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The United States and its Asian partners want to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, ostensibly to prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon there. They worry that Beijing will gradually persuade its neighbors to distance themselves from the United States, accept Chinese primacy, and defer to Beijing’s wishes on key foreign-policy issues. In 2018, for example, then-U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis  China is “harboring long-term designs to rewrite the existing global order. … The Ming Dynasty appears to be their model, albeit in a more muscular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states, kowtowing to Beijing.” Former U.S. officials such as  and  and  writing on U.S. grand strategy——have made similar arguments, and China’s stated desire to be a “” and its efforts to alter the status quo in the South China Sea and elsewhere appear to justify these concerns.

The implications of this view are troubling. If China is actively seeking to become a regional hegemon in Asia and the United States is dead set on preventing it, a direct clash between the world’s two most powerful countries will be difficult to avoid.

But are these fears justified? Although China might be better off if it could expel the United States from Asia and become a true regional hegemon, that goal is probably beyond its grasp. A Chinese bid for regional hegemony is likely to fail and do enormous harm to China (and others) in the process. The United States can take a relatively sanguine view of this prospect, therefore, even if it cannot dismiss it completely. Even as they strive to preserve a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, therefore, the United States and its allies must ensure that their efforts do not convince China’s leaders that they must try for hegemony despite the obvious risks.

Why Regional Hegemony Is Desirable

It is easy to understand why a powerful state might like to be a regional hegemon (i.e., the only great power within its geographic area). If there are no other major powers nearby, a regional hegemon has little reason to fear direct attacks on its home territory. A great power that dominates its surroundings in this way will also be less vulnerable to blockades or other forms of pressure, and it can expect deference from the weaker states in its sphere of influence even if it does not rule them directly. The absence of local dangers also makes it easier for a regional hegemon to project power into other areas of the world if doing so seems necessary or desirable.

The history of the United States illustrates these benefits nicely. The United States is separated from the other great powers by two enormous oceans and insulated from many of their quarrels. This “” gave U.S. leaders enormous latitude: They could remain neutral when conflicts erupted elsewhere or fight “wars of choice” far from home if that seemed advisable. When these distant interventions failed—as they did in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan—the United States could eventually withdraw without putting its security at serious risk.

China’s leaders undoubtedly think their country would be more secure if it achieved a hegemonic position in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing would have less to fear if the United States were not closely aligned with many of its neighbors and did not have powerful military forces stationed throughout the region. China would be less vulnerable to blockades in the event of war, a significant concern given the constricted maritime geography of East and Southeast Asia and Beijing’s substantial reliance on foreign trade. With fewer local dangers to worry about, it would also be easier for Beijing to project power elsewhere if it so desired.

These same factors also explain why the United States wants to prevent this situation from arising. Since it became a great power at the dawn of the 20th century, the United States has sought to  a rough balance of power in Europe and East Asia and prevent any single power from dominating either region. U.S. leaders were concerned that a European or Asian hegemon might eventually amass equal or greater economic and military power than the United States. No longer concerned with local threats, it could choose to intervene in other areas, as the United States has been able to do. A rival of this sort might even ally with states in the Western Hemisphere and force Washington to focus its attention closer to home. The enduring desire to prevent a regional hegemon in Europe or Asia is why the United States eventually entered the two world wars and why it kept substantial military forces in both regions during the long Cold War.

If regional hegemony were readily achievable, therefore, it might make good strategic sense for China’s leaders to want it and for U.S. leaders to go all out to prevent it. But what if this seemingly attractive goal is, in fact, a mirage: difficult and maybe impossible to achieve? If so, Beijing would be foolish to pursue this objective, and Washington can take a more measured approach to discouraging it.