A basic income will not cause women to leave the labor market – other factors are more important and existing welfare programs give much worse disincentives to women workers.

At the same time, predictions of a drop in women's labor force participation may also be overstated. Sociological and heterodox economic perspectives have emphasized broader motivations other than income regarding labor force participation, such as status, satisfaction, and other less tangible benefits. The incentive for unemployed persons to take up employment is most often measured using the "replacement rate" (RR)—the ratio between net income out of work and net income when in work, and research in this area reinforces the idea of work or employment being more than just income. Empirical data shows that there are many who choose to work, despite facing replacement ratios of close to or over 100 percent (Callan et al., 2011). That is, they choose to be working, even if they could be close to or even better off financially by remaining unemployed. BIG advocates (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Van Parijs, 1995) further point out that existing systems of social security have substantial disincentives to work embodied in unemployment and poverty traps where low-income households face severe reductions in benefits for every dollar they earn. Combined with logistical problems, financial costs of entering work, and uncertainty regarding stability of employment, there is a huge incentive to forgo work in favor of benefits, if choosing one reduces income from the other. BIG reduces such disincentives, thus potentially making the most vulnerable women better off, with greater rather than lesser incentive to engage in paid labor. This issue highlights the role of women's diversity in creating ambiguous effects of BIG, with some women likely to be gainers and some losers under any reform (see also Robeyns, 2001).