Comprehensive analysis including Rare Events Regression, finds econ decline increases the worst conflicts

Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

Next, I conduct a series of follow-up tests suggested by an anonymous Reviewer; results based on the reanalysis of Model 1 are presented in the online appendix. Evaluating the implication that territorial diversions are indeed more likely to result from diversionary conditions than nonterritorial diversions, I set up a multinomial logit model that contrasts the initiation of territorial MIDs versus nonterritorial MIDs (base outcome). The results show a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the government unpopularity variable (first column of Table 3), meaning that higher levels of government unpopularity are more likely to produce territorial rather than nonterritorial MIDs. Further checks include performing rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001) and population-averaged logit analyses to verify whether the rare events nature of the dependent variable or cross-sectional characteristics of the data alter the findings, respectively. The findings for the two independent variables remain unchanged (see Table 3, columns two and three). Finally, protesting behavior in more populous countries could be considered more ‘‘normal’’ and less threatening to the government, potentially lowering the incentive to divert. Dividing the government unpopularity variable by the log of country’s population (from the Correlates of War National Capabilities data set, Singer 1987) reveals that the population size-standardized government unpopularity variable remains positive and significant; see Table 3, final column.

Concerning the control variables, the effects of power and distance are consistent with expectations and across the Models in Table 1. Democracy, alliance ties, and trade coefficients have mostly the expected dampening influence on territorial conflict initiation; but only trade exhibits a significant impact and only when the dependent variable is the fatal territorial MID (i.e., in Models 3–4). 16 These results are somewhat surprising, but the reader is reminded that the effects of alliance are highly contested (see Maoz 2000), while the impact of trade has not been established in the domain of territorial conflict. Similarly, recent research shows that the democratic peace weakens considerably in the context of territorial conflict (James, Park, and Choi 2006) and that the democratic peace may be epiphenomenal to territorial peace (Gibler 2007). 17 Importantly, the control variable results imply that some of the related interests (e.g., security, regime ties) may indeed be subordinated to the territorial diversion impetus.

Revisiting the link between regime type and diversion, some scholars argue that democratic leaders have a greater motivation—due to the need for popular support—for diversion (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Russett 1990; Smith 1996). Yet, others (e.g., Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 1995; Pickering and Kisangani 2005) assert that authoritarian leaders need popular support in order to appear legitimate. Because they cannot derive legitimacy from democratic institutions and elections, they look to diversions to help them achieve this goal. Autocrats can also divert with greater impunity due to the lack of institutional checks and balances. In follow-up tests available from the online appendix, Table 4, I restrict the set of initiator countries in Model 1 to democracies only, autocracies only, all nondemocracies, and all nonautocracies. That the findings hold suggests that both democratic and autocratic leaders value territorial diversions. Nevertheless, resolving the broader debate is beyond the scope of this study.