Trade induced resource competition sparks quick nuclear wars between economically dependent regional powers.

Under such conditions, it is perhaps not surprising that great power rivalry between the US and China has intensified, almost to the extent of the struggle for global supremacy between the US and the USSR, albeit with more of a regional focus. Hence, David Shambaugh (2018, 85) has pointed out that despite their deep interdependence and elements of cooperation, the world’s two major powers are increasingly locked in a “comprehensive competitive relationship,” made explicit by the labeling of China and Russia as “strategic competitors” and “revisionist powers.” Nuclear weapons can be seen as the ultimate expression of power politics, and regional actors are prominent proponents. Russia and the US have the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, China’s complement ranks third, and North Korea has become only the ninth nuclear deterrent-enabled state in the world (Arms Control Association 2021). Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan could go nuclear virtually overnight, only refraining from doing so because of the shelter of the US nuclear umbrella.

In addition, so dramatic have been the impacts of controversies surrounding the administration of US President Donald Trump and its aftermath, that the American democratic polity can be viewed as being in crisis rather than a shining city on the hill, and therefore American soft power contributes less in terms of leadership resources in the region. President Trump’s attacks on international organizations (IOs), institutions, and multilateral treaties, revealed their limitations, raising the specter of the US walking away from any treaty, agreement, or institution that it considers not to be in the interests of US citizens. This turning away by the US has been particularly acute in the East Asian region, where only bilateral diplomacy could hold the attention of the previous president, and even then, only sporadically.

Even with the incoming administration of President Joe Biden there is no guarantee of a return of US leadership and contributions to peace and security in the region. At least initially, the Biden administration has signaled an intent to continue the tough line with China, while returning to something akin to the strategic patience of effectively doing nothing about North Korea. Furthermore, despite the much-vaunted “pivot to Asia” under President Barack Obama, the US neglected engagement with the region (beyond hedging over China). A revitalization of such policies, therefore, also bodes ill for regional leadership, especially given that President Biden has inherited so many other diplomatic challenges. In what may only be a one term presidency (even if he is succeeded by another Democrat), it is likely that, with the exception of the need to address China, Asia will once again be put on the back burner.

Neorealist-inspired coercive tactics have been prevalent in the international relations between the great powers and among other states as they attempt to structure the decision-making of the other, whether it be saber-rattling, namecalling, overt threats, or political and economic sanctions. Facing diverse challenges, successive governments in regional states have adopted state-centric national security policies with an emphasis on national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. The most extreme manifestation of this state centricity can be found on the Korean Peninsula where the two regimes, North and South, view each other as existential threats; across the Taiwan Strait, between the similarly mutually exclusive regimes of Beijing and Taipei; and in the state-centric security tensions very much in evidence in the East China Sea and South China Sea (Taylor 2018). Yet even between democratic allies of the US, such as South Korea and Japan, diplomatic relations can be strained at best, and take on power-political overtones.

Meanwhile, from a neoliberal perspective, throughout East Asia a premium has been placed on economic development, with rapid success in this field combined with high levels of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization across the region. Regional developmentalism has been labeled “econophoria,” whereby the solution to all governance challenges, whether domestic or international, is sought through the prioritization of economic growth (Buzan and Segal 1998, 107). In East Asia, state-centric macroeconomic development has been described as assuming “cult-like status” (Christie and Roy 2001, 5).

Economic development itself, however, does not automatically lead to an interdependence induced peace between states. Competition for limited pools of resources necessary for development raises the perspective of resource wars. Already tensions are high in the Mekong region of Southeast Asia due to hydroelectric dam construction along the river dramatically impacting the security of those living downstream. Tensions in the South China Sea are as much about marine resources and trade routes as they are about geopolitics. Recent tensions between Japan and South Korea, between the great powers China and the US, and between Russia and the European Union have been amplified by resource competition, trade wars, and economic sanctions.

Competition for markets among the export-orientated economies of East Asia can severely undermine incentives for cooperation between them. It can also impact on strategic policymaking, with lesser powers being caught between a dependence on the US-led Washington economic consensus and San Francisco hub-and-spokes security system, and a dependence on the Chinese market (Kim and Cha 2016). Finally, in the competitive rush to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to rise up the development status ladder, countries in the region have mortgaged their autonomy, and thus a significant element of their traditional national security, first to the US, then after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, to the International Monetary Fund, and most recently, to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative as manifested in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). There are concerns that AIIB activities could lead to as much insecurity as security promotion within the region (Uhlin 2019, 1).