The CP avoids the link to the politics DA – skirts Congressional backlash and saves Biden’s pc.

Polarization and divided government have produced gridlock and a slowdown of national policy production, again generating incentives for groups to venue shift to the states. Since the 1970s, polarization has increased in Congress and divided federal government has become a more frequent occurrence. This has led to policy gridlock and “drift”—and higher costs of national policy change for policy demanders. Faced with federal gridlock, policy demanders may increasingly turn to states to implement their agendas. Federal gridlock also means that these policy demanding groups can be more confident than in earlier periods that their state policy victories will not soon be reversed by federal legislation or court rulings. In the rarer moments when important federal policy does pass, polarization and divided government may increase incentives for members of Congress to delegate authority to the states. A legislator who would ideally implement his or her ideal policy across all 50 states may accept a decentralized policy as a second-best option if it moves the average outcome (such as the policy regime for the average state or average individual) toward his or her ideal. Moreover, the district-based electoral connection in Congress can improve the relative appeal of the second best option because “representatives know that when they delegate to state and local agents, policy for their constituents will be set by representatives elected by those same constituents.” Indeed, the rise of polarization in Congress has coincided with what scholars call a “devolution revolution.” In a similar fashion, the federal judiciary has undergone a “federalism revolution” in which the courts are an increasingly “state friendly arena” precisely during an era of increasingly partisan and narrow (5–4 split) decisions.