The State will kill the alternative.

Nongovernmental organizations are central to contemporary global governance, and their numbers and influence have grown dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century. However, in the last three decades more than 130 states have repressed these groups, suggesting that a broad range of states perceive them as costly. When they choose to repress NGOs, under what conditions do states use violent strategies versus administrative means? The choice depends on two main factors: the nature of the threat posed by these groups, and the consequences of cracking down on them. Violent crackdown is useful in the face of immediate domestic threats, such as protests. However, violence may increase the state's criminal liability, reduce its legitimacy, violate human rights treaties, and further intensify mobilization against the regime. Therefore, states are more likely to use administrative crackdown, especially in dealing with long-term threats, such as when NGOs influence electoral politics. I test this theory using an original data set of administrative crackdowns on NGOs, as well as violent crackdown on NGO activists, across all countries from 1990 to 2013. To shed light on the strategic decision between violent or administrative crackdown, and how states may perceive threats from domestic and international NGOs differently, I provide a case study from India. I conclude by discussing the implications of this crackdown for the use of civil society actors by the international community, as well as donors and citizens in the global South. What are these US research organizations and foundations: the George Soros Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and others that have opened up shop in Russia? Why are they here? —Report by the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service, January 1995 The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the third wave of democratization in the early 1990s gave a massive boost to the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Central and Eastern Europe. These NGOs sought to tackle a range of issues: institutional development, establishing and supporting electoral processes, and working to reduce ethnic conflict, to name a few. As such, NGOs began to be seen in the West as a precondition for democratic transition and consolidation, protecting against authoritarian overreach and holding governments accountable. However, while Western states were enthusiastic about NGOs because NGOs espoused the same liberal values these states ostensibly promoted, many host countries began viewing them with skepticism. In Russia, for example, Putin believed the West had orchestrated the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—which led to widespread protests and regime change—through their support of local NGOs and activists. Following years of increasingly vocal suspicion, in 2006 Russian authorities passed a law restricting NGO activity. This was followed in 2012 by the infamous “foreign agent” law, which forced organizations receiving foreign funding and engaging in political activities to register as foreign agents, a term intended to stigmatize NGOs. Moscow argued that this crackdown was prompted by the excessively political role of US and Western European aid to NGOs. Under the Bush administration's Freedom Agenda, the spread of democratic ideals worldwide became even more clearly linked with US national security objectives. US Secretary of State Colin Powell commented in 2001, “American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the frontlines of freedom. NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” Such statements did little to allay the concerns of foreign leaders. Research has shown that NGOs can wield real influence in ways that can be threatening to states. These organizations can influence electoral politics, aid mobilization, and threaten a state's economic interests. In response, states have increasingly chosen to repress NGOs they perceive as threatening. In this article, I argue that when states decide to repress NGOs, they have two main strategies at their disposal: violent or administrative. Administrative crackdown is a nonviolent strategy which entails enacting legal restrictions to create barriers to entry, funding, and advocacy by NGOs. Hampering foreign funding is the most insidious of these tactics because without adequate funds NGOs cannot continue their operations in target countries. Both democracies and autocracies have used this tactic to repress NGOs. More broadly, since the end of the Cold War, more than 130 countries have engaged in NGO repression. When they choose to repress NGOs, under what conditions do states use violent strategies versus administrative means? I argue that, once states decide to repress NGOs, the choice of strategy (violent or administrative) depends on two factors: the nature of the threat posed by these groups, and the international consequences of cracking down on them. Violent crackdowns address a state's short-term strategic goals. When states are dealing with immediate threats, such as ongoing protests, they are more likely to violently repress NGOs they see as aiding these activities. However, violence has consequences: it can increase the state's criminal liability, reduce its legitimacy domestically and internationally, violate human rights treaties, and intensify mobilization against the regime. State agents may even refuse to implement violent orders. To avoid these consequences, states often look for strategies to prevent various forms of collective action from coalescing in the first place. I argue that states are more likely to undertake administrative crackdown as a long-term strategy, especially in dealing with threats preventively. This is the case particularly when NGOs have the potential to influence electoral participation or challenge key economic interests of the state. Administrative crackdown has smaller domestic consequences than violence. Citizens are likely to see administrative crackdown as a form of regulation rather than repression, making a backlash less likely. The international consequences are also fewer, since administrative actions are less likely than violence to invite condemnation, shaming, or threats of aid withdrawal. Using panel data on all countries from 1990 to 2013 and an original data set on state repression of NGOs using administrative crackdown, I demonstrate that as elections become increasingly competitive, states are, on average, more likely to repress NGOs via administrative means. However, administrative crackdown is not the state's main choice of strategy when NGOs pose immediate threats. Instead, a higher number of protests is positively and significantly associated with the use of violence against NGOs and activists. I provide qualitative evidence for the proposed mechanisms through a case from India. Through interviews with state elites and NGOs, this case sheds light on how states choose between different crackdown strategies. The case study also explores how states perceive varying levels of threats from domestic and international NGOs, even when they work on similar issues. This article makes two main contributions. First, it develops a new theory of the conditions under which states, when they decide to repress NGOs, choose violent or administrative means. Although violent responses to dissent have been studied extensively, the use of alternative mechanisms of control in a state's repertoire, such as the administrative crackdown introduced in this paper, has not. Research on such alternative mechanisms has looked primarily at co-optation or surveillance, and with a focus on autocracies. By examining the frequency and tactics of administrative crackdown, I show how democracies and autocracies alike design coercive institutions to facilitate nonviolent repression. This article is also unique in that instead of focusing on armed targets, it shows how states crack down even on nonviolent nonstate actors, such as domestic and international NGOs. Second, in contrast to the influential work on transnational advocacy networks, I show that human rights victories and reforms resulting from local and international pressure may be short-lived. Implicit in both the boomerang and spiral models of NGO power is the core assumption that local NGOs are able to reach out to international actors for assistance. While this assumption had a stronger empirical basis in the past, this article sheds light on the contemporary barriers to NGO mobilization. Instead of initiating long-term improvements in human rights when facing international pressure, states may be learning to counter these dynamics by ramping up repression. The article proceeds as follows. First, I examine the rise of NGOs as important actors in contemporary global governance, and look at the main strategies of repression states can employ against these groups. I then lay out my theory and introduce an original data set on state repression of NGOs to test its hypotheses. A case from India sheds light on how and why the state adopted different crackdown strategies in response to immediate or long-term threats, and how these strategies differed between domestic and international NGOs. I conclude by discussing the implications of this crackdown for the use of civil society actors by the international community, as well as donors and citizens in the Global South. Both the absolute number and the influence of domestic and international NGOs have grown dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century. This was due to both geopolitical changes and the emergence of a pro-NGO norm across the international system. Since NGOs provided a number of political and economic benefits, many states have given these organizations wide access and participatory roles in recent decades. Globally, a large amount of resources was channeled to NGOs because many donors—public and private alike—perceived them as more efficient than states in achieving certain goals. For instance, in countries with weak institutions and poor governance, direct aid transfers to states raised issues of misuse and bureaucratic inefficiency. Donors then specifically sought out NGOs for projects instead. Being less bureaucratic and more nimble than state institutions, NGOs were seen as key agents of both development and democratization. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Western governments also began spending more resources to promote democracy abroad, including, but not limited to, conditionality, diplomacy, and military intervention. Democracy assistance, or “aid programs specifically designed either to help non-democratic countries become democratic or to help countries that have initiated democratic transitions consolidate their democratic systems,” was among the most visible facets of democracy promotion. As part of this assistance, US administrations have allocated billions of dollars in foreign assistance each year. Much of this was spent on programs supporting democratic institutions, rule of law, and human rights, implemented via domestic and international NGOs. These groups became the face of civil society for donors seeking to promote democracy. As a result, NGOs in the global South were often targeted by foreign donors as visible, easy-to-reach organizations within civil society. Authorities frequently engage in repression to counter ongoing challenges to the status quo. That is, dissent increases repressive behavior. However, dissent and repression have an endogenous relationship: state authorities may engage in preventive repression to undermine or restrict dissent before it occurs. In addition to undermining groups’ willingness to organize against the state, such preventive repression damages their capacity to impose costs. In addition to undermining groups’ willingness to organize against the state, such preventive repression damages their capacity to impose costs. As I show however, preventive repression is not synonymous with violent repression. Repression can also be carried out through administrative or nonviolent means. The causes and effects of what I call administrative crackdown have not been analyzed in great depth. Existing studies on the determinants of state repression and control primarily look at the causes and consequences of state violence that is used to repress conventional challengers such as social movements, opposition parties, and dissidents, with much less attention to state repression of NGOs. I focus on NGOs because of their centrality to contemporary global governance. Although their functions may sometimes overlap with broader civil society groups and social movements, NGOs are more institutionalized than other kinds of amorphous civil society organizations and thus may be easier to target. A focus on NGOs is valuable because states may repress nonviolent nonstate actors in ways that differ from those used against armed nonstate actors. However, NGO organizational structures and strategies are tied to national environments. Beyond their internal organization, NGOs are shaped by the political structures and institutions with which they interact. Ultimately, both domestic and international NGOs are governed by national laws, develop advocacy strategies in response to domestic political opportunities, and are shaped by powerful sets of social norms in their host countries. Although there is a growing number of studies on state–NGO dynamics, this is the first paper to systematically analyze how states, once they decide to repress NGOs, choose between different crackdown strategies. Repression is the use of coercive action against an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. Its purpose is to impose a cost on the target as well as to deter specific activities perceived to be challenging to state personnel, practices, or institutions. I differentiate between violent or overt crackdown and nonviolent or administrative crackdown. Overt crackdown involves violence against NGO officials, including arrests, detention, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and assassinations of organizational staff, volunteers, and activists. It also includes attacks on NGO offices and destruction of their property, and thus captures physical integrity rights violations. In contrast, administrative crackdown is the use of legal restrictions to create barriers to entry, funding, and advocacy by NGOs. This includes (but is not limited to) violations of civil liberties, such as the rights to free speech, assembly, association, and movement. To be clear, not all NGO-related legislation is aimed at cracking down on these groups. Regulations may establish standards for appropriate organizational behavior and set penalties for legitimate violations. States frequently use regulations to routinize the behavior of NGOs. These regulations produce convergent practices and prevent malfeasance that threatens to undermine confidence in the entire NGO community. However, I focus on the conditions under which states, when they decide to repress NGOs, use administrative crackdown (anti-NGO laws) as a strategy. Unlike regulation, administrative crackdown is intended to impede the larger NGO community, through barriers to entry, funding, and advocacy. Barriers to entry means the use of law to discourage, burden, or prevent the formation of NGOs. Such laws increase the complexity and difficulty of the registration process, expand state discretion in denying permits, and prevent appeals. Barriers to funding impose restrictions on how NGOs secure financial resources. States impose restrictions based on the origin of the funds, how those funds are channeled, and what purposes they can be used for. Restrictions on foreign funding are worrisome because many NGOs in the Global South depend on funds from abroad. Local groups tackling contentious issues may not be able to raise funds domestically. Barriers to funding impose restrictions on how NGOs secure financial resources. States impose restrictions based on the origin of the funds, how those funds are channeled, and what purposes they can be used for. Restrictions on foreign funding are worrisome because many NGOs in the Global South depend on funds from abroad. Local groups tackling contentious issues may not be able to raise funds domestically. Even local philanthropists may be deterred by poor tax incentives or a fear of retribution. Finally, barriers to advocacy restrict NGOs from engaging in the full range of free expression and public policy advocacy. They prevent legitimate activities by making certain forms of speech, publication, and activity illegal. Many countries also implement laws that ban NGOs from working on “political” issues. The word political in these laws is intentionally left vague, providing cover for states to crack down on NGOs they perceive as politically threatening. When confronted with threatening NGOs, states decide whether to accommodate them or repress them. Some states may decide to accommodate or tolerate their presence in the country, owing to the multitude of economic, technocratic, and service-provision benefits they provide. However, it is clear that some states are not willing to tolerate at least some of the NGOs operating within their borders. Whether a state chooses violent or administrative crackdown depends, I argue, on its short-and long-term strategic goals. To understand the causes and strategies behind state repression of NGOs, scholars have recently begun documenting trends, making important theoretical and empirical contributions in a burgeoning area of study. For example, some studies have found that states perceive foreign aid to NGOs as supporting the regime's political opponents. In these circumstances, states may choose to forego the benefits accrued from foreign-funded NGOs and adopt restrictive financing laws. Regimes that have recently experienced competitive elections are particularly likely to crack down on foreign aid to local NGOs as political opponents may seek to discredit the incumbent's victory and states perceive a window of opportunity to crack down on these opponents. Most recently, scholars have argued that when states continue to commit severe abuses and have also ratified human rights treaties, they impose restrictions on human rights organizations to avoid monitoring and hide their noncompliance.A large focus of this work lies in explaining the onset of legal restrictions, rather than variation in the type of laws, or repressive strategies, states employ to target NGOs. Moreover, the analysis is confined to democratizing low-and middle-income countries, or to NGOs working in specific issue areas. Instead of the narrower focus on the onset of restrictive foreign financing laws (one form of what I term administrative crackdown), I examine the variation in the type of crackdown (that is, violent or administrative). Empirically, I also expand the focus to include all countries. I argue that violence is more useful in the context of ongoing domestic threats such as protests, since it addresses the short-term strategic goal of ending such threatening mobilization. But in addition to its punitive and deterrent effects, violence can have adverse consequences. Regimes may refrain from using violence against nonviolent mobilizations for fear of defection. And even if the state orders violent crackdown, state agents might refuse. Violence may also intensify mobilization against the regime. Research has shown that publics are more likely to approve of abuses targeted at violent opposition movements.However, given that NGOs are nonviolent in nature, violently cracking down on them can alienate the population. If violence is easily linked to the state or its agents, it also increases the state's risk of criminal liability. Since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic increase in criminal accountability of state officials for the past use of violence, in both international and domestic judicial processes. These prosecutions of military, civilian, and political leaders can increase the perceived costs of repression. Thus, state agents may be deterred from using violence due to a mix of normative pressures and material punishments. However, not all states have the same attitudes to the use of violence. Besides institutional features that protect organizations against repression, there are normative reasons why states may differ. The strong presence of the rule of law, combined with preferences for less coercive means, may lead some states to be more likely to use administrative means rather than violence to deal with opponents. Violence against NGOs can also have adverse international consequences. It may violate human rights treaties and preferential trading agreements that contain human rights clauses. Compared to local NGOs, targeting INGOs is especially risky since they often have the legal and political backing of their home states. It can also be risky for states that are dependent on INGOs for service provision and transfer of aid. Finally, the use of violence requires knowledge of specific actors and organizations to target, information which is sometimes costly and difficult to acquire. Therefore, states may prefer strategies that prevent NGOs from posing challenges in the first place. Administrative crackdown is one such strategy. In the short term, it may not be attractive because it requires time, effort, and resources. In democracies or states with democratic trappings, legislators have to go through the process of drafting bills, debating provisions, and collecting sufficient votes on a bill before it can be adopted as law. However, in the long term, it has advantages over the use of violence. Because laws seem ordinary, routine, and apolitical to many, they are more likely to be perceived as regulation rather than crackdown. Indeed, coercion can be “costly, crude, and potentially dangerous for authorities.” Compared to violence, administrative crackdown is also less likely to invite international condemnation. When states repress groups administratively, they rarely face tangible consequences beyond minor public expressions of disapproval.It can also deter collective action from coalescing in the first place. Aleksandr Tarnavsky, sponsor of Russia's 2015 “undesirable organizations” law, argued that it would be a “weapon hanging on the wall … that never fires” but stands as a warning to potentially uncooperative NGOs. Thus administrative crackdown has some advantages over violent crackdown in the long term. While the foregoing argument applies to both domestic and international NGOs, they are not entirely interchangeable. They represent different threats to states because they have different primary audiences. NGOs can direct their programming to locals, domestic elites, or international elites. While both domestic and international NGOs may target all three of these constituencies, INGOs are inherently better at targeting other states, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational networks. INGOs disseminate information more effectively, and transnational advocacy networks can pressure governments to reform. Access to Western forums is also critical to the success of local challengers, and INGOs can lend legitimacy to local grievances. Negative reports by INGOs can also impair the shamed country's access to aid, trade, and foreign direct investment. Since INGOs are better able to target international audiences and impose costs on states from above, states may feel more threatened by their activities. These differences in audiences might lead states to crack down on domestic and international NGOs differently. Violence against domestic NGOs may go unnoticed internationally, but violence against INGOs is likely to be reported. Since such reports can have negative repercussions internationally, states may prefer to use administrative crackdown with INGOs.