Converging tensions snowball – defense doesn’t assume non-linear escalation

In this “broader MENA” region, whose confines and internal cohesion are unstable, the challenges are ever more complex. Despite the relative consensus between NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners on the deep-rooted causes of the structural instability, the potential solutions are much debated. NATO’s “Projecting Stability” concept raises as many questions with the partners, as it does within the Alliance, since a desired end-state has yet to be defined. While all efforts contributing to an increase in stability are a priori welcome, the Alliance and its partners must agree on the conditions of stability in order to identify and implement effective means suited to the local context.

Multiple challenges, increasing complexity

The “broader MENA” region has likely never known such instability since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948; all the states in the region are, to a greater or lesser extent, involved in a conflict, or challenged by grave domestic difficulties. From Sudan to Iraq, via Algeria, Lebanon or Iran, popular uprisings have sprung up, placing the very future of the states in the region into question.

Structural instability: a symptom of a state in crisis

The regimes which survived the first wave of the Arab spring seem not to have learned the lessons arising from the chaos in neighbouring Syria or Libya, and continue to use force to contain social tensions. Ageing, they no longer have the ability to respond to the basic socio-economic demands of their populations, and even less so to the aspirations of their people. In a region where half of the population is under the age of 25, demographic growth has acted as a catalyst and exacerbates the pressure put on systems which are already broken, further weakening the infrastructure and resources of the state. Whether inspired by socialism or liberal capitalism, the economies of the region are all struggling to create jobs for young people whose level of education has greatly increased since the 1970s. The State remains a major economic player, relying on revenue from hydrocarbons and tourism to support national industrial and/ or agricultural production. The scale of imports combined with the weakness of domestic production – not to mention the corruption and nepotism which undermine most of the states in the region – hamper the development of private enterprise and discourage foreign investment. And yet the region, as a whole, is in dire need of investment, particularly in the areas of health, education, transport and energy. The credibility and legitimacy of the States’ ability to meet the basic needs of the people directly depend on it, as witnessed by the slogans branded in the demonstrations in Baghdad, Tehran and Beirut, which clamour for greater integrity from their leaders, and decent living conditions. How the regimes of these countries might reform their economies to provide a future for their youth, who have gained in self-awareness as a political class, remains a central issue.

Since the mid-2000s, the region as a whole has entered into a multidimensional process of transition. The regional system, in which the first cracks appeared after the Camp David agreements (1973), no longer exists and a new order is struggling to emerge. The escalation of tensions in the Gulf at the beginning of 2020 seems to signal that red lines could easily be crossed, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of the guarantees afforded by the great powers to their allies in the region.

In addition, the construct of the nation state, resulting from decolonization, is at stake. Preserving their political and ideological heritage has been the main source of legitimacy for the regimes in place, as brought sharply into focus by the political events shaking the region since the beginning of 2019. In Algiers, Beirut, Tehran, and Baghdad, we have seen the extent to which the renewal of the political class, and a gradual opening-up to pluralism, or political change, became an existential issue for these regimes. In this context, secular forces remain largely divided when faced by a well-organized opposition able to mobilize its grass roots with the use of religious ideology. A situation characterized by disunity and violence – where states are seen as shackling individual aspirations, when they are not simply perceived as a force of oppression – is fertile ground for the development of behaviour which goes against the system, as well as for forms of political, religious, and/or sectarian radicalism, which can easily morph into violence.

Renegotiating the social contract: a costly challenge

All the states in the region must now question the fundamental issues on which their social contracts rest. Who is re-defining the forces that shape the political arena and make up the State apparatus? Who are the players powerful enough and/or legitimate enough to redefine what the national interests are, which do not always coincide with the interests of the State? The same holds true for national borders, which often leave some of their constituent communities outside their national perimeter. Implicitly, these questions relate to non-state actors in these societies and to the capacity of states to integrate them and to allow them to play a positive role. Civil society in the MENA region has been relatively resilient and has demonstrated an ability to occupy the public space by creating new forms of political expression which continue to confuse the authorities in place.

All of these examples highlight the challenges faced in (re-)defining social contracts; with the repercussions on governance, and in particular on the distribution of power between civilians and the military within government institutions. The “strong” states which had the upper hand in the 1960s and 70s continue to prioritize security over socio-economic development and individual freedoms. In states which are fragmented, the steady erosion of the state’s ability to govern hints to a redefining of governance, even to the risk of “cantonization” around large urban centres, or “city-provinces” like Cairo. What consequences will the “re-localization” of power have on traditional state responsibilities? One can easily imagine the disastrous results of a general privatization of state responsibilities – already visible in some states – and its impact on social redistribution, border control or the flows of illegal migration and organized crime. Finally, the exponential growth of demographics in the countries of the South, exacerbated by the consequences of climate change and unrestrained urban drift, inform as to the longer-term stability of these countries. The COVID-19 crisis, of which we are witnessing only the preliminary effects, demonstrates the magnitude of the challenges facing these countries in terms of human security2 . Sooner or later, the region will be forced to start transitioning its energy policies, with obvious consequences on energy security in the West. What impact will the diversification of MENA’s oil-based economies then have on their economic partners?

NATO in the South: a clearer vision and revisited approaches

While many of these issues are not new, their accumulation and entanglement constitute a challenge of unprecedented magnitude that cannot be ignored by the Alliance, given the direct and indirect repercussions on the stability of NATO members. Together with the more obvious deterrence and defence mandate, Projecting Stability has therefore become the other priority for NATO. The consequences of the conflicts in Syria and Libya in terms of migration have shown the direct impact that these forces of violence could have on maritime security in the Mediterranean, and on the capacity of European countries to host migrants. Moreover, the weakening of some states on the southern periphery of the Alliance has provided fertile ground for the rise in violent non-state actors who have demonstrated their ability to benefit from new technology. So far, we are witnessing only the first signs; in the longer term, there will undoubtedly be major health and social repercussions for which Alliance countries must be prepared.

What kind of stability for what kind of South?

Disengaging is clearly not an option and NATO must continue to closely monitor what is happening with its neighbours on the other side of the Mediterranean, in order to better anticipate developments and try as much as possible to support the processes of transition in MENA states. Denial strategies to protect our borders or delegating our security responsibilities to our partners cannot be a sustainable strategy. The complexity of the task requires a partial rethinking of our instruments, or at the very least, a questioning of NATO’s ability to tackle the issues previously described. Developing and intensifying our partnerships with other international organizations is certainly one of the best options available.