XO’s link to politics---encourage Congressional budget battles

Here, we take a different tack and emphasize the informal political∂ costs of unilateral action. Specifically, we argue that presidents consider∂ more than just whether Congress or the courts will act affirmatively to∂ overturn a unilateral presidential order. Rather, presidents consider the∂ longer-term political costs that unilateral action may entail. These∂ political costs can take many forms, two of which are particularly∂ important. First, when presidents act unilaterally, they may burn∂ bridges with members of Congress opposed to the action on political,∂ ideological, or even constitutional grounds. To be sure, in almost all∂ circumstances, presidents will be able to carry the day and beat back∂ any legislative effort to undo what they have done unilaterally.∂ However, the ill will so generated on Capitol Hill may prove politically∂ costly the next time the president’s policy wishes require action that∂ only Congress can take. For example, despite being a rather blunt∂ instrument, Congress retains the power of the purse and therefore,∂ ultimately, the power to support or de-fund most policies that∂ presidents begin unilaterally.40 This echoes Neustadt’s moral from the∂ “three cases of command”—Truman’s firing of General Douglas∂ MacArthur and seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, and∂ Eisenhower federalizing the Arkansas National Guard to integrate∂ Central High School. In each case, the president succeeded in achieving∂ his immediate policy objective. Yet, in each case, Neustadt argues the∂ victory was a pyrrhic one, coming at a high political cost. Truman’s∂ actions, in particular, only intensified ongoing battles with Congress on∂ both the foreign and domestic fronts and likely hindered Truman’s∂ efforts to extract concessions from Congress on other key elements of∂ his legislative agenda.41