Iran aggression causes nuclear retaliation.
Edited for anti-Palestinian language
Louis Rene Beres, 3-15-2019, Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue, "Nuclear War Avoidance in the Middle East: Background (Part I)," Jurist, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/03/beres-mideast-nuke-1/, KL
Before appropriately legal remedies can be identified and assessed, one key question needs to be asked: How, more-or-less exactly, might Israel ultimately find itself in some configuration or other of actual nuclear war? What, with still greater exactitude, are the more-or-less identifiable circumstances under which Israel could sometime discover itself involved (whether wittingly or unwittingly) with belligerent nuclear weapons use? To meaningfully answer these complex questions, pertinent analysts must capably integrate the expressly strategic aspects of their necessary investigations with the jurisprudential.
There can be no plausibly successful ways of managing the latter without simultaneously understanding and applying the former.
For the moment, all such concerns could appear extraneous, gratuitous or simply without useful foundation. Israel, after all, remains the only presumptive nuclear weapons state in the region. Nonetheless, certain still malleable order-of-battle considerations could change quickly and unexpectedly, perhaps even from moment to moment. In the always unpredictable Middle East, this “fluidity” is specifically plausible in regard to any future aggression from Iran.
Iran will not be easily deflected from its seemingly long-term nuclear ambitions. All things considered, Tehran’s confirmable membership in the Nuclear Club remains more than likely within the next several years. This worrisome “membership” is reasonable to expect despite the multilateral July 2015 Vienna Iran Agreement and despite also the subsequent unilateral JCPOA withdrawal by US President Donald Trump. Even in the absence of any actual Iranian nuclear adversary in the region, [Israel] the Jewish State could still find itself having to rely upon nuclear deterrence against certain biological and/or massive conventional threats.
Acknowledging such a prospectively existential reliance, the residual prospect of atomic weapons firings should never be ruled out prematurely or altogether.