Callon’s performance theory needs more nuance. Boldyrev & Svetlova 16

But where does this vagueness really come from? A characteristic way to challenge the performativity thesis is to claim that the ‘pure’ cases of performativity in its most interesting, ‘strong,’ or ‘Barnesian’ form— when the reality, after being represented by economics, converges with its theoretical portrayal—are rather rare and it is thus not clear why the rest should interest us (Santos and Rodrigues 2009). For coming to grips with performativity, it is essential to recognize that these critics often repro- duce the ‘linear’ view of innovation Callon (2007b, 312ff.) so fiercely rejects. This view implies that there is a separate entity called ‘economics’ (or a group called ‘economists’) that should have real ‘effects’ and exert ‘influence.’ However, the ANT perspective rejects this simple unilateral causation and treats economics as a Hegelian ‘moment’ in the complex heterogeneous world (or network, as Callon and Latour would say)— in the totality of devices, theoretical claims, policy briefs, university text- books, experimental practices, statistical measures, ratings, rules, and so on.12 What really matters for Callon and his followers is the back-and- forth, uncertain, and staggering movement of performation—for which nothing can be guaranteed. But it does not mean that the attempts to perform economic ideas do not exist. They all should be accounted for— within a more nuanced perspective on economics, markets, and society as their general frame or element. And it is this nuanced perspective that should both overcome Callon’s alleged naïveté when treating ‘economics’ as ‘economics at large’ (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2008), and provide non- trivial answers to the familiar question on why some forms of knowledge become performative while others do not.