Comparing different approaches to ontology allows for revisionary reform with society perception of the economy. Only ontology is capable of making lasting reforms and shaping our relationship to the economy by evaluating the nature of our current system.

One can pursue economic ontology in a variety of ways. They differ from one another in regard to the aims pursued, the theoretical resources employed, and the relationships envisaged between the substance of economics and general ontological doctrines. chapter 2 by Harold Kincaid deals with some of these issues. Economic ontology may be practised as an exercise in direct description of what is believed to be the fundamental nature of the economy, or it may be viewed as an exercise in describing or prescribing the ontological presuppositions underlying theoretical accounts of economic phenomena or the ontological convictions held by economists. In the first guise, it is an attempt to directly represent economic realities, while in the second mode, it is directly about economics and only indirectly about the economy. Another distinction is that between descriptive and revisionary ontology (Strawson 1959). We may pursue a description of the ontological categories and presuppositions that we, or some others, work with. Given that much of the ontological underworld in our belief systems is implicit and hidden, the task of articulating it in explicit and systematic form may not be easy. Descriptive ontology in this sense is a challenging project. Revisionary ontology, on the other hand, is an attempt to change, rather than just describe, the prevailing ontological categories and presuppositions of a belief system: it is a matter of constitutional revision. Examples of the latter include John Dupré's criticism of the ontology of mechanism in chapter 16; the suggestions to revise the ontology of economic agency in chapter 7 by John Davis; and Philip Pettit's re-articulation of the self-seeking economic man in terms of virtual reality in chapter 5. Most of the contributions to the present volume belong to descriptive rather than revisionary ontology. It is to be noted that these two endeavours do not exclude one another. In particular, if one wants to do revisionary ontology, say, in order to replace the prevailing ontological windows of certain branches of economics, one had better have accomplished an analysis in descriptive ontology so as to be in possession of an adequate account of the categories and presuppositions that underlie those parts of economics. Some critical writing on economics that has such a revisionary character is clearly not based on an adequate descriptive ontology. It is difficult to do good descriptive ontology. It is more difficult to do good revisionary ontology, based as it should be on sound descriptive ontology. These perspectives are connected with others, such as those of a priori and a posteriori approaches to economic ontology. One can do economic ontology in an a priori fashion by starting from some general philosophical ontology, then try to apply it to parts of economics in pursuit of description. If the fit is poor, one may then switch to a revisionary gear and propose that the ontological presuppositions of economics had better be changed so as to establish a better fit between economics and general ontological doctrine. Economic ontology in this mode may become an exercise in a priori imposition. Alternatively, one may proceed by way of empirical case studies in descriptive economic ontology so as to develop, in an a posteriori fashion, an accurate account of the actual ontological presuppositions of particular economic theories and the actual ontological commitments of particular econo-mists. By comparing these to one another and to the ontologies of other social sciences and scientists, one may then possibly end up with identifying interesting mismatches and using them to develop arguments of a revisionary kind.