They must defend unique links and a solvent alternative. Debating feasibility and comparing the alt to the plan prevents their framework from devolving into “you-link-you-lose” monologues that are devoid of substance and impossible to fairly assess.

The next question raised by Cox’s argument that critical theory must limit the range of choices to ‘alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world’ is how we assess feasibility, or on what basis we are to ‘reject improbable alternatives.’72 More specifically, referring back to the continuum of transitional justice possibilities (Table 1), the question is whether any of the outlined alternatives can rightly be rejected as ‘improbable’ or ‘infeasible.’ The short if unsatisfying answer is that much depends on the particularities of context, including the legal, political, economic and cultural dynamics with which a particular approach to transitional justice might be expected to engage (and of which it is a part). In assessing whether a thinner or thicker approach to transitional justice is possible or probable, and whether that approach is likely to have much of a chance of disrupting the postconflict status quo, one would need to look at a range of context-specific factors, including: the nature of existing elites and their resistance to change; whether there is a history of democracy and strong institutions; the level of economic development and the nature of the economy; the nature of the victims of conflict, their perpetrators and the abuses that were suffered; and the strength of victim and civil society networks.

Thus, for example, even if critical theorists are correct that the ‘constructed invisibility’ of the economic within paradigmatic transitional justice is a matter of deepseated neoliberal ideology,73 the question of whether and to what extent an embrace of economic justice is possible will still require careful analysis of these and other contextual factors. Such factors may in turn suggest the feasibility of a comparatively broad approach to economic justice involving fundamental questions of redistribution, or perhaps only a narrow approach to economic justice involving the selective prosecution of economic crimes of corruption and violations of economic and social rights that rise to the level of a war crime.74 For this reason, abstract debates about the value of paradigmatic transitional justice versus one of the other possibilities outlined in Table 1 are unlikely to advance the discussion at this stage. To move forward, the current critical theory debates need to do more to engage with the difficult tradeoffs, policy choices and contextual realities that would inevitably be associated with efforts to implement an alternative vision of transitional justice.

Once again, this suggests that too sharp a delineation between critical and problem-solving theory is unhelpful. After all, how can feasibility be determined – how can ‘improbable alternatives’ be rejected – without engaging with some of the nitty-gritty questions associated with the potential implementation and implications of a particular critical vision?75 Cox himself explains that ‘critical theory contains problem-solving theories within itself,’ but curiously notes that this is only to ‘contain’ and point to the ‘conservative consequences’ inherent in problem-solving theories – and not because of any usefulness they might have ‘as guides to action.’76 In this way, Cox does not offer much of a bridge between critical and problem-solving theory. Perhaps it would have been difficult for him to do otherwise insofar as problem-solving theory has been defined as inherently status quo preserving. Irrespective of the label applied, however, it would seem that if critical theory is to constrain its potential utopianism, as Cox argues it must, then an analysis of tactical and strategic policy questions associated with ‘real world’ implementation – and at higher level of detail than is typical of most critical studies literature – is required. This could be thought of as ‘critically motivated problem-solving.’ Unlike Cox’s problem-solving theory, critically motivated problem-solving makes no pretension to being ‘value free.’ 77 And unlike most critical theory, critically motivated problem-solving is keyed to understanding ‘the how’ of bringing about the potential alternative orders for which critical theory has provided a very rough sketch. In other words, it sweats some of the small stuff that critical theory famously ignores. Critically motivated problem-solving theory can be modeled as a spiral that corkscrews around the continuum of critique represented in Figure 1, helping to push things in one direction or another. Critical theory and critically motivated problem-solving theory then come together in sustained and close conversation as integrated critique (Figure 2).

As an example of the questions this model helps to draw out, I briefly consider here the critical vision for a kind of transformative justice that seeks to address structural violence. As articulated by Johan Galtung, structural violence helps to explain the difference between human beings’ actual and potential realization, and includes social structures that harm people and keep them from meeting basic needs through, for example, institutionalized racism or sexism.78 Galtung contrasted structural violence with what he called ‘direct violence,’ which would include (but remains broader than) the egregious violations of bodily integrity that have been central to paradigmatic transitional justice.79 Unlike direct violence, Galtung’s structural violence is not ‘personal,’ ‘direct’ and ‘intentional.’80 In this sense, it is also different from what I have called ‘economic violence’ because acts of corruption and plunder of natural resources are ‘direct’ and ‘intentional’ acts of harm more akin to Galtung’s direct than structural violence.81 Without the level of individual and collective agency associated with direct violence, many struggle to understand the impersonal, unintended consequences of an ill-defined ‘system’ as a form of violence at all, and indeed structural violence is often normalized and legitimized to the point of near-invisibility by what Galtung called ‘cultural violence.’82

The argument arising out of critical theory is that the question of structural violence has been a longstanding blindspot within paradigmatic transitional justice due to its neoliberal and legalistic blinders, and must be addressed as one of the root causes of conflict under the banner of transformation. 83 There is little doubt that given the deeply embedded and intertwined nature of many forms of violence, a holistic transitional justice paradigm that addresses both gross and subtle forms of violence, including structural violence, is appealing. And yet, following Coxian theory, we must ask whether such an alternative paradigm should be rejected as ‘improbable.’84 If we assume for purposes of argument that key constituencies within a particular country all agree that structural violence is a problem and that addressing it should be part and parcel of the transitional justice process in that country, we still need to use critically motivated problem-solving to try to understand what this might look like in practice, and whether it might make a meaningful difference when it comes to disrupting postconflict power dynamics.

It is not that the onus is on the critical theorist at this stage to develop a detailed blueprint or plan of action. However, even a loose exploration of how mechanisms such as tribunals, truth commissions, vetting and reparations programs, and so on might go about attempting to address a form of violence that is impersonal, indirect and unintentional would go a long way in helping to assess whether this form of transitional justice should be rejected as an improbable or infeasible alternative in a particular context. Thus far, the critical literature either has largely failed to do this, or has concluded that meaningful reduction of structural violence would require a level of institutional reform and redistribution of wealth and power that the traditional staples of transitional justice are unlikely to deliver. 85 This may therefore point to the need for alternative changemaking initiatives well outside of the mainstream transitional justice ‘toolbox’ to address structural violence. Indeed, it has been suggested that perhaps transformative justice might better be seen as a field unto itself and not simply as a thicker version of transitional justice, 86 ‘go[ing] beyond’ 87 the transitional justice framework through ‘longer term and less individualized tools.’ 88

Nevertheless, whether transformative justice is conceptualized as part and parcel of the transitional justice continuum (Table 1) or rather as its own field of concern and action that picks up where paradigmatic transitional justice leaves off, hard questions of feasibility and operationalization remain. To these ends, Da´ire McGill has helpfully outlined questions that could be used to assess whether alternative initiatives and approaches impact structural violence in a meaningful way, but offers little in terms of operational detail beyond the general need for bottom-up, participatory processes and context sensitivity.89 Once the injunction to ‘add participation and stir’ has been heeded, it remains unclear how or whether such unspecified alternative initiatives might have a better chance of overcoming the barriers to institutional reform and redistribution of wealth and power than paradigmatic transitional justice (and indeed compared to more general development, poverty-alleviation and empowerment programs as well). Without more detailed analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this or another transitional justice paradigm – be it paradigmatic, social democratic, revolutionary or something else – would be more feasible, more likely to successfully disturb the status quo. If one paradigm seems improbable, perhaps a narrower one might prove less so for a particular context. Ultimately, however, it is the task of Coxian critical theory to help clarify the range of feasible alternatives, and not to advocate for an ideal likely to generate more disillusion than hope due to its unworkability in a particular context.

To be clear, an integrated approach to transitional justice critique does not necessarily require the rejection of critical theory aspirations for broader and more holistic approaches to justice-building. It is not, as Lars Waldorf suggests, that the social democratic and transformative paradigms must be rejected out of hand because transitional justice is inherently ‘short term, legalistic, and corrective.’ 90 That argument is far too categorical, and not based on the limitations of a particular context. Even so, the critical theory appeal to holism must not become a means of avoiding hard choices, as Waldorf has warned,91 but an entry point into the hard ‘real world’ choices, tradeoffs and policy details that would inevitably be involved in expanding the field to address additional forms of violence. For example, in my work on economic violence, I have attempted to deconstruct the underlying political and ideological assumptions that have led to the marginalization of violations of economic and social rights, corruption and other financial crimes, and plunder of natural resources within paradigmatic transitional justice.92 At the same time, I have also wrestled with hard choices relating to how questions of economic violence might be meaningfully and concretely operationalized by tribunals, truth commissions and reparations programs, sketching out a spectrum of hypothetical policy options ranging from broad to narrow that might be adopted depending on the particular constraints and opportunities of the context in question. 93

As this example suggests, the goal of integrated critique is to generate critical insights that are more policy relevant, contextually informed and engaged with the question of how to proceed with the necessary changemaking than has often been the case in the past. Integrated critique therefore sits at the fold between the potential conservatism of incremental pragmatism and the potential utopianism of critical theory. It is a precarious position subject to being assailed by some for implicitly serving the status quo by unwittingly replicating technocratic approaches, and by others for being insufficiently detailed and realistic. Integrated critique may seem less radical than some critical theory, and yet it contains its own element of radicalism arising out of an impatience with the speed at which relentless critique alone is likely to change the world.

The Question of Transformation

A final question raised by the need for Coxian critical theory to limit ‘the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world’ is just what should count as a ‘transformation.’94 In other words, what would ‘success’ look like? As critics, what would or should satisfy us? While Cox’s use of the word ‘transformation’ suggests a highly ambitious critical theory, this ambition is moderated somewhat by his inclusion of feasibility, suggesting the need for a more balanced and less utopian vision of the possibilities for changemaking. Without such a balance, there is a danger that the critical turn in scholarship will raise the bar for success so high that transitional justice of any variety will be almost guaranteed to disappoint. Vasuki Nesiah, for example, argues that there is a ‘crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness’ in transitional justice due to ‘the failure to open up the hierarchies of power to accountability’ and because transitional justice processes have too often ‘left the structures of impunity intact.’95 Without doubt, a transitional justice paradigm that left no structures of impunity intact would qualify as a significant transformation of social and political order. The problem, however, is that in all likelihood there will always be hierarchies of power and structures of domination left intact even following a robust, progressive and longer-term approach to transitional justice. This is especially true if one takes into account more subtle forms of violence such as structural violence, whose minimization – one cannot speak of elimination even in comparatively peaceful consolidated democracies – is the work of generations. While unintentional, there is therefore a risk that the more critical voices emphasize a matrix of power and domination left untouched by transitional justice, the less legitimate the enterprise may appear. In finding transitional justice wanting, some may come to see it as worthless. This points to the need for humility and expectations management on the part of critical theorists.

To be clear, what Colleen Murphy has called ‘societal transformation’ is indeed a normatively desirable, exciting and ambitious goal for transitional justice that may well serve as a prism for generating new and creative practice in the future.96 It seems inevitable that transitional justice will be judged in part based on a comparison between the preand postconflict status quo, including the level of societal transformation that has taken place. And a transitional justice project that does not at least highlight and contest the roots and drivers of conflict risks rendering the refrain ‘never again’ somewhat hollow. At the same time, it is important to recognize that in many contexts transitional justice is but a tail on a much larger peacebuilding and development dog.97 Its positive impacts have proven to be modest, but worthwhile.98 The more general and multifaceted limitations in the postconflict context that so often contribute to the production of incremental rather than revolutionary change will make no exceptions for transitional justice, whether paradigmatic, social democratic, transformative or otherwise. As Padraig McAuliffe has noted, if there is disappointment at the failure of transitional justice to transform, such disappointment would only be warranted where ‘pre-existing conditions, domestic political will and external support are such that genuine transformation is possible.’99 Given the exquisite complexity involved, it is just too simple to attribute the inevitable persistence of some forms of violence, domination and inequality to a penchant for apolitical and technocratic engagement, insufficient participation, top-down approaches, and other critical studies boogeymen – even as these remain serious issues to grapple with.

For these and other reasons, Gready and Robins have prudently spoken of the need to unleash ‘transformative dynamics’ rather than focusing on literal transformation.100 Along similar lines, I have argued that the concept of ‘progressive realization’ might be borrowed from the world of economic and social rights in order to assess not whether a transitional justice paradigm has firmly established positive peace, but whether efforts are steadily pushing things in the direction of positive peace.101 Finally, in attempting to maintain balance and perspective within critical theory, it will also be useful to keep Kathryn Sikkink’s injunction in mind: if human rights and transitional justice are found wanting in a particular context, we must always ask the question ‘compared to what?’102 While some might argue that this question has the potential to crimp the critical imagination and push us into mere status quo oriented problem-solving, 103 it is also true that if the compared-to-what question fails to point to a more auspicious and feasible paradigm, then this is a fact of which critical theory must take sober note.

CONCLUSION

The critical turn in transitional justice scholarship is an important and exciting development in the evolution of the field, and a sign of growing maturity. As certain norms and practices gain a toehold in the global policyscape, leading to an internationalized and institutionalized mainstream with its associated experts, it is important for critical voices to question the naturalness and inevitability of that mainstream. Thus far, critical transitional justice scholarship has pushed against the narrowness and blindspots of the dominant paradigm, helping to envision a broader and more holistic project of building peace with justice in the aftermath of repression and mass atrocity. One preliminary sign of the success of this work is an emerging rhetorical consensus – even within the mainstream – that new approaches are needed.104 It is also noteworthy that there are comparatively few voices within the scholarly community marshaling a defense of paradigmatic transitional justice. This suggests an evolving mainstream, and it is worth asking whether some of the sharpest critiques in the literature may at times have more relevance to the past than the present moment.

Even so, it is too early to say whether the critical turn will in fact lead to evolutions in ‘real world’ practice that stand a better chance of challenging the social and political postconflict status quo than what came before. Thus far, too much of the emerging critical scholarship has been pitched at a level of generality bordering on sloganeering. I make few exceptions for my own critical scholarship in this regard. Moving these debates forward over a decade into the critical turn will require a higher degree of engagement with ‘the how’ of implementing the critical vision in ways that are true to that vision. After all, many critical theory ideals – such as participation and local ownership – have become ritualized mantras devoid of substance after adoption by large international institutions.105 Perhaps the most radical thing of all at this stage would therefore be to figure out how to better translate critical theory ideals into actual practice without being stripped of substance in the process. To these ends, I have, building on Cox’s famous binary, proposed a model of integrated critique that draws together both critical theory and what I have called critically motivated problem-solving. The goal is to continue to push thinking beyond the status quo as the critical scholarship has largely successfully done, but with a greater eye to possibility and feasibility, tactics and strategy. Such a course correction should prove useful not only in bringing critical theory debates within the field into a second productive phase, but also in efforts to bridge the historic divide between critical theory, practice and changemaking.