Opposition in all three states prevents normalization

This led to the visits to Riyadh this month of Mr. Blinken and Mr. McGurk.

For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel is less about Israel and more about what it can get out of the United States, its historical security guarantor. Given how unpopular Israel remains among Saudi citizens, normalizing relations with the country would cost Prince Mohammed political capital with his own people, Saudi officials say. To justify that, they say, he would need to secure significant concessions from the United States, with an eye toward deterring Iran.

But Prince Mohammed’s initial demands were steep: U.S. guarantees to defend Saudi Arabia from military attack, a Saudi-American partnership to enrich uranium for a civilian nuclear program and fewer restrictions on U.S. arms sales to the kingdom.

Richard Goldberg, a White House official during the Trump administration and now a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which advocates for greater security for Israel, met with senior Saudi officials last month. In an interview, he said officials talk about uranium mining and enrichment for export revenue, but he believes that glosses over the real purpose: to have the means to build up a nuclear arsenal if Iran does the same.

“The open question — the big question mark — is this: Is the uranium enrichment a red line, as MBS says, or is it an opening position?” said Mr. Goldberg, who is opposed to Iranian enrichment and has “strong discomfort” over the prospect of Saudi enrichment. “Whether it’s a bargaining position or truly a red line is not really known.”

A big Israeli hurdle: Saudi nuclear enrichment

Mr. Netanyahu is in the most serious political crisis of his years as prime minister: he is on trial for corruption and the legal reform he tried to pass was met with mass protests in the country. If new elections were held tomorrow, polls suggest Mr. Netanyahu would lose.

A landmark diplomatic arrangement could help reverse his political fortunes, some close to him believe. But consenting to a Saudi nuclear enrichment program would also be a reversal of longstanding policy in Israel, which worries that a Saudi nuclear program could lead to a nuclear arms race across the Middle East.

Mr. Netanyahu could still face strong opposition from Israel’s national security establishment if he agrees to a Saudi enrichment program.

A small group of Israeli aides has been entrusted to handle negotiations over a possible Saudi deal, including Ron Dermer, the minister of strategic affairs and a former ambassador to Washington, and Tzachi Hanegbi, the national security adviser. The group has visited Washington several times in recent months.

With a hard-line government in Israel, there are no prospects for any deal that makes provisions for a Palestinian state. But for a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel to take place, the Saudis and the Biden administration have insisted that any deal include some concrete gestures for the Palestinians, officials say.

What those might be remains unclear.

“Bibi wants this so badly he can taste it,” said Mr. Indyk. But, he said, unless there were real accommodations made by Israel toward the Palestinians, the deal would be ephemeral and U.S. concessions to the Saudis would be wasted. “The Saudis are supposed to deliver the Muslim world, but if the U.S. lets MBS leave the Palestinians behind, the whole thing becomes unstable.”

In public, Saudi officials have repeatedly said that they will not establish relations with Israel without a deal that includes the creation of a Palestinian state — a line they have maintained since the kingdom led the 2002 Arab peace initiative, which offered Israel diplomatic relations with Arab countries in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Prince Mohammed reiterated that message at an Arab League summit last month.

“The Palestinian cause was, and still is, the pivotal issue for Arabs and Muslims,” Prince Mohammed said. “It comes at the top of the kingdom’s foreign policy priorities.”

Among the largest barriers to Saudi Arabia expanding its ties with Israel is public opinion. Even as the Gulf’s authoritarian rulers and business elites lean toward deepening their relationships with Israel, most Gulf citizens are opposed to full normalization. In an April poll by the Washington Institute, 78 percent of Saudis said the Abraham Accords would have a negative impact on the region.

A divided Congress on Saudi relations

Any new defense pact or nuclear deal with the Saudis would require congressional approval, a tall order given the ambivalent or outright hostile attitude of some prominent Democratic lawmakers toward the kingdom.

Along with Republican colleagues, lawmakers have denounced Prince Mohammed for the murder of Mr. Khashoggi — in which he has vehemently denied playing any role — and the mass killing of civilians in the war in Yemen. A top Democrat in the Senate, Robert Menendez of New Jersey, has placed a hold on the sale of certain weapons to Saudi Arabia.

Lawmakers have also expressed apprehension over any move by Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium in its territory, citing proliferation concerns. For years, the State Department has been trying to negotiate what it calls a 123 agreement with the Saudis, which would lay out tough nonproliferation criteria to allow for American cooperation on civilian nuclear energy, though Saudi officials have balked at the restrictions in part because of Iran’s program. The United States has such an agreement with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, that bans in-country uranium enrichment.