Utilitarianism justifies wars without interrogating the morality of the intentions

Consistent utilitarians are ready and willing even to kill innocent people, if necessary. The alleged permissibility of “collateral damage”, and the euphemistic manner in which it is described by the military and the media alike, is perfectly in keeping with the utilitarian outlook. In view of the virtual inevitability of noncombatant civilian deaths attending any decision to resort to military intervention in the modern world, some contemporary scholars maintain that only utilitarian reasoning could justify war. Furthermore, international law now prohibits the waging of war for purely punitive or retributive causes (Richard Regan, 1996, chapter 3). Wars may be waged only when they will lead to an overall improvement in the current state of affairs. The “self-defense” rationale for war seems to many to be fairly straightforward in the utilitarian framework. If more people will die if one does nothing than if one goes to war, then, in this view, one is morally obliged to go to war. The major distinction between the “just war” and the classical utilitarian approach is that the former insists upon the moral centrality of intention, while the latter does not. Intentions are, strictly speaking, morally irrelevant in utilitarianism. If a military campaign does not lead to an overall improvement in the state of affairs for all members of the moral community, then, according to classical utilitarianism, the executors of war have acted wrongly, even if they had the best of intentions. In contrast, the just war tradition demands that the jus ad bellum requirements be fulfilled, including right intention and just cause, in order for a war to be waged justly. Only a war waged with moral intention could be conducted justly, but some justly waged wars are conducted unjustly, viz., those in which the requirements of jus in bello are violated. In its insistence upon moral intention, just war theory may seem more complex and demanding than utilitarianism. However, in another sense, just war theory is less demanding, for it permits radically divergent interpretations of the same sets of historical circumstances. Just war theory requires that there be a reasonable chance for success, while utilitarianism requires success tout court, an objective improvement in the state of affairs. So, for example, regarding the Gulf War, just war theorists hold every conceivable position ranging along the entire spectrum of possibilities. While some who apply just war theory conclude that the Gulf War was an abomination, others are convinced that it was just. In view of the problem of interpretation, some critics dismiss just war theory on the grounds that it is wielded at least as often for evil as for good ends and is, in reality, the criminal leader’s most deadly weapon. It seems fairly clear that every group that has committed mass murder at the behest of its leader has been persuaded to do so by appeal to an interpretation according to which those killings were “just” (Calhoun, 2002b). But the problem of interpretation is pervasive and hardly unique to just war theory. Although utilitarianism is an ostensibly simpler theory, an accurate assessment of the morality of a war would require that one consider all consequences of the resort to deadly force, a daunting task indeed. In reality, seldom are more than the immediate consequences of prospective military action taken into account. Ultimately, the conclusion one reaches through applying utilitarianism to a particular instance of war will depend upon the length of time over which one conducts one’s analysis. While military action may seem to be the optimum solution in the short term, induction on the wars of the twentieth century might, in contrast, lead one to conclude that recourse to war will never maximize utility (Calhoun, 2002a). In the end, we will be plagued by the problem of interpretation whether we favor just war theory or utilitarianism (or vacillate between the two). Still, from the perspective of either the “just war” or the utilitarian approach, we can appreciate Lackey’s concern with proportionality. Although he focuses upon “Bush’s Abuse of Just War Theory”, Lackey’s criticism of the Gulf War can be read equally plausibly as a utilitarian critique. The crucial point is that, in considering whether to resort to the use of deadly force, a leader must, morally speaking, bear in mind the consequences of his actions for his fellow human beings. According to utilitarianism, the right action maximizes the happiness of the greatest number. If waging war will result in a better net outcome, then war must be waged, and unless war will result in a better net outcome, war may not be waged. But just war theory, no less than utilitarianism, proscribes wars that culminate in pyrrhic victories.