Ad hoc agreements solve, empirically proven

By any measure, the US has done a remarkably effective job of winning over like-minded governments to its view of limiting the presence of “untrustworthy” (read: Chinese or Russian-developed) companies in critical technology networks. In 2020, the UK announced it would not ban Chinese vendors from all parts of its 5G network in a move that frustrated US counterparts and risked undermining the US strategy at its outset. Following steady lobbying from the US government and the implementation of sanctions against Chinese entities, however, they reversed course. Today, the UK government is among the most ardent advocates for the Prague Proposals – a set of recommendations on technical and non-technical risks to 5G infrastructure that aligns with the US view. Canada, France, and Germany all deliberated for a long time, eager not to upset relations with China, before ultimately acquiescing to the view that our digital infrastructure cannot be owned and operated by companies that function at the whim of authoritarian governments. Alignment on restricting autocratically controlled technology is now moving more rapidly, with cooperation among likeminded states on everything from ransomware to AI to quantum computing. While the Trump Administration embraced bilateral pressure, the Biden Administration has embraced international coalition-building. But its approach is not merely a reversion to the status quo. More so than any administration before, Biden’s is largely looking to ad hoc coalitions rather than traditional forums for international engagement to drive its agenda. This is due in part to the realities facing the administration: most existing forums were designed with the mindset that economic integration would drive all countries toward the US’s democratic, capitalist model. Now that the “end of history” has been debunked and decoupling critical supply chains from China has superseded integration as the preferred approach, many pre-existing multilateral forums are no longer viewed as feasible settings for implementing multilateral technology policy initiatives. Take the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as an example. Its raison d’etre is “championing free trade and open investment, promoting and accelerating regional economic integration, [and] encouraging economic and technical cooperation.” While the US may share these objectives with many APEC member economies, APEC’s sweeping membership includes governments such as Russia and China, with whom such integration is no longer desired. At the same time, APEC undermines its utility by excluding major regional partners such as India. APEC is not unique in this regard. The G20, United Nations (UN), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) all face similar challenges. In response, we saw the US first pivot away from APEC to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), then to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) as its preferred mechanisms for driving regional economic discussion and integration. Similarly, the recently established Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) has become the preferred mechanism for addressing legal and policy issues around cybercrime, rather than the UN. And the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has risen from dormancy to become a highly active environment for Australia, India, Japan, and the US to cooperate on issues ranging from technology policy to vaccines. The center of gravity has shifted. The deadlock resulting from traditional methods of international cooperation has forced a call for new bargains, new coalitions, and new forms of international cooperation.