Its DISTINCT from the plan --- doesn’t require appropriations

(Lev Menand, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, “The Logic and Limits of the Federal Reserve Act,” 40 Yale J. on Reg. 197, pg lexis//um-ef)

A third cost is more subtle. Relying on the Fed an institution that can create money to perform nonmonetary tasks presents risks to the proper functioning of our democratic institutions. The problem lies in the dynamics over time. If the Fed can print money to advance government priorities outside of monetary system stability, it can reduce the incentive for Congress to legislate. Among other things, the Fed's expenditures do not have to be financed through taxation or borrowing, nor are they included on the government's balance sheet. The Fed's asset purchases and lending programs also do not have to get through the various veto gates that slow ordinary appropriations bills. From a short-term perspective, this alternate route for government disbursement may be appealing. But when the Fed satisfies certain powerful constituencies through its programs, it alleviates pressure that would otherwise drive broader legislative action.395 In this way, Fed expansion on the asset side of its balance sheet threatens to crowd out political action by benefiting certain groups like homeowners who would otherwise lobby elected officials for economic legislation.396 Accordingly, the Fed's expansion may have shrunk the scope for democratic deliberation, further limiting legislators and increasing demands for additional action by the Fed.