Their attempted "middle ground" erases epistemological differences and reifies positivist problem solving theory- the alternative better captures their offense through pluralism

(J. Ann, Continuing the Conversation... , International Studies Quarterly 42)

Let me begin by complementing Robert Keohane on his understanding of gender relations and his agility in deploying feminist rhetoric against my argument. Keohane’s replacement of my dichotomies with continua (Keohane, 1998:194) and his claim that the ends of these continua are not the optimal places to rest one’s perspective—that a sophisticated view of science overcomes dichotomies and “forces the investigator to make interrelated choices about purposes, subject matter, and methods” (Keohane, 1998:195)—is a welcome opening to the recognition of the validity of critical perspectives. His description of late positivist or “neopositivist” scientific inquiry is a refreshing effort to take the positivist/post-positivist debate to a higher epistemological level. It is in this spirit that I critique Keohane’s response, suggesting several points which I will then integrate with Marchand’s. First, in arguing for areas of agreement between critical and problem-solving theories, Keohane is proposing an “inclusive middle”; he is more inclined to deny epistemological differences than to celebrate them. While acknowledging the usefulness of certain critical work, such as that of some constructivist scholars, 4 Keohane remains committed to an albeit broad definition of the basic method of the social sciences—formulating and testing hypotheses, making conjectures about causality, et cetera. It is precisely this epistemological orientation and many of its associated methodologies that many critical theorists and feminists critique and/or reject. A commitment to causal analysis does not acknowledge that interpretive traditions, or “understanding,” to use Hollis and Smith’s (1990) term, can also be scientific. Besides devaluing much recent feminist IR, this conception of social science also devalues European IR, much of which is neither positivist nor neopositivist.5 Since these epistemological divides are so fundamental, an “inclusive middle” is problematic, more so than Keohane would have us believe. In the U.S. at least, where to locate oneself epistemologically or methodologically depends not only on the condition of world politics, the state of knowledge, and the nature of the problem to be investigated, as Keohane claims, but also on deeper issues of disciplinary legitimacy and career risks to which I referred earlier.6 Since, as I stated in my article, methodologies relevant for the construction of sophisticated interpretive analysis are not generally taught in U.S. IR graduate programs, the choice is often either not available or undertaken at considerable extra cost and effort. Robert Cox’s distinction between critical and problem-solving theory is also deeper than Keohane would have us believe. Keohane and I agree that Hans Morgenthau did not accept the prevailing order of Europe in the late 1930s. Nevertheless, Morgenthau’s attempts to explain these and other forces of aggression accorded with the realist position of acknowledging certain “universal truths” about humanity and the enduring structures of the international system and then searching for generalizable laws which can better explain them. The normative goal of this theoretical endeavor is an honorable one: that by better understanding the world we can more knowledgeably try to influence it and avoid its worst aberrations, such as those of the 1930s and 1940s7 Problem solving is important and necessary; few would deny this. Nevertheless, feminists and other critical theorists would want to address policy issues more critically and interpretively. A contemporary illustration of the related distinction between explanatory and interpretive theorizing8 can be found in the U.S. military’s recent report on the investigation of widespread sexual misconduct in its ranks. As solutions to these problems, the report urges more active leadership as well as better screening and training of drill sergeants (New York Times, 1997). While welcoming the military’s efforts to act, most feminists would claim that these problems are unlikely to go away until deeper gender hierarchies, out of which they arise, are diminished. These hierarchies are evident in somewhat extreme forms in a militarized masculinity characteristic of all or most armies as well as the society from which soldiers are drawn; they cannot be fully solved merely through better leadership selection and training. Unequal gender structures arise out of social practices deeply embedded in everyday life;9 ending them requires understanding how they are constructed and maintained by power structures that rely on “common sense” knowledge for their legitimation. The differences between problem solving and critical theorizing are, therefore, more fundamental than those largely methodological issues that Keohane addresses. (207-8)