Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion – full text.

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program pro- vides a guaranteed minimum income to certain vulnerable citizens who lack the means to support themselves. If they meet uniform federal eligibility criteria, recipients are enti- tled to SSI regardless of their contributions, or their State’s contributions, to the United States Treasury, which funds the program. Despite these broad eligibility criteria, today the Court holds that Congress’ decision to exclude citizen residents of Puerto Rico from this important safety-net pro- gram is consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s equal pro- tection guarantee. I disagree. In my view, there is no ra- tional basis for Congress to treat needy citizens living anywhere in the United States so differently from others. To hold otherwise, as the Court does, is irrational and anti- thetical to the very nature of the SSI program and the equal protection of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution. I re- spectfully dissent.

I

Congress’ enactment of the SSI program in 1972 repre- sented a major change in the Federal Government’s rela- tionship with States and Territories in assisting low-income individuals. Prior to 1972, means-based assistance for peo- ple over the age of 64, blind people, or those with disabilities came in the form of programs administered and funded by States and supplemented with matching federal funds. See S. Rep. No. 92–1230, pp. 383–384. One of those programs was known as Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD). Under AABD, the States and Territories set their own in- come and asset limits for individual participation and de- termined their own benefit amounts. See Brief for Public Benefits Scholars as Amici Curiae 27. The Federal Govern- ment paid 75% of the benefits and 50% of the administra- tive costs, subject to a statutory cap on total expenditures. See Congressional Research Service, W. Morton, Cash As- sistance for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled in Puerto Rico 12 (2016).

To provide a uniform, guaranteed minimum income for the neediest adults, Congress established the SSI program in 1972. In creating the SSI program, Congress “displaced the States.” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 38 (1981). Rather than dispensing money through block grants to the States, SSI provides monthly cash benefits di- rectly to qualifying low-income individuals who are over 65 years old, blind, or disabled. The Federal Government sets uniform qualifications for eligibility and fully funds the pro- gram through mandatory appropriations from the general fund of the United States Treasury. See 42 U. S. C. §1381 et seq. Unlike AABD benefits, SSI benefits do not vary based on the specific State or Territory that a beneficiary is located in, as long as the beneficiary is otherwise eligible.1 In sum, SSI created a fully nationalized assistance program with federal administration, federal determination of eligi- bility, and financed entirely from federal funds.

When Congress created SSI, it made the program availa- ble only to “resident[s] of the United States,” and it defined United States as including “the 50 States and the District of Columbia.” 42 U. S. C. §§1382c(a)(1)(B)(i), (e). Congress later extended the SSI program to residents of the Com- monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. 90 Stat. 263, note following 48 U. S. C. §1801.

Although Puerto Rico is not a State, it has been part of the United States for well over a century, and people born in Puerto Rico are U. S. citizens.2 In other contexts, Con- gress has made clear that references to the “United States” include Puerto Rico. See, e.g., 52 U. S. C. §20310(8). In this context, however, Congress did not extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico and other Territories. Instead, Congress left in place the AABD program. See notes following 42 U. S. C. §§1381–1385.

Congress’ decision not to include Puerto Rico in the SSI program has a significant impact on U. S. citizens in Puerto Rico. In 2021, 34,224 residents of Puerto Rico were enrolled in the AABD program; by contrast, in 2011, the Govern- ment Accountability Office estimates that over 300,000 Puerto Rico residents would have qualified for SSI. Brief for Hon. Jenniffer A. Gonzalez Colon, Resident Commis- sioner for Puerto Rico, as Amicus Curiae 28, 34. The 34,224 Puerto Rico residents enrolled in AABD in 2021 received an average of $82 per month, compared to the $574 per month that the average SSI recipient received in Fiscal Year 2020. Id., at 29, 33. In other words, significantly fewer Puerto Rico residents are eligible for AABD than would be eligible for SSI, and the benefits they receive under AABD are hardly comparable to those they would likely receive under SSI.

II

Jose Luis Vaello Madero is a U. S. citizen who was born in Puerto Rico in 1954. In 1985, he moved to New York, and in 2012, while still living in New York, he began receiving SSI after suffering from a serious illness. Approximately one year later, Vaello Madero moved back to Puerto Rico. Vaello Madero continued to receive monthly SSI payments of between $733 and $808 via direct deposit after he re- turned to Puerto Rico.

In June 2016, Vaello Madero, approaching his 62d birth- day, went to a Social Security Administration office in Puerto Rico to apply for Title II Social Security benefits. As a result, the Social Security Administration learned that Vaello Madero had moved from New York to Puerto Rico, and within two months, the Administration reduced his SSI benefits to $0, retroactively effective to August 2013. By letter, the Administration notified Vaello Madero that he was “outside of the United States” while he was living in Puerto Rico. App. 39, 45.

In 2017, the United States filed suit against Vaello Madero to recover the $28,081 (plus interest, costs, and at- torney’s fees) that it calculated Vaello Madero had illegally cashed while he resided in Puerto Rico. As an affirmative defense to the suit, Vaello Madero claimed that excluding U. S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico from the SSI pro- gram violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.3 The United States District Court for the Dis- trict of Puerto Rico agreed, granting summary judgment to Vaello Madero.

The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. See 956. 3d 12 (CA1 2020). The court agreed that rational-basis review applied to Vaello Madero’s equal protection claim. It found no rational basis to exclude “individuals who meet all the eligibility criteria for SSI except for their residency in Puerto Rico.” Id., at 18. The court rejected the United States’ argument that the tax status of Puerto Rico pro- vided a rational basis for the challenged classification, ex- plaining that SSI recipients are, by definition, low-income individuals who cannot afford to pay taxes. Id., at 27. The Court of Appeals also observed that SSI is a “national pro- gram” that is operated and administered uniformly, with- out regard to State of residence. Id., at 25. The court there- fore declared invalid the “exclusion of Puerto Rico residents from SSI coverage.” Id., at 32.

The United States petitioned this Court for a writ of cer- tiorari, which we granted. 592 U. S. ___ (2021).

III

In general, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that the Government will treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. Equal protection does not foreclose the Government’s ability to classify persons or draw lines when creating and applying laws, but it does guarantee that the Government cannot base those classifications upon imper- missible criteria or use them arbitrarily to burden a partic- ular group of individuals. Where a law treats differently two different groups of people that are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and the classifica- tion does not implicate a fundamental right, the law will survive an equal protection challenge if it is “rationally re- lated to a legitimate governmental interest.” Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533 (1973).

Rational-basis review is a deferential standard, but it is not “toothless.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510 (1976). Even neutral classifications must “rationally ad-vanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable governmental objec- tive.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981). When the relationship between a statutory classification and its goal is “so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational,” that distinction violates equal protection. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U. S. 1, 11 (1992).

Congress’ decision to exclude millions of U. S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico from the SSI program fails even this deferential test.4

A

The United States contends, and the Court accepts, that Puerto Rico’s “tax status” provides a rational basis for ex- cluding citizens who reside in Puerto Rico from the SSI pro- gram. See ante, at 5 (emphasis deleted). As the United States argues, “Congress could rationally conclude that a jurisdiction that makes a reduced contribution to the fed- eral treasury should receive a reduced share of the benefits funded by that treasury.” Brief for United States 17–18.

The Court holds that our prior decisions in Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1 (1978) (per curiam), and Harris v. Ro- sario, 446 U. S. 651 (1980) (per curiam), require acceptance of this rationale. Ante, at 4–5. It is true that both Califano and Harris relied on Puerto Rico’s tax status to justify the unequal treatment of its residents. See Califano, 435 U. S., at 5, n. 7; Harris, 446 U. S., at 652. Neither case, however, stood for the principle that Puerto Rico’s tax status could justify any and all unequal treatment of its residents, and neither addressed the claims at issue here. Califano re- solved a claim under the right to travel, while Harris de- cided a challenge to the unequal distribution of block grants to the States and Puerto Rico under a separate benefits pro- gram. Those cases do not preclude an equal protection chal- lenge to a uniform, federalized, direct-to-individual poverty reduction program like SSI. Moreover, as summary dispo- sitions, Califano and Harris are not “of the same preceden- tial value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). And both Califano and Harris rested on the mistaken premise that residents of Puerto Rico do not con- tribute at all to the Federal Treasury. Califano, 435 U. S., at 5, n. 7; Harris, 446 U. S., at 652. Here, the United States concedes that “residents of Puerto Rico make some contri- butions to the federal treasury.” Brief for United States 19 (emphasis deleted).

Moreover, the Court overlooks the fact that SSI estab- lishes a direct relationship between the recipient and the Federal Government. The Federal Government develops uniform eligibility criteria, recipients apply for assistance directly to the Federal Government, and the Federal Gov- ernment disperses funds directly and uniformly to recipi- ents without regard to where they reside. Indeed, when it created SSI, Congress replaced existing programs that dif- fered between States as well as between States and Terri- tories and that involved States and Territories in adminis- tering the programs. Under the current system, the jurisdiction in which an SSI recipient resides has no bear- ing at all on the purposes or requirements of the SSI pro- gram. For this reason alone, it is irrational to tie an indi- vidual’s entitlement to SSI to that individual’s place of residency.

While it is true that residents of Puerto Rico typically are exempt from paying some federal taxes,5 that distinction does not create a rational basis to distinguish between them and other SSI recipients. By definition, SSI recipients pay few if any taxes at all, as the First Circuit correctly recog- nized below: “[B]y its very terms, only low-income individu- als lacking in monetary resources are eligible” for SSI. 956 F. 3d, at 27. In fact, to qualify for SSI, recipients must have an income well below the standard deduction for single tax filers. Ibid. It is “antithetical to the entire premise of the program” to hold that Congress can exclude citizens who can scarcely afford to pay any taxes at all on the basis that they do not pay enough taxes. Ibid

In some cases, it might be “reasonable for Congress to take account of the general balance of benefits to and bur- dens on” citizens when deciding eligibility for benefits. Ante, at 5. That is not a rational basis for this classification, however, because SSI is a means-tested program of last re- sort for the poorest Americans who lack the means even to pay taxes. Residents of Puerto Rico who would be eligible for SSI are like SSI recipients in every material respect: They are needy U. S. citizens living in the United States.

The Court cautions that holding this classification uncon- stitutional would “usher in potentially far-reaching conse- quences,” such as requiring the extension of other federal programs to citizens who reside in all Territories. Ante, at 5. It bears noting that tax status did not preclude Congress’ extension of SSI to the Northern Mariana Islands, under- mining that justification as a rational basis to distinguish Puerto Rico from the States. In any event, the Court iden- tifies no federal program other than SSI that operates in such a uniform, nationalized, and direct manner. For in- stance, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is administered by local governments. See Brief for Public Benefits Scholars as Amici Curiae 8–9. That distinction alone may justify differential treatment by jurisdiction of residence.

In fact, it is the Court’s holding that might have dramatic repercussions. If Congress can exclude citizens from safety- net programs on the ground that they reside in jurisdictions that do not pay sufficient taxes, Congress could exclude needy residents of Vermont, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, and Alaska from benefits pro- grams on the basis that residents of those States pay less into the Federal Treasury than residents of other States.6 Congress has never enacted a uniform, nationalized direct assistance program, and then excluded entire States on the basis that the taxpaying residents of that State do not pay sufficient federal taxes. The Court’s holding today suggests that doing so would be constitutional and not a violation of the Constitution’s promise of equal protection of citizens.

SSI is designed to support the neediest citizens. As a pro- gram of last resort, it is aimed at preventing the most se- vere poverty. In view of that core purpose, denying benefits to hundreds of thousands of eligible Puerto Rico residents because they do not pay enough in taxes is utterly irra- tional.

Congress’ decision to deny to the U. S. citizens of Puerto Rico a social safety net that it provides to almost all other U. S. citizens is especially cruel given those citizens’ dire need for aid. Puerto Rico has a disproportionately large population of seniors and people with disabilities. See Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae 8–10. The Census Bureau estimated that in 2019, 43.5% of residents of Puerto Rican residents lived below the poverty line—more than triple the national percentage of 12.3%. See C. Benson, American Community Survey Briefs, Poverty: 2018 and 2019, p. 5 (Sept. 2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ library/publications/2020/acs/acsbr20-04.pdf.

Equal treatment of citizens should not be left to the va- garies of the political process. Because residents of Puerto Rico do not have voting representation in Congress, they cannot rely on their elected representatives to remedy the punishing disparities suffered by citizen residents of Puerto Rico under Congress’ unequal treatment.

The Constitution permits Congress to “make all needful Rules and Regulations” respecting the Territories. Art. IV, §3, cl. 2. That constitutional command does not permit Congress to ignore the equally weighty constitutional com- mand that it treat United States citizens equally. I respect- fully dissent.