Essentialism is sustained through the public/private divide that upholds mainstream economics. Looking at epistemology through a gendered lens via the K is a necessary corrective to the dualistic nature of economics and debate.

The mainstream model is part of a whole epistemological approach which is built on duals of which the male-female dual is only one (McCloskey ; Nelson ). The public/private dual, for example, leads to the household being ‘exclusively regarded as the place of consumer spending and saving, but not as the location where the labour force is reproduced and where gender norms are reinforced and reproduced’ (van Staveren : 277). Dualism extends to scientific practice itself, with the rigour of the mainstream scientific method presented as the dual of intuition, precision the dual of vagueness, objectivity the dual of subjectivity, and so on. The former are all traditionally thought of as ‘male’ characteristics, while the latter are all traditionally thought of as ‘female’ characteristics. The dualistic characterisation of gender feeds into a social/institutional process by which power is maldistributed, including cognitive power. The gender classification of characteristics is socially generated to a considerable extent. Indeed, if gendered nature is not in fact dualistic, then the ‘male’ characteristics do not apply universally to men, any more than the ‘female’ characteristics apply to all women. The implication of what has been discussed so far is that a feminist epistemology differs from the epistemology underlying male-dominated mainstream economics. But, as Richards () argues, if epistemology were to be represented as a normal distribution, male and female epistemologies would be overlapping distributions. Nevertheless the distributional means are sufficiently distinct to allow us to think in terms of each having a characteristic epistemology (on average). Indeed, there are many leading non-mainstream male economists who adopt a different epistemological stance from the conventional approach, associating themselves with an epistemology normally characterised as female (on Keynes, see Forster-Broten , and on Boulding, see McMaster ). Their epistemology followed from the prevalence of uncertainty in an open system (of knowledge and of society). Foster (, ) similarly explores the epistemology of evolutionary economics in relation to the uncertainty associated with an open, evolutionary social structure. Perhaps the key concept here is ‘otherness’ (Kaul ). In a dualistic framework employing a ‘masculine’ epistemology, women are ‘the other’; feminine characteristics are to be avoided, so that science can produce demonstrable truths to be held with certainty. But in a ‘feminine’ epistemology, to recognise otherness is not to reject ‘science’ but to recognise the situated nature of knowledge as a general phenomenon, i.e. an epistemology not peculiar to women. This naturally leads to thinking of knowledge as arising from human logic rather than deductivist classical logic, being provisional and subject to uncertainty, and something which requires persuasion, demonstration being impossible. This is the epistemology of the Scottish Enlightenment, which arose in the context of a country which had recently formed a union with a dominant neighbour—it was hard not to recognise otherness in such a situation. The significance of this ‘feminine’ epistemology extends from philosophy to practice: Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science … identif[y] ways in which dominant conceptions and practices of knowledge attribution, acquisition, and justification systematically disadvantage women and other subordinated groups, and strives to reform these conceptions and practices so that they serve the interests of these groups (Anderson ). The feminist cognitive approach governs the approach to building (provisional, uncertain) knowledge in macroeconomics. But it also governs behaviour with respect to knowledge in everyday practice, and particularly with respect to risk and uncertainty. Thus, for example, behavioural differences between genders have been found within the financial sector, leading to the Lehman Sisters Hypothesis that the collapse would not have happened if women had been in charge (see van Staveren , but see Nelson for a different view). Such studies must of course take account of the fact that the women being studied already operate within a system of power relations, in employment, in society and in the household. But, that gendered epistemic differences have been seen by some to persist is significant, given the scope a hierarchical society provides for epistemic injustice (Anderson ). 4 Gender as a focus for alternative approaches to macroeconomics There have been developments outside mainstream economics which are specifically addressed to gender issues, for example, the international movement to promote Gender Budgeting, to scrutinise government policy from a women’s perspective. Since women account for roughly half of the population, focusing on the rights of women is not exactly a minority interest. But the feminist literature demonstrates the wider macroeconomic implications of taking gender seriously than simple sectional interest. On one hand, focusing on gender sheds new light on consumption, saving and investment behaviour, as well as the more traditional feminist concerns with the labour market. On the other hand, the issues thrown up by considering economics from a feminist perspective resonate more widely within non-mainstream economics. It has been argued above that feminist epistemology potentially has much wider application. Indeed, the gender perspective provides a good context in which to consider how differently economics might be done. One set of issues is raised by considering the nature of the individual, individual identity and the individual in society: ‘[f]eminist theory questions objectivity in knowledge production, argues for the importance of lived experience, and requires us to grapple with interconnected identities’ (Forster-Broten : Abstract). As Davis () argues, identity is inherently social, undermining a dualistic categorisation of the individual and the social. Thus, gender identity is profoundly influenced by social norms. Further, interpersonal relationships, in the economy, in wider society and in the household, are conditioned by the social nature of identity. This perspective was addressed in Smith’s ([] 1976) Theory of Moral Sentiments, where he further developed Hume’s concept of sympathy. This human faculty employed the imagination, not only to understand experience from another’s perspective but also to arrive at moral judgement. The moral motivation for particular behaviours (such as caring for others) arises both from a sense of fellow feeling with the caree and also from a sense of social obligation within a particular social structure. It is the influence of the social, and the scope for broad generalisations (e.g. about the behaviour of women), which makes these characterisations of individual behaviour relevant to macroeconomics. That gendered analysis does not lend itself easily to deductivist mathematical formalism is not in itself a problem for an alternative epistemology. There may well be scope for mathematical formulations of particular arguments, to be put together with arguments arising from other methods. The key difference from a mainstream methodology is that in a Keynesian/feminist epistemology, a formal mathematical model cannot constitute a full argument with respect to a complex, open social system. The system is open not least because of the emergent nature of such key elements as gender, gendered behaviour and social norms.