Their conception of framework corrupts objectivity ruining the value of social science- allowing interfield critique is crucial

(Mary, Prof @ Rutgers, Policy discourse as sanctioned ignorance: theorizing the erasure of feminist knowledge Critical Policy Studies Vol. 3, Nos. 3–4, October–December 2009 )

Drawing insights from post-positivist philosophy of science, feminist scholars have advanced trenchant critiques of positivist conceptions of objectivity, but they have not abandoned conceptions of objectivity tout court. Feminist scholars have pointed out that traditional conceptions of objectivity have relied upon adherence to research methods designed to control for individual idiosyncrasy as the key to attaining objective knowledge, that is, knowledge free from distortion, bias, error, self-interest, and caprice. Yet, observations, beliefs, theories, methods of inquiry, and institutional practices routinely labeled ‘objective’ fall far short of the norm. Challenging the conviction that the central problem of objectivity lies with the emotional and perceptual quirks of the subjective self that distort, confuse, and interfere with objective apprehension of reality, feminists scholars have pointed out a remarkable uniformity in the kinds of distortion that impede the acquisition of truth. Shared cultural values such as racism, sexism, and heteronormativity pose powerful obstacles to the achievement of objectivity. Incorporated within the consciousness of individuals within a particular society, these values easily escape detection precisely because they are shared. When objectivity is defined as ‘intersubjective corroboration’, as it is in the dominant approaches to philosophy of science, the distortions introduced by shared social values escape detection. Feminist philosophers have advanced an account of ‘social knowledge’ (Longino 1990) as a key hindrance to the attainment of objectivity. The conviction that the central problem of objectivity lies with the emotional and perceptual quirks of the subjective self that distort, confuse, and interfere with objective apprehension of phenomena neglects the social dimensions of inner consciousness. Situating the issue of objectivity in a contest between the inner self and external reality masks the social constitution of subjectivity. The recurrence of a profound degree of sexism and racism that filters perceptions, mediates philosophical arguments, structures research hypotheses, and ‘stabilizes inquiry by providing assumptions that highlight certain kinds of observations and experiments in light of which data are taken as evidence for hypotheses’ (Longino 1990, p. 99) indicates a remarkable uniformity in the kinds of distortion that impede the acquisition of truth. Such uniformity challenges the myth of radical idiosyncrasy. One need not be committed to the full implications of Foucault’s view of subjectivity as normalizing practice to accept the feminist argument that even one’s innermost consciousness is culturally freighted. If social values incorporated within individual consciousness present an important obstacle to objective knowledge, then norms of objectivity that blind the individual to their role or assure the individual that intersubjective consensus is a sufficient remedy will fail to produce objective accounts of the world. For if certain social values structure conceptions of self and perceptions of the social and natural worlds, then neither isolated acts of pure intellect nor intersubjective testing will suffice to identify them. On the contrary, the belief that idiosyncrasy is the fundamental obstacle to objectivity will preclude detailed investigations of shared assumptions and observations as well as intersubjectively verified theories. Rather than being perceived as a potential source of error, values such as sexism and racism that are widely held will escape critical reflection. Their very popularity will be taken to certify their validity, thereby truncating further inquiry into their merits. Feminist scholars have illuminated the numerous points at which social values infiltrate scientific discourses. Helen Longino (1990) has drawn upon these insights to develop an account of objectivity that can coexist with a clear understanding of the social and cultural construction of science. Longino identifies the crucial role played by social values in framing research questions, characterizing the objects of inquiry, accrediting forms of explanation, demarcating credible evidence, structuring modes of argumentation, and reducing a discipline’s vulnerability to maverick claims. The point of Longino’s investigation is not to demonstrate the impossibility of objectivity, but rather to illuminate the complexity of attaining it. Only heightened awareness of the multiple sources of error and the complexity of problems of knowledge can sustain adequate strategies to achieve objectivity. And only repudiation of naive faith that adherence to a simple method can guarantee the acquisition of truth can help cultivate the sophistication essential to objective inquiry. At the heart of this feminist conception of objectivity is a conception of cognition as a human practice, a conception that recognizes the complex interaction among traditional assumptions, social norms, theoretical conceptions, disciplinary strictures, linguistic possibilities, emotional dispositions, and creative impositions in every act of cognition. Operating in the context of cognition as complex social practice, the quest for objectivity entails the cultivation of the intellect. To track the multiple sources of error in a specific field of inquiry requires far more than intellectual engagement within a narrow sphere of specialization. Sensitivity to distortion and bias presupposes an intellect informed by systematic study of a chosen field, familiar with strengths and weaknesses of a wide range of methodological tools, and sufficiently knowledgeable across disciplines to analyze the role of social values in constituting the research object (Hawkesworth 1989, Alcoff 2000). A capacity for critical reflection is central to this feminist conception of objectivity, but it is not the sole requirement. Intersubjective critique also plays a key role. ‘A method of inquiry is objective to the extent that it permits transformative criticism’ (Longino 1990, p. 75). The point of intersubjective criticism within this framework is not the confirmation of shared assumptions about what is normal, natural, or real, but rather to subject precisely what seems least problematic to critical scrutiny. Awareness of the role of social values in naturalizing oppressive practices, leads feminists to emphasize the importance of a particular version of critical intersubjectivity in probing tacit assumptions and foundational beliefs of various disciplines. If objective inquiry is dependent upon systematic probing of precisely that which appears unproblematic, then who does the probing may be a matter of central concern to those committed to objective inquiry. For what is taken as given, what appears to be natural, what seems to fall outside the legitimate field of investigation may be related to the gender, race, class, and historical situatedness of the investigator. Feminist scholars have argued that the attainment of objectivity by means of probing and sophisticated intersubjective critique has implications that transcend the quest for an appropriate intellectual procedure. Convinced that ‘methodological constraints are inadequate to the task of ruling values out of scientific inquiry’ (Longino 1990, p. 15), feminists have argued that objectivity demands inclusivity. Objective inquiry cannot be attained within the preserve of privilege – whether it be the privilege of whites, Westerners, the middle class, or men. The feminist argument for the inclusion of women and people of color within academic disciplines can thus be understood in terms of the demands of objectivity. To the extent that social values mediate perception and explanation, exclusionary practices can only help insulate questionable assumptions from scrutiny. A commitment to objectivity conceived as sophisticated intersubjective critique embraces diversity as a means. More and different guides to the labyrinths of reality may help us to confront the contentious assumptions most deeply entrenched in our conceptual apparatus. The inclusion of people from different social backgrounds, different cultures, different linguistic communities, and different genders within science and philosophy cannot guarantee, but might foster, sustained critique of problematic assumptions long entrenched in the academic disciplines (Alcoff 2000). A feminist conception of objectivity does not offer an authoritative technique that can guarantee the production of truth. In lieu of a simple method, it calls for the cultivation of sound intellectual judgment. It demands a level of sophistication that can be cultivated only by sustained study across an array of disciplines. It presupposes a reconceptualization of the relation between inner self and external world. Moreover, it demands the expansion of the scientific and philosophical communities to encompass formerly excluded groups. Thus this feminist conception of objectivity cannot be easily attained. It remains at odds with the excessive specialization of contemporary academic training, with the naive conviction that truth lies in the application of an accredited method, and with the renewed commitment to preserve white, middle-class, male hegemony in philosophy, science, and society at large. Despite such marked differences from dominant trends, the strength of this feminist conception of objectivity lies in its promise of fostering the benign aspirations and objectives of objectivity where traditional conceptions have failed. (281-3)