Unilateral executive action solves

An executive agreement along the lines of the proposals below need not be a treaty. Such provisions need not require Senate advice and consent or any other congressional action. Further-reaching commitments by the United States (presumably in exchange for further-reaching commitments by Saudi Arabia) could be included in a subsequent U.S.-Saudi treaty or other agreement requiring congressional action. The key areas explored are: security assurances and cooperation; preventing a nuclear-armed Iran; arms sales; oil, gas, and petrochemicals; nuclear energy; terrorism; and human rights.

SECURITY ASSURANCES AND COOPERATION

According to published analysis by various experts, the Saudis may desire a written agreement defining U.S. commitments in the event that Saudi Arabia is attacked.51 The preeminent example of such an agreement, of course, is the North Atlantic Treaty and its foundational Article 5.52

There is little chance that Washington would extend an Article 5-like commitment to Riyadh that would legally obligate the United States to consider an attack on the kingdom an attack on the United States. If that is a non-negotiable demand of Riyadh’s, then a strategic partnership agreement will be impossible.53 However, if Riyadh is willing to accept something more than the status quo yet short of an Article 5-like commitment in return for valuable Saudi commitments to Washington, such an agreement might be possible.

What could the security provisions of such an agreement perhaps look like?54

As a first step, the United States could designate Saudi Arabia a Major Defense Partner (MDP). To understand why this might be an option and why it might help facilitate a strategic partnership agreement, it is worth considering the background.

In a non-binding joint statement issued by President Barack Obama and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi on June 7, 2016, the United States “recognized” India as a “Major Defense Partner.”55 India remains the only country to enjoy that designation from the U.S. government. President Obama issued this designation using his executive powers without reference to any statutory authority or previous congressional action. One month prior (on May 18, 2016), the House of Representatives passed a bill (the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017) requiring the U.S. government to “recognize India’s status as a major defense partner of the United States.”56 But the Senate did not pass this bill until after the joint statement, and the bill did not become law until December 23, 2016.

The term “Major Defense Partner” was not defined in the June 7, 2016, joint statement. Nor has it been defined by legislation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 required the Commerce, Defense, and State Departments to “jointly produce a common definition that recognizes India’s status as a ‘Major Defense Partner’ for joint use” by those departments.57 Such a definition, if it exists, does not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations and it is not readily available online.

In practical terms, the president publicly committed to strengthening technology sharing with India, supporting its “Make in India” initiative, and bolstering its “defense industries and their integration into the global supply chain.”58

That was a prudent step for the United States given the importance of India to Washington’s efforts in the Indo-Pacific, as part of an effort to forge a coalition to deter aggression from the People’s Republic of China. India’s designation as an MDP symbolically boosted the bilateral relationship in the short-term and helped catalyze a series of subsequent steps that continue to bolster security and economic cooperation between the two countries.

There appears to be no restriction on the executive branch using the term “Major Defense Partner” for another country. President Biden could designate Saudi Arabia as a Major Defense Partner utilizing his current authorities as president. This would send a powerful signal of the importance the United States places on its defense relationship with Saudi Arabia without necessarily committing the United States to take any particular substantive steps. Nor would it serve as an endorsement of everything the government in Saudi Arabia has done that Washington does not condone.

The designation, however, would formally recognize the truth: Saudi Arabia has been and should remain a major defense partner of the United States in practice despite their differences. Such a formal designation could begin to heal some of the damage in the relationship, signal that Washington values the security partnership despite several lingering challenges, provide Washington with more leverage to encourage reform in the kingdom, counter Riyadh’s drift toward Beijing, and pave the way to tangibly strengthen security cooperation.

For its part, Saudi Arabia might appreciate being designated as the second U.S. Major Defense Partner alongside tangible defense and economic benefits that advance the kingdom’s security and prosperity.

As with the 2016 U.S.-India statement, designating Saudi Arabia as an MDP could be accompanied by new efforts to facilitate technology sharing. Similar to the U.S.-India statement, a U.S.-Saudi agreement could (as appropriate) commit to the provision of license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies focused on defensive capabilities in return for a commitment from Riyadh to advance export control objectives. The announcement could also be linked to key elements of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 that are consistent with U.S. interests.

Following Obama’s June 7, 2016, designation of India as an MDP, Congress enacted legislation, the National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 that supported the designation, pushed the Departments of State and Defense to implement and expand U.S.-India cooperation, and sought to hold the executive branch accountable for results. This included, for example, congressional support for the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation, two agreements valued by New Delhi that could be replicated in some way with Riyadh, as appropriate.

Admittedly, unless perceptions of Saudi Arabia change significantly in Congress, there is no reason to believe the relevant committees and the two chambers would vote to take analogous actions with respect to Saudi Arabia following its designation as an MDP. Nonetheless, the important symbolic benefit associated with an MDP designation of Saudi Arabia could be bolstered with several accompanying presidential and executive branch actions relying on the president’s existing authorities. As political perceptions in the relationship potentially improve, Congress could build on the designation.