US military is necessary to mediate and prevent conflict between the two powers

Colonel Sandrack, who was the US military attaché during 1990, left from the US embassy in New Delhi on a secret visit to Hisar, in Haryana, near the border. In those days, Hisar was hosting the Indian Army division and the forces which were to attack Pakistan.

Colonel Sandrack set out on a mission to obtain intelligence, and he had the direct permission of General VN Sharma, who was the Chief of Army Staff at the time. At the request of the US Ambassador William Clark in New Delhi, the Indian Army Chief allowed a team of US military attaches to visit the Indian border states where the Pakistani military feared that India would send troops to attack Pakistan, and had deployed tank divisions.

The Washington-based Henry L. Stimson Center, known for its specialized research on nuclear non-proliferation, in December 1994 convened a meeting of US civilian and military diplomats who were working in New Delhi and Islamabad during the January-April 1990 military crisis in the region.

The purpose of inviting the US military attaches and ambassadors stationed in New Delhi and Islamabad during this period, in particular, was to understand the realities of what was happening at that time when the tensions were at the peak.

Washington had a key role to play in ending the military crisis, so these officials had a lot to say at the meeting. The Henry L. Stimson Center published all the conversations that took place at the meeting that year, which are available on the Internet.

At a 1994 conference in Washington D.C., hosted by Henry L. Stimson, Colonel Sandrack confirmed, “We visited the siege, the city where the Indian Armored Division was stationed. After that we went to Bikaner, but there we did not see any military movement on the highway. In both cantonments, we did not see any military equipment being prepared for installation on the border. Then we set off for the military training area of ​​Mahajan where we only found tanks.”

Winter is the time of year when the armed forces of both India and Pakistan conduct military exercises. On the Indian side, the location of such exercises is near the town of Bikaner in Rajasthan, which faces Pakistan’s Multan on the opposite side of the border, located near the Indian region of Mahajan.

The distance between the two sides is 100 to 120 km. “These exercises were considered normal, but from our point of view, the most unusual thing was the deployment of troops in Kashmir and Punjab,” he said.

“The deployment of troops to India between 1989 and 1990 was huge, but there is no evidence that heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery were moving. Our estimates and evidence are in line with the Indian statement that the increase in troops towards India was to prevent cross-border incursions.”

The US military attaches stationed in New Delhi and Islamabad were engaged in a concerted effort in Pakistan and India to gather this intelligence. In India, the team was led by Col. Sandrack, while in Pakistan, Col. Donald Jones was leading the mission.

The teams set up a network of military experts, which was given responsibilities by Washington, to not only track any offensive military alignments or weapons installations on either side of the border but to report any such news immediately.

The teams were briefing US ambassadors in their respective countries on a regular basis and liaising with each other to get a full picture of the military tensions between Pakistan and India during February, March, and April 1990 and report them. This was at a time when the activities of armed groups were gaining momentum in Kashmir.

In a 46-page text of a meeting hosted by the Henry L. Stimson Center, US ambassadors and military attaches described their experiences with military activity on both sides of the border.

The ambassadors noted how the information contributed to US efforts to reduce misunderstandings, suspicions, and tensions between the two rival countries. The intelligence details collected by the US military attaches were sent simultaneously to Washington, New Delhi, and Islamabad. It was these intelligence-gathering missions that paved the way for the arrival of US Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates in the region to avoid military tensions in South Asia.

Col. Donald Jones, a former military attaché, who was stationed in Islamabad at the time, told the meeting that he had traveled from Kashmir to Karachi in Pakistan in February 1990 to find out if there was any military activity. According to him, there was an area of ​​50 to 75 km only around Lahore where military activities were taking place.

Col. Donald Jones, addressing a press conference, said: “The analysis of our two embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi was that neither side had any intention of war. Our only concern was the occurrence of any incident anywhere on the border that had nothing to do with this issue but would lead to war between the two countries.”

According to experts, there were a number of factors contributing to the rise in tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors at the time. One of them was the withdrawal of Russia from Afghanistan, which made the Pakistani military proud since they had played a role in it.