Executive action magnifies the link

Moreover, other institutions, particularly Congress, may play an important role—even when presidents know that efforts to overturn an∂ executive action will fail—by engaging in the political debate and mobilizing public pressure against the president should he act unilaterally contra congressional preferences. Decades of political science scholarship have demonstrated that the public lacks systematic knowledge∂ of politics and therefore relies heavily on heuristics when forming their∂ political judgments.48 Political elites thus become key cue-givers who∂ help inform and shape public opinion.49 Finally, citizens acquire most∂ of their knowledge about politics from the mass media. Scholars have∂ long noted that the media depend on official Washington sources for∂ information. However, a robust literature in political communications∂ goes further and argues that the media tend “to ‘index’ the range of∂ voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the∂ range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a∂ given topic.”50 When other political actors, particularly members of∂ Congress, object and criticize presidential actions in the public sphere,∂ they are all but assured of receiving considerable media coverage, and∂ they are well-positioned to influence public opinion against the∂ executive branch.51∂ In essence, we argue that while the statutory and legal constraints∂ on presidential unilateral power are weak, the political constraints are∂ quite robust.52 Unilateral actions that could provoke public ire and∂ erode the president’s political capital, thereby undermining later efforts to pursue other aspects of the president’s programmatic agenda, may∂ fail a simple cost-benefit calculation. The informal political costs of∂ acting—even when Congress and the courts are almost certainly∂ unwilling or unable to strike down the action—may outweigh the policy∂ benefits of acting unilaterally. These political costs, which are not∂ accounted for in most extant models of unilateral politics, are tangible∂ and substantial; indeed, they may explain why presidents fail to act∂ unilaterally as aggressively and on as many issues across the gamut of∂ policy as formal models suggest they should.