Soft power is hard to quantify

Soft power is hard to quantify, and thus it is hard to measure its success. Hard power, focused more on measurable resources (money, soldiers, bullets), is a straightforward counting game, and so are the results of its applications. Soft power aims to change attitudes, which is a hard “thing” to which to assign a number or level. Using targeting as an example, the joint targeting process includes two evaluative concepts—measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE). The former, MOPs, measures how friendly forces are completing targeting tasks and asks planners “Are we doing things right?” The latter, MOEs, measures the impact of those actions and asks, “Are we doing the right things?” Using these concepts in an operational military environment, targeteers and intelligence analysis can track the progress of campaigns and ensure that friendly forces are striking the right targets with the right weaponry to have the pre-determined effects. Still, the effects of soft power are tangible—and can be measured. The serve as one example with the longstanding and respected Fulbright scholarship program as a second. Graduate student exchanges, as part of the , had two important effects. First, it grew a body of U.S. students with knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union during a time when much of U.S. policy was based on conjecture and fear. Second, on the Soviet side, it grew a body of Russian scholars who understood how far behind their communist country was and allowed them to discern between truth and government-sponsored domestic propaganda. Likewise, studying in locations around the world routinely return to their home countries only to reinvest their knowledge and build on their experiences—further fostering global understanding and diplomacy. Because soft power is not confined to the domain of the U.S. government, with public and private industries contributing to U.S. influence abroad, the effects of soft power can be seen in other ways. Take the role of the English language in the Netherlands as an illustration. Upwards of 93% of residents in the ; much of this trend can be attributed to the dominance of American film and textbooks coupled with the relatively small size of the Dutch population. Quantifying the successes of soft power can work, but the process becomes much more of a qualitative over quantitative exercise. It is much easier to calculate the destruction of a training compound or to count enemy dead than it is to track pro-U.S. sentiments in a key village. Part of this problem is a sense of time—feedback from a bombing or freezing of a key group’s assets (hard power approaches) is near real time. Calculating anti-U.S. sentiment (soft power metric) throughout a region is not. This soft power feedback is hamstrung by time in two non-concurrent ways. First, analysts need time to allow preferences to change, and second, they need time to collect new data. The shift in language in the Netherlands, for example, took years to manifest fully. The effects of the cultural exchanges were not apparent or public until after the Iron Curtain had fallen. One of the most , developed and conducted by Portland and USC Center on Public Diplomacy, was first released five years ago and is compiled once a year. Battle damage assessments, on the other hand, are often released to the public in near real time, as evidenced in President Donald Trump’s order to attack Shayrat Air Base in Syria in April 2017. The strike was immediately followed by an to the American public. President George W. Bush’s infamous also stands as an example of the simplicity of success when it comes to hard power, regardless of its premature nature. It was relatively easy to convince the American public that U.S. efforts in Iraq were not only complete, but also successful based on the results of military action. The lessons of psychology and marketing tell us that simplicity sells, and selling is the most difficult challenge to soft power.