The decline of military readiness incentivizes aggression – we’re at a tipping point

You mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, the earlier 2010 independent panel and the 2014 National Defense Panel that the Congress appointed. I'm sorry to confess that I'm a recidivist. I think I'm the only person who served on all three of those panels. This time, they made me chairman, so, you know, I guess people figured I had to keep doing it until I got it right. But, I would say that, on the 2010 panel, we warned, as you noted, that, absent some activity--and this was before the BCA [Budget Control Act] was passed--that we were headed towards a train wreck. In 2014, we quoted then-Secretary Hagel, who was talking about our declining margin of military advantage over our adversaries and said that the BCA had been a serious strategic misstep that was putting us on a very difficult and dangerous path. In this report, I think it was the unanimous view of all commissioners that we are now on the cusp of a national security emergency because of the waning of our military advantages and the dangers that the current world presents, perhaps the most complex, volatile, and difficult security environment that the United States has ever faced.

Our conclusions were that the National Defense Strategy that Secretary Mattis unveiled earlier this year largely moves us in the right direction. It is nested, appropriately, under a National Security Strategy, both of which stress the primacy of great-power competition, the importance of that competition to the security and prosperity of the United States, as well as the other challenges that we continue to face: an emergent nuclear power in North Korea, a would-be nuclear power in Iran, as well as a lot of the steady-state counterterrorism activity that our military is engaged in around the world.

But, while we applaud the direction that the strategy moves us in, we did have a number of concerns. Some of them have been already addressed in both your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and in Senator Reed's opening statement. In particular, we are concerned that the strategy is not adequately resourced, that the 2018 and 2019 budgets moved us in the right direction. There's now a prospect, however, that we will be moving in the wrong direction, because, as Senator Reed just noted, we believe strongly that, for this strategy to succeed, it needs adequate, predictable, and consistent levels of funding, and the difficulties we've had funding the Department of Defense, having periodic 2-year budget deals interspersed with a series of continuing resolutions, is just not going to provide the kind of predictability that is required to develop the future capabilities and also meet some of the readiness challenges and capacity shortfalls that Senator Reed was adverting to in his opening remarks.

We're also concerned that, although the objectives and ambitions of the strategy are appropriate, that we did not see, across the enterprise of the Department of Defense, a equal understanding of what this would require of the Department; and, in particular, operational concepts for how we would actually both deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat these great-power adversaries. Therein, I think, lies an important role for the committee in its oversight responsibilities, making the Department of Defense come forward and show you, over time, how they plan to execute this strategy, which moves us in the right direction, but doesn't get us there on its own.

With that, I'll await your questions, but I invite Admiral Roughead to add or subtract from my remarks.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD, USN (RET.), CO-CHAIR, COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Chairman Inhofe. Admiral Roughead.

Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed.

First off, I will echo Ambassador Edelman's remarks with respect to the Commission, a truly remarkable dozen that came together. I thank those who appointed them. Extremely solid experience. But, I think you would all be heartened by the tone and the approach that the commissioners took. I've often said, as we went through this month-long process, that if I gave someone a piece of paper and asked them to identify who was appointed by whom, you couldn't tell, because of the common effort, the common focus that we had.

I'm pleased with the conclusions that we reached. As Eric said, we found the National Defense Strategy to be a great first step, but it's, how does it all come together? One of the things that I think must be kept in mind is that we find ourselves in a position that didn't happen overnight, whether you're talking about readiness or modernization drives the new technology, geopolitical/geo-economic competition has been moving. We are at a significant inflection point.

I had nothing to do with arranging for these young midshipmen from the Naval Academy to be here this morning. Senator Reed, it's not part of the strategy for next week. But, they are really what we're talking about here, because they're going to be the ones that will be leading our military into the coming decades. The question, I think, is, how do we get to where we need to be?

I mentioned modernization, readiness and technology. We are operating a force today that was last modernized in the 1980s. We are dealing with significant readiness challenges. We're having to deal with technology, but deal with it with competitors who are moving very quickly in a very integrated civilian/military strategy, investing billions of dollars in things such as artificial intelligence and 5G, autonomy, hypersonics. We're moving into a very new phase of warfare that I think has to be addressed, and it has to be addressed beyond just the Department of Defense.

I think the newspapers of the last couple of days highlight some of the challenges that we have. We talk, in the report, about the gray zone, that space between peace and war, the Sea of Azov, Russia, Ukraine, new construction in the South China Sea, tragically losing some more soldiers in Afghanistan in the last 24 hours. Then I read a report this morning that deals with readiness. The USS John S. McCain, that was involved in a tragic collision 15 months ago, just refloated yesterday. Fifteen months to restore a major capital asset to the fleet, I would submit, in today's pace and speed of conflict, is not satisfactory.

Those are some of the things that we pointed out. We are very mindful that it will take money to do that. We believe that the $733 billion that was identified is a floor, and that we need to continue that growth as we modernize not just our conventional forces, but our nuclear forces, all of which came of age back in the 1980s.

We look forward to your questions. Again, I would just like to compliment and thank our fellow commissioners for their tremendous work and service and dedication in putting this report together.

Thank you very much.

[The joint prepared statement of Ambassador Edelman and Admiral Roughead follows:]

Prepared Joint Statement by Eric S. Edelman and Gary Roughead

Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the Committee we are pleased to appear before you today to address the report of the National Defense Strategy Commission.

Americans assume U.S. military superiority, but today the United States faces a growing crisis of national defense. The strategic landscape is more ominous and dynamic as violent jihadist groups, aggressive regional challengers, and ambitious authoritarian regimes challenge U.S. interests. America's traditional military advantages are eroding rapidly because of our rivals' strategies and increasing capability and our complacency. The United States must restore the hard-power strengths that buttress its foreign policy and the global environment. Doing so requires far greater coherency and urgency and a higher and more expeditious commitment of resources than the country has mustered to date.

These are the conclusions of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States, a non-partisan, congressionally chartered body we co-chaired. Our commission consulted with civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense, representatives of other U.S. Government departments and agencies, allied diplomats and military officials, and independent experts. Our report makes clear the nation is losing its ability to defend its vital interests and preserve a global environment in which America and like-minded nations can thrive.

Since World War II, America has led a world of remarkable prosperity, freedom, and security. That achievement rested on unmatched U.S. military power. America's military strength ensured the defense and security of the United States and its allies and deterred or defeated aggression around the world and underpinned the freedom of the global commons. They averted a recurrence of the devastating global wars of the early 20th century and repeated large interventions that cost hundreds of thousands of American lives.

Today, our ability to deter and defeat are in jeopardy. China's and Russia's ambition for regional hegemony and global influence are underwritten by determined military buildups aimed at neutralizing United States strengths. Threats posed by Iran and North Korea have worsened as those states develop more advanced weapons and creatively employ asymmetric tactics. In many regions, gray-zone aggression-- coercion in the space between war and peace--has become revisionist actors' strategy of choice. The dangers posed by radical jihadist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda have evolved and intensified. America is not simply facing renewed geopolitical competition, states and non- state actors are in conflict against the U.S. and the world it shaped.

Meanwhile, America has weakened its own defense. Decisions made by both political parties over the past decade, particularly the effects of the Budget Control Act of 2011 where defense spending fell from $794 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2010 to $586 billion in fiscal year 2015, have taken their toll. Political gridlock forced the Pentagon to operate on disruptive, short-term continuing resolutions that triggered crippling, across-the-board cuts associated with the sequester mechanism in 2013. Accordingly, the size, readiness, and future capabilities of the armed forces have left America with less military power relative to the challenges it faces.

In the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe, critical regional military balances are shifting dramatically in China's and Russia's favor. In the South China Sea, Ukraine, and the Middle East gray-zone aggression is shifting the status quo in destabilizing ways. Allies and adversaries question whether America can uphold its commitments. From the Taiwan Strait to the Baltics, peace has long rested on the perception, indeed belief, that the United States can win decisively. As that perception fades, conflict becomes more likely.

Should war occur, American forces will face harder fights and suffer far greater losses than at any time since Vietnam. Competitors such as China, Russia, or North Korea can disrupt the homeland with cyberattacks or the real risk of limited nuclear strikes. In war with Russia in the Baltics, with China in defense of Taiwan, or with two or more rivals simultaneously American forces might fail to accomplish timely objectives at an acceptable price. Bluntly, the U.S. could lose.

Such outcomes can be avoided. The Department of Defense needs innovative operational concepts for countering gray-zone aggression and projecting power into contested zones. Bolder approaches to acquiring and rapidly fielding leap-ahead capabilities are imperative. The United States must thoroughly modernize its nuclear deterrent, increase its cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, space, and missile defense capabilities, and remedy accumulated readiness shortfalls.

A larger military is needed. The Army, Navy, and Air Force all must grow. The United States requires more--and more capable--forces in key areas from short-range air defense to precision-guided munitions and air- and sealift. These enhancements are critical to projecting American power globally and to defeating aggression in more forms and in more than one region simultaneously. The evolving, serious security challenges in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific demand it.