Soft power has limitations – challenging to international politics

Selling Soft Power Success Is Hard It is not that soft power has more complex strategic aims; changing human behavior should always be the goal of a foreign policy. The strategic aims of soft power are more transparent and more directly translated in the operational phases of execution. It is much more difficult to obfuscate strategic aims during a soft power initiative because the operational “targets” are often human behavior and attitudes and are not easily quantifiable. U.S. foreign policy can be characterized, generally, as traditional and slow to change. This traditional approach has been long-centered on realist principles with the prioritization of hard power. Even the department charged with “soft power” programs like diplomacy and cultural exchanges face their own internal organizational culture barriers. In the SVI, for example, State Department officials were very reluctant to accept an interdisciplinary approach from an advertising executive, disparaging Undersecretary Beers with comments on her dress and demeanor. Moreover, this history of traditional approaches has been punctuated over the past three decades with periods of increased “toughness” abroad, most notably in the Middle East. In short, the United States prioritizes toughness and traditional measures. Soft power is doubly handicapped in this regard because, as mentioned above, it is new. It’s also not considered to be “tough.” Years ago, when explaining soft power to a young Corporal in the Marine Corps, I presented two different types of leadership. The first included threats and rewards to push subordinates to perform required tasks: “Take out the trash every day or get written up.” The second encouraged the same behavior by appealing to the subordinate, by setting the example and earning his/her respect resulting in the Marine taking the trash out because he/she wants to be seen as a team player and as a good Marine without explicit threats or rewards. When asked which form was more effective and generally preferable, the Corporal immediately favored the latter. “That’s soft power,” I replied. “No, I still don’t like it. It’s soft, and leaders aren’t soft,” he retorted. While this could be dismissed as a singular incident not indicative of a larger trend, a glance at any political campaign will show you that policymakers don’t win elections on being “soft.” While critics rightly point out the limitations of soft power, many critiques fall flat. , a Shanghai-based venture capitalist and social scientist, argues that countries overestimated their soft power capabilities since the end of the Cold War. That’s not a criticism of soft power itself, but rather an indictment of an over- or mis-reliance on it. The crux of Li’s argument isn’t against the utility of soft power, but rather its overall presence, or lack thereof. Other scholars beholden to the realist school of international relations are resistant to even considering the potential effectiveness of soft power because much of soft power is reliant on non-state actors, actors deemed irrelevant by the tenets of realism. Ultimately, most critics simply believe soft power doesn’t work in international relations, but offer little concrete evidence to support these assertions. Soft power has real limitations, and there are real challenges to its effective use in international politics. However, these challenges are not so much a reflection of soft power’s utility, but rather its political desirability, none of which challengse its validity or effectiveness. All policy is politics, and if the United States seeks to redefine and reshape foreign policy in a post-pandemic world, policymakers must first recognize and be willing to take the political risk in order to avoid the unnecessary risks associated with a one-dimensional hard power dominant foreign policy.