Clear funding mechanisms make the CP preferable.
Indivar Dutta-Gupta et al. 18, Co-Executive Director of the Georgetown Center on Poverty & Inequality (GCPI), where he leads work to develop and advance policy recommendations that alleviate poverty and inequality, advance racial and gender equity, and expand economic inclusion for all people in the United States, Published in 2018, “Working to Reduce Poverty: A National Subsidized Employment Proposal,” https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/rsfjss/4/3/64.full.pdf // KG
This proposal envisions a generous, open- ended federal match to states for the formula grant. Each states’ grant would be based on states’ FMAP (Federal Medical Assistance Per- centage, or Medicaid match rate). The FMAP for each state is based on the relative per capita income of a state compared with national per capita income. It currently varies between 50 and 82 percent, limited by a statutory maxi- mum of 83 percent (ASPE 2015). Under this sub- sidized employment proposal, each state would receive a minimum (regardless of macroeco- nomic conditions) match equal to its FMAP plus half the gap between the state’s FMAP and 100 percent, resulting in minimum matching rates ranging from 75 percent in the wealthiest states to 91 percent in the poorest. States would be able to count TANF,8 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), and other federal funding legitimately utilized for subsidized em- ployment toward their contributions. Based on the TANF Emergency Fund’s subsidized jobs experience and the adoption of the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act, a re- imbursement rate that is more generous than the existing FMAP for basic Medicaid is likely necessary to ensure that all or nearly all states choose to participate in this program (Kaplan 2009; Ollove 2015). This proposed federal sub- sidized employment match (FSEM) also would rise (never above 100 percent) and fall (never below 75 percent), with each year-over-year per- centage point increase in three-month average state unemployment rates triggering a percent- age increase in the match rate. Unlike the FMAP, the FSEM would be more responsive to economic changes by being updated every cal- endar quarter, though increased match rates would trigger on for a minimum of the balance of the current and subsequent fiscal year to allow for state fiscal, policy, and programmatic planning. (Overly volatile match rates, espe- cially falls in the match rate, would jeopardize the viability of the program’s match structure.)
The competitive grant, administered by HHS, would be administered similarly to exist- ing competitive grant programs.