledge arises out of embodiment in society; it always has and always will.3 Social science and society bear a codependent and necessary symbiotic relationship to each other. The relation of society to social science occurs as both object and subject-a central issue whose implications have not been sufficiently recognized by social scientists. According to Foucault (1 973b), "Man' provides not only the object of social science but also the conditions under which that knowledge is acquired. Cousins and Hussain (1984:50), commenting on Foucault's thoughts, observe that "this ten- sion cannot be said to be one which can be resolved. No conceptual advance, no empirical finding within the social sciences, can resolve it. The tension is constitutive of the human sciences as such.' My comment is not to say that social science is inferior to natural science in this; it is to say that social science is not, was not, nor need be "value-free" in order to be useful knowledge. Postmodernizing Social Science. Postmod- ern contentions can help us make explicit the codependent relationship between social sci- ence and society. For now I shall describe this as the postmodernizing of social science. We can implement this project: 1) by pointing out the constructivist nature of social processes (Lyotard 1979); 2) by insisting that social sci- ence's epistemology be more reflexive on how it knows (Aronowitz 1988; Proctor 1991); 3) by admitting that "data" do not exist inde- pendent of our social theory (Sayer 1992; Gre- gory 1978); 4) by recognizing language's im- portant role in cognition (Derrida 1978; Sarup 1988:6-62); 5) by working within the bounds defined by semiotics which denies an unam- biguous correspondence between a sign and what it signifies (Gottdiener 1994); 6) by trac- ing the history of disciplines such as sociology, economics, and geography to show that basic categories such as deviancy, social mobility, re- sources, scarcity, and region do not carry uni- versal meanings valid for all cultures and social groups (Foucault 1973a; Livingstone 1992; Smith and Godlewska 1994; Merchant 1983; Sachs 1992); and 7) by acknowledging that power is deeply implicated in the production and use of social-science knowledge (Proctor 1995; Rouse 1987; Foucault 1980).4 But this said, why is the postmodernizing of social sci- ence (and society) relevant for Third World poverty? It is my contention that academic un- derstandings of poverty and their repre- sentations in our textbooks and policy reports lie at the heart of the story. Discourse theory can help us understand why poverty cannot be alleviated within the epistemology of con- ventional social science. Skeptics and Affirmatives. Reading post- modern writers such as Lyotard, Derrida, Fou- cault, and Baudrillard is difficult. The writing is technical, dense, and opaque, and their con- clusions are often divergent and even contra- dictory. According to Roseneau (1992:15), "within this diversity of post-modern pro- nouncements, as far as the social sciences are concerned, two broad, general orientations, the skeptical post-modernists and the affirma- tive post-modernists, can be delineated.' The skeptical postmodernists offer a gloomy, nega- tive assessment of the contemporary world as one of fragmentation, malaise, and meaning- lessness; hence, no political project is worthy of commitment. Roseneau (1992:15) believes that the skeptics are inspired by Continental European philosophers, especially Nietzsche; they practice a form of politics of despair; they speak of the death of the subject and author, This content downloaded from 104.28.153.123 on Thu, 29 Jun 2023 19:07:07 +00:00 All use subject to https:/ What Causes Poverty? 709 the impossibility of knowing truth, and the abolition of social science. The affirmative post- modernists share this sense of disenchantment with modernity and the failed promises of the Enlightenment. Yet, they retain a more hopeful, optimistic view of postmodernism's possibili- ties. They are open to, and participate in, is- sue-specific social movements; they eschew the relativist stance of "anything goes"; they take ethical stands and make normative choices. Roseneau's (1 992) distinction suggests that much of the hostility shown toward post- modern theorizing has arisen from a failure to appreciate the distinction between the affirma- tives and the skeptics. The Nexus of Production Relations The analytical scheme used here is "the nexus of production relations" (Yapa 1996; Yapa and Wisner 1995). Production is an economic activity only in the narrowest sense of the word because it includes far more than technology, goods, and markets. Production is conducted within a network of discursive and nondiscursive relations-technical, social, ecological, cul- tural, political, and academic-whose under- standing is distorted by subject-specific views of reductionist science (Figure 1). I have bor- rowed the term "production relations" from Marx (1989 [1869]). In doing so, I have ex- tended the term's meaning beyond the "so- cial," its original usage. I have consciously tried to avoid the problems of the Marxian scheme of associating social relations with the eco- nomic base, and matters of culture, knowl- edge, and ideology with the superstructure; I explore the interactions among these relations without regard for those that may be more determinate or "essential."5 These relations should not be conceived of as discrete analyti- cal categories; depending on the purpose at hand, any node may be subdivided or a new one added. These relations act and react upon each other constantly to maintain a dynamic system of mutually constituted elements. An entity that appears to be technological from one angle or at one time may be thought of as academic or social from another angle or time, The nexus of production relations of poverty ACADEMIC ECOLOGICAL TECHNICAL POLITICAL SOCIAL LTURAL Figure 1. The nexus of production relations of povThis content downloaded from 104.28.153.123 on Thu, 29 Jun 2023 19:07:07 +00:00 All use subject to https:/ 710 Yapa or what appears to be academic may be better treated with language that is social or cultural, and so on. The diagram of the nexus should not be misconstrued. All nodes are not equally important for a given outcome, but the relative ranking of relations is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In any event, the nexus of production shown in Figure 1 is not a model of economic reality; it is a discursive device constructed to enable a conversation about poverty. The phrase "technical relations of production" refers to a concept similar to Marx's forces of production, in which he included raw materials, resources, labor, and technology used in production (Marx 1989 [1869]). I prefer the term "technical relations" to call attention to the fact that attrib- utes of production forces are determined in a larger context (i.e., by other relations) in which production occurs. The term "social relations of production" is used in a manner identical to its use in Marxian economics, where it refers to ownership of the means of production, the manner in which the means of production are utilized, and the rules for the social distribution of the final product (Marx 1989 [1869]). Pro- duction requires matter and energy as inputs and a repository to hold waste materials, chemicals, and heat, setting in motion a myriad of interactions with the biophysical environ- ment-"the ecological relations of production." The phrase "cultural relations of production" refers to the interaction of production with "the ways of life" of social groups as embodied in shared meaning, beliefs, values, symbols, signs, and language. "Political relations of pro- duction" include interactions between the state and society in the organization of economic activity. The state plays a key role in resource allocation in both centrally planned and market economies. In Third World economies the state has come to play an all-pervasive role in civil society through its command over the de- velopment project. The concept of "academic relations of production" is central to a post- modern view of poverty. Academic relations are of two kinds: internal and external. Internal relations arise from the understanding science has of itself in the production of knowledge. Mainstream social science claims that its work is neutral, value-free, and nonpolitical (Proctor 1991), and that its norms and standards are self-evident (Aronowitz 1988). The postmod- ern critique of social science arises largely from science's image of itself. External academic re- lations refer to the discourses that are pro- duced at other sites in the nexus: technical, social, cultural, political, and ecological-where our understanding of technology, property, culture, the state, and nature is mediated through social theories produced about these matters (Demeritt 1994). Thus each node of the nexus is the site of both discursive and nondiscursive practices. Language and discourse make us conscious of material processes (practice), but the form of that understanding (how we know) is influenced by both material processes and choice of language. The relation between dis- course and material is not confined to the in- tellectual task of providing an understanding of material; by acting on our understanding, dis- course affects practice (the material). More- over, discourse is not conducted under rules of free inquiry; it is constructed out of, and constrained by, the very material circum- stances that it studies. It is this sense that Fou- cault tries to capture in the couplet "dis- course/practice"; this is also the sense that I wish to communicate through the use of the term "discursive materialism." I shall give a brief example to clarify the use of this term. A given distribution of land ownership is usually thought of as a social relation of production. But the persistence of a specific land distribu- tion is facilitated through a dense network of discursive practices-laws of property, land- use zoning, theories of land rent, efficiency of farm size, and so on. Thus an effort to reform a particular land distribution must overcome objections raised in discursive realms that are not directly connected to land ownership. So is landownership a social relation? a material relation? or a discursive relation? The answer is that it is all of these because it exists in a space of discursive materialism.

 Representations don’t shape subjectivity – plethora of alt causes

Beach 13; Beach J. M., 2013, "Subjectivity, Culture, & Common Sense — 21st century literacy," 21st century literacy, MYH

We do not see the world clearly, and we do not completely understand what we see. Our mind is not a “mirror of nature,” as many early theologians, philosophers, and scientists assumed (Abrams, 1953; Rorty, 1979; Polanyi, 1964). Human consciousness is not a passive receptor of experience, like a mirror simply reflecting an image of the real world. Instead our consciousness is like a lamp shining on the real world, but coloring what we see with the light of our own unique vision. Our consciousness actively engagejes with experience through our perceptual process in order to create knowledge, meaning, and values. Our brain connects the "fragments of knowledge" we experience into a coherent narrative. We understand our experience through our meanings and values, thereby, making our knowledge useful (Kahneman, 2011, p. 75). Consciousness also colors our experience with emotion, which helps us remember important events and give them meaning (Pinker, 1997). Our perception does not directly reflect the reality of the world we experience. Instead, we see a subjective world that is mediated by our biological brain and also by our culture.

2. We all inherit ways of thinking and acting that are particular to our unique social context. We call these ways of thinking and acting culture. We mimic the actions and beliefs of the individuals who shape us, such as our parents, peers, teachers, priests. Culture also includes larger social institutions that mold our behavior, such as families, schools, churches, organizations, and governments. Culture entails the language we speak, the customs we practice, and the beliefs we think are true (Geertz, 1973/2000; 1983/2000). All of this makes up our "social heritage" (D'Andrade, 2002, p. 223). Culture is a tool. It is a large assembly of "technological and social innovations" (Pinker, 2002, p. 65-66), which fosters our development as human beings, gives us meaningful lives, and helps us survive (Nussbaum, 1997).

3. While we are born into a culture, we have the power to accept and reject the various sub-cultures to which we are exposed. We can shape our own individual identity and character. Social scientists call this phenomenon subjectivity. Our subjectivity is our own unique identity and personal world view. But we are influenced by others in our culture, and since we seek to be like our friends and family, our subjectivity will be very similar to those around us. We use our subjectivity to understand our world, create knowledge, and communicate with others. Our subjectivity co-creates experience with the objective world and our minds create what has been called "subjective realism" (Flanagan, 2011, p. 66). The phenomena we see and experience (Kant, 1781/1994, p. 48) is real to us. It appears real, although it might not be objectively real; therefore, other people might not be able to verify what we see and believe.

4. While subjectivity enables us to live a rich and meaningful life, it can also cause many problems. Our brain can often misperceive the objective world, and these misperceptions can lead us to make bad decisions (Kahneman, 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). For instance, we might hear a noise at night and believe there is a burglar in our house. We might see a weird flying shape in the sky and believe it to be a UFO. We might see a political protester burn a flag and believe the act to be unpatriotic. We might see a soldier step on a Qur'an and believe the act to be sacrilegious and an affront against our God. The conclusions reached in each of these examples may or may not be objectively true, but every example is subjectively true: the individual believed the phenomenon to be true as he or she experienced it. In each case the culture of the individual shapes perception, which leads the individual to classify experience in a particular way. Prior belief in house burglars, UFOs, a patriotic ideal, or a religious code would lead an individual to classify new experience with these frames of reference. This process of framing is all part of a normal functioning brain.

5. Outside of subjective framing, our brains can also malfunction or become damaged. Such malfunctioning can lead to false perceptions that can exacerbate the problem of subjectivity. The brain perceives a phenomenon that seems very real, but which is a product of the brain itself and does not objectively exist in the real world. Such malfunctioning might include color blindness, schizophrenia, or autism. It could include deliberate malfunctioning, such as taking mind altering drugs. It could also include being manipulated to believe a false memory, but really all our memories falsify reality even when the brain is working properly. We all tend to believe that our unique subjective vision represents the objective world as it really exists. But, in fact, the phenomenon we see is more of a product of our own brain rather than the objective world we partially (and imperfectly) perceive or remember. Even when it's fully functional, our biological brain does not work very well. It is, as behavioral economist Dan Ariely (2008) points out, "predictably irrational" (p. xx). We often make "naive, random" decisions based on "gut feelings," which can be "self destructive" (pp. 45, 53, 166), and even the brains of experts and scientists fall prey to these same flaws (p. 197). We are all, as one reporter explained, "confident idiots." Dan Ariely (2008) concluded his bestselling book on the brain by saying, "We are pawns in a game whose forces we largely fail to comprehend. We usually think of ourselves as sitting in the driver's seat, with ultimate control over the decisions we make and the directions our life takes but, alas, this perception has more to do with our desires - with how we view ourselves - than with reality" (p. 321).