The agent that implements that plan heavily affects policy.
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran 99, 1999, Epstein is a Fellow at the Department of PoliSci and Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis a Columbia; O’Halloran is a Fellow at the Department of PoliSci, School of International and Public Affairs, and Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis at Columbia, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS, pg. 7, HKeef
It is clear from these examples that where policy is made – in Congress or through delegation to the executive – has a significant impact on policy outcomes. The central puzzle to be explained, then, is why does Congress delegate broad authority to the executive in some policy areas but not in others? Does this delegation reflect the particularities of an issue area, such as who are its benefactors, who are adversely affected, and what are its complexities? Does it reflect deeper structural factors, such as legislative organization, committee composition, or congressional–executive conflict (divided government)? Is executive branch decision making different from the internal workings of Congress, and how does this affect the decision to delegate? Can Congress perfectly control delegated authority through administrative procedures, oversight, and administrative law? Does it want to? In the end, what are the implications of delegating discretionary authority for our separation of powers system and the incremental mode of policy making that it was meant to encourage? Can the virtues of separate powers intended by the Founders be maintained alongside significant delegation to the executive?