“Petro-States” are twice as likely to go to war

While there has been much research on the effect of valuable natural resource extraction on a state’s domestic development (e.g., the “resource curse”), Wilson Center Fellow Jeff Colgan focuses on how natural resource extraction affects foreign policy. In 'Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War,' Colgan finds that “petrostates” – countries where revenue from oil exports exceeds 10 percent of GDP – are twice as likely to engage in inter-state conflict than non-petrostates.

“America has the unfortunate habit of getting into war with oil-exporting states,” said Colgan. Understanding the dynamics of petrostates’ aggressive behavior is therefore a vital security interest.

Low Risk, Little Reward

High oil revenue, due to its dependability and worth, reduces the risk of foreign policy adventurism, Colgan explained, because it lowers the domestic political accountability of leaders.

For example, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein launched an unpopular, expensive, and bloody eight-year war with Iran from 1980-88 and lost a devastating invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Despite these failures, Hussein remained in power until the United States invaded Iraq in 2003.

Likewise, Muammar Qaddafi involved Libya in violent clashes with Chad in the years between 1978 and 1987, sent soldiers to Tanzania and Uganda, and financed global terrorist networks, but remained in power for more than 40 years.

Regardless of whether or not the oil sector is nationalized, oil wealth is often controlled by the state, which leads to clientelism and bought-off political support, Colgan explained. In his book, Colgan writes that Qaddafi was able to benefit from Libya’s oil revenue with “political autonomy that would have been difficult in [oil’s] absence.” This wealth in turn supported his more aggressive tendencies: Libya’s military expenditures were as high as 25 percent of total revenues in some years.