The current system is unsustainable – only a private account system can solve for debt crisis
Saving and Rettenmaier 05 - (Andrew J. Rettenmaier is from Texas A&M University and part of Private Enterprise Research Center and Thomas R. Saving from Texas A&M University and studies Department of Economics, Ph.D. University of Chicag) PhD January 2005, "(PDF) Private Accounts as a Solution to Social Security Debt," ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268055439_Private_Accounts_as_a_Solution_to_Social_Security_Debt //mish
The 2001 President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security suggested that private accounts offset some of the accumulated debt. More importantly, however, the Commission also suggested that rather than replace a constant share of wage indexed earnings, the defined benefit part of Social Security provide a fixed level of purchasing power. This change alone reduces the outstanding debt to existing generations, the 100-year closed group liability, and significantly reduces funding requirements for both new and current generations. Such a change is one way of recognizing the fact that the existing system is not sustainable and therefore, is not the appropriate target when deciding whether a transition is Pareto. The private account portion of the President’s Commission would allow workers who are 55 years of age and above to contribute roughly 31.7% of their payroll taxes, 4 percentage points of the total 12.4% payroll tax, up to $1,000 per year, to a private account. With the restriction of $1,000, the total contributions to private accounts ultimately reach 2.39% of taxable payroll. This reform also replaces the wage indexed benefits formula with a price indexed formula beginning in 2009. Price indexing effectively sets the defined benefit after 2008 to the real purchasing power of the 2009 benefit. 5 In exchange for the opportunity to divert one’s payroll taxes to a private account, the price indexed benefit is offset by the annuity resulting from one’s private account, assuming the private account earns 2%. Future benefits are first reduced by the new benefit formula and are then further reduced by the benefit offset, assuming the 2% rate of return. Any accumulations earned in excess of the 2% are added to the reformed benefits to arrive at a retirees’ total benefit. Assuming that the private accounts are invested in a portfolio that yields a rate of return of 4.6% during the accumulation phase, and a 3% return during the decumulation phase, the Commission estimated that the ultimate benefits from this reformwould be roughly comparable to those that are currently scheduled