Bioterror causes extinction and is likely.

Terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) have expressed interested, and have even attempted, to use biological agents in terror plots (Biodefense, 2016). The technical and administrative knowledge of biology and chemistry can be acquired globally in medical schools, research programs, and laboratories, making it difficult to prevent potential practitioners of bioterrorism from acquiring the required scientific knowledge (Chiodo, 2015). While at one time the ability to mutate strands was restricted to advanced research laboratories, rudimentary high school laboratories now have the ability to develop deadly biological agents (Garrett, 2012). With relative easy, terror groups could engineer the flu virus, making it deadlier (Selk, 2017). By combining traits of multiple strains and maximizing the virus’ natural properties, it could become highly transmittable (Farmer, 2107). Genetically engineered viruses have the potential to kill more people than nuclear weapons, governments remain underprepared for that threat (Selk, 2017).

Terrorists could be drawn to the use of biological agents because of the difficulty of detection and the ease at which some biological agents can naturally spread through a population (Bioterrorism, 2006). There are essentially three ways which agents could be acquired by terrorist: they could be stolen, created in laboratory environments, or collected naturally. A gloomy reality is that as the advancement of new technologies reduce the costs of genetic sequencing, it will become easier and less expensive to create novel organisms (Garrett, 2012). Bioterrorist attacks can be planned to induce maximum damage and panic with a minimum risk of early detection. Potential agents of attack are categorized by risk (rated as an, A, B, or a C) depending on the agent’s availability, ease of dissemination and transmission, and potential impact (Bioterrorism, 2006). Category A agents are considered the most dangerous and threatening to National Security. Ebola is categorized as a Category A bioagent because of its ability to cause mass panic and disruption and the special public health actions required for treating those infected.

Through the EVD, “mother nature has created the perfect bioweapon” (Thiessen, 2014). Following the Paris terrorist attacks, the French have warned that terrorist organizations may attempt to steal biological agents (Talent & Graham, 2016). The British Ministry of Defense feared terrorists would try to acquire EVD and released a report outlining three separate scenarios in which terror groups could successfully weaponize the virus. (Quinn, 2015) These could be stolen from research facilities, laboratories, or government stockpiles. While the more exotic and devastating agents (such as small pox) must be cultivated in laboratory environments and are therefore more difficult to obtain, many biological agents are naturally occurring (Gottron, 2002). Examples of these naturally occurring, and easier to obtain agents include: human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the hepatitis strands, yellow fever, and the Ebola virus (Gottron, 2002). Moreover, the Ebola virus is native to a continent where terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State are active (Thiessen, 2014). The 21-day incubation period allows potential jihadists more than enough time to infect themselves, then travel to infected population centers, developing the means of mass distribution (Thiessen, 2014).

In June 2001 – months prior to the September 11th attack in New York – Dark Winter, a senior level wargame, was run in conjunction with security think tanks and government agencies to simulate government responses to acts of bioterrorism (Dark Winter). The simulation demonstrated how a biological terror attack could result in mass civilian casualties, civil disorder, institutional breakdown and lack of faith in government – compromising national security (Dark Winter). Major challenges for policymakers included the many “fault lines” which existed between governmental agencies, the levels of government, private healthcare systems, and the public (Dark Winter). Breakdowns in centralized leadership and communication could threaten containment and control. It was revealed that the healthcare system in the United States had no surge abilities to prevent hospitals from becoming overwhelmed or to meet the heightened demand for vaccinations (Dark Winter). Finally, targeted communications and information management was recognized as a challenge, both in working with the media and in disseminating important information (Dark Winter). It became very clear after the exercise that the United States was unprepared for an act of bioterrorism. In 2010, nearly ten years after the Dark Winter exercise, a commission created to evaluate the national emergency response capabilities gave the nation a failing grade on its ability to respond to a bioterrorist threat (O’Grady, 2015).