Unchecked development of Chinese SOIs risk great power war

During both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then, spheres of influence evolved in response to systemic pressures generated first by great-power rivalry and later by superpower competition. They were functional adaptations to the dynamics of multipolar and bipolar competition in that they reduced the possibility of war and thus contributed to the overall stability of the international order.

During the subsequent era of unipolarity, however, the specific systemic pressures that had given rise to the two superpower dominated spheres during the Cold War era largely evaporated. As Cold War competition gave way to the universalization of the U.S.-led liberal international order, spheres of influence evolved yet again, this time reflecting the new realities of U.S. hegemony in a globalizing world. In this new context, the logic of spheres was less about managing multipolar imperial rivalry, or about stabilizing Soviet-American geopolitical relations under conditions of mutual nuclear vulnerability and ideological hostility, than it was about sustaining and expanding the so-called “liberal international order.” During the post-Cold War era, a system defined by two spheres based on ideologically determined blocs dominated by the two superpowers gave way to one defined by a single, world-wide sphere of influence dominated by the sole remaining superpower, the United States. For the most part, other states conceded—or at least did not actively challenge—Washington’s assertion of this planetary sphere of influence. Functionally, this new unipolar-sphere arrangement both reflected the underlying structure and logic of the Liberal International Order and licensed U.S. intervention against “rogue states” or illiberal non-state actors that threatened that order. During this era, non-U.S. spheres did not disappear entirely, of course. Russia, for example, asserted a residual sphere of influence in its “near abroad.”

At the same time, the constructive role played by spheres of influence in managing great power competition in the past was largely forgotten. According to the liberal internationalist conventional wisdom prevailing in this era, such spheres were little more than dangerous atavisms—relics of a benighted past that had no place in the enlightened liberal international order of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice perhaps best summarized this new perspective when she described the post-Cold War order as one “in which great power is defined not by spheres of influence or zero-sum competition, or the strong imposing their will on the weak—but by open competition in global markets, trade and development, the independence of nations, respect for human rights, governance by the rule of law, and the defense of freedom.”9

The reason for this act of forgetting is perhaps obvious. Despite having carved out its own sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century, for most of American history, U.S. leaders have generally opposed the idea of an international order divided into rival spheres—and have denied that the United States is implicated in any way in upholding such an order.10 This being the case, it is hardly surprising that at precisely the moment when the Soviet sphere of influence had largely disappeared, and when the U.S. sphere was being characterized as something very different, they were inclined to deny both that spheres of influence had ever played a positive role in international politics and that they could ever play such a role in the future.

THE RETURN OF MULTIPOLAR GREAT POWER COMPETITION

Just as the multipolar international/inter-imperial system of the nineteenth gave way to the bipolar system of the post-WWII era, and the era of Cold War bipolarity then gave way to post-Cold War unipolarity, so the unipolar moment has now given way to a new era of multipolar great power competition.11 While this new era may be defined in part by the institutional residues of post-Cold War U.S. dominance, it is primarily defined by the end of unipolarity—that is, by:

the erosion of U.S. military primacy;

China’s emergence as a global power;

Russia’s persistence as a (diminished) great power;

the emergence of other powers (like India) that are not only dominant players or aspiring hegemons in their home regions, but increasingly willing and able to shape global politics more broadly; and,

the erosion of the ordering mechanisms (rules, norms, and institutions) associated with the post-war liberal international order (recently rebranded as the rules-based international order).

As this transition has taken place, a new configuration of spheres has begun to crystallize. Specifically, in the current era—while pressures to manage inter-imperial rivalry (specific to the late nineteenth century), to sustain ideologically defined blocs (specific to the Cold War era), and to unilaterally police the liberal international order (specific to the post-Cold War era) have all dissipated—the deep systemic pressures to exclude potentially dangerous competitors from one’s periphery and to shape regional economies in one’s favor have not. They remain as powerful as ever, though now they reflect the emerging realities of multipolar great power competition.

While this historical transition is in its infancy, the broad contours of a multipolar world at least partly defined by the presence of spheres of influence are already apparent.12

First, the evolving realities of the contemporary world order are such that great powers like Russia and China (and perhaps others in the future) are inevitably going to assert spheres of influence in pursuit of their core economic, political, and strategic interests. These spheres may or may not be limited to a country’s “near-abroad” or “backyard.”

Second, there is little the United States can do to prevent current and future great powers from establishing spheres of influence. States seeking to assert a sphere in pursuit of core economic or geopolitical interests are typically willing to invest considerable resources, and take significant risks, both to exert influence within their sphere and to exclude other powers from it. Given the United States’ specific national security interests in the “backyards” of these states are usually relatively weak, the resulting “commitment asymmetry” is such that the United States is unlikely to be willing or able to do much to deter or prevent these states from asserting their spheres of influence.13

Third, the return of spheres of influence can have positive strategic consequences—both for the United States and for international order more broadly. These include:

establishing red lines of acceptable and unacceptable behavior for both sides, thus limiting potential flashpoints;

creating buffer zones around asserting states’ peripheries, thus reducing the fear of encirclement and the associated risk of war;

focusing Washington’s attention on securing the United States’ sphere, thus limiting the scope of U.S. strategic commitments, and better aligning them with its capabilities; and,

circumscribing the freedom of action of subordinate states, thus limiting their ability to draw the predominant power into conflict with other great powers.14

Finally, given both the inevitability of spheres of influence and the ordering benefits they can provide, the United States’ best strategy is to acknowledge their existence as a permanent fixture in international politics and then work to ensure that each specific sphere meets the criteria for stability laid out above.15

TOWARD A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

The hard reality, then, is that the end of unipolarity and the return of multipolar great power competition simply assures that some states will respond to systemic pressures by attempting to assert their influence over other states. The relevant question therefore is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how Washington should manage such an inevitable development in ways that are both realistic and conducive to U.S. interests.

The most realistic answer to this how question is to adopt a differentiated strategy that recognizes that, while the United States will not be able to prevent non-U.S. spheres of influence as a feature of international order tout court, it may be able to thwart specific spheres in certain specific circumstances.