Their method excludes the possibility of contingent endorsement of state action in particular contexts without accepting its broader legitimacy—that dooms broader efficacy and turns case. Cost-benefit analysis of particular policies is the best form of anarchist praxis.

In the radical context, the statement ‘politics is about power’ challenges not only a perspective that neglects this insight, but one that expressly rejects it. There is a major tendency in contemporary anarchism and anarchist-influenced radicalism that explicitly presents as ‘anti-power’ (Marshall, 2010: 679; Meltzer, 1993: 11), and anti-realist (Holloway, 2005: 18). This approach proposes disengagement and defection from the status quo with the implied expectation that capitalism and the state could wither away through lack of support and without confrontation.9 Realist anarchists oppose this view and argue that realistic efforts to ‘change the world’ unavoidably entail the acquisition and exercise of some forms of power (Mueller, 2003: 128); that the state and capitalism will not disappear without confrontation (Rai, 2015: 177); and that ignoring the current mechanisms of power in the hope that they will go away is not a realistic strategy for radical social change (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425).

For a realist anarchist the statement ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ similarly holds its greatest relevance as a corrective to a mainstream position in radical thought across its history including in the contemporary milieu. Orthodox Marxism, and many of its descendants, held to a long-term vision of a communist utopia where conflict had been reconciled and politics as such had been replaced by ‘the administration of things’ (Adamiak, 1970: 16). Many contemporary anarchists share a similar vision of a post-revolutionary utopia where conflict has been eradicated and where decision-making systems that allow for ongoing disagreement are replaced with those that accept only consensus (see Graeber, 2013: 210–231). Some, like the anti-power tendency discussed above, go beyond the expectation of a future without disagreement and presume the absence of conflict even in the realisation of their utopia. Here ‘everybody’ is made aware of the pressing need for radical social change either through rational argument, or by a sudden realisation or change of consciousness based on the recognition that ‘we are all one’ and have universal shared interests.10 So the realist anarchist perspective on the idea that ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ is not that conflict is universal and inescapable as with the conservative take, but that conflict cannot be completely eradicated, and that no future post-revolutionary society will be free from antagonisms (Edgley, 2000: 73). Nor does the radical interpretation imply that we must forgo radical aims for an uneasy acceptance of pluralism under a liberal democratic modus vivendi. The realist anarchist perspective, however, is not primarily directed at these conservative defences of dictatorship, or at liberal realist pessimism. Instead it is aimed at anarchists and other radicals who see the possibility of a conflict-free utopia, and propose confrontation-free strategies for its realisation that are based either on withdrawing from political struggle, or on successfully convincing all, through education and rational argument, that the proposed radical alternative is in their best interest. The realist anarchist interpretation means that direct and active struggle for positive change, and against oppression, are necessary; that they will continue to be in any future society; and that future visions and current strategies should reflect this (Edgley, 2000: 73; Gordon, 2007: 64–68).

The idea that political thought should be ‘concrete and oriented towards action’ (Geuss, 2008: 95) stands in opposition to anarchist theory that focuses on the articulation of a comprehensive vision of an alternative system of social organisation, with the implied belief that the mere articulation of such a vision should be enough to bring about its realisation. It also counters anarchist perspectives that present as a position of permanent critique without any attempt, or serious belief, that an alternative could actually be achieved, or those similar (in practice) perspectives which posit a revolutionary future based on awaiting some precondition that precipitates radical social change, such as the spontaneous collapse of capitalism due to the unfolding of an inevitable process (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425; 2014 [1924]a: 461).

This entails recognising the imperfectability of radical action and rejecting ‘purist’ revolutionary perspectives. Realist anarchism recognises that all action ‘before the revolution’ is necessarily and unavoidably compromised. Anticapitalists must survive and resist under capitalism while subject to its demands, yet this does not entail that they cannot take any action against it that is not a direct and immediate contribution to the ‘final revolution’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1922] b: 432–433; Rai, 2015: 180). While many anarchists disdain any and all forms of political action that could be construed as reformist, realist anarchists accept that reformism is unavoidable in radical politics. This should not be taken to suggest that realist anarchists exclusively advocate, or even particularly prioritise, reformism. They still, as anarchists, advocate a ‘diversity of tactics’, from prefigurative construction of radical institutions and direct action against oppression, to insurrection and revolution. And as realists they determine the appropriate form of action according to context.

They also argue that, as anarchism is not a fixed idea but a ‘living force’ that constantly responds to and creates ‘new conditions’ (Goldman, 1969: 70), there will always be a need for struggle against oppression, and vigilance against exclusion and subjugation, even after the seemingly most comprehensive and progressive revolutionary change. Any revolution then can only ever be partial, and there can never be a ‘final’ phase of radical social change (Gordon, 2007: 67; Malatesta,2014 [1922]a: 427). Therefore, purist opposition to all reformist struggle is based on an unrealistic hard division between reform and revolution, as revolutions can themselves be seen as ‘the radical reform of institutions, achieved rapidly’ (Malatesta, 1965: 82). So while recognising the importance of revolutionary rupture and upheaval, they also argue that between such events radicals should take ‘all possible reforms with the same spirit that one tears occupied territory from the enemy’s grasp in order to go on advancing’ (Malatesta, 1965: 83).

However, to the extent that realist anarchists endorse reform, they do so only under certain conditions. Firstly, they support reforms that have the capacity to move directly towards radical goals, or to position for future radical gains. To this end they sometimes invoke a distinction similar to that between ‘reformist’ and ‘non-reformist’ reforms articulated by Andre Gorz. Gorz (1967) argued, in relation to labour reforms, that some reforms can have the effect of securing the status quo and others can in fact challenge the status quo and serve as progressive steps towards radical change. Likewise, Malatesta claimed that reforms:

either consolidate the existing regime or undermine it; assist the advent of revolution or hamper it and benefit or harm progress in general, depending on their specific characteristic, the spirit in which they have been granted, and above all, the spirit in which they are asked for, claimed or seized by the people. (Malatesta, 1965: 81)

This distinction has also been employed by various others in relation to issues such as prison abolition (Gilmore, 2007: 183), ecosocialist transformation (Baer, 2017) and the generalised radicalisation of democratic institutions (Mouffe, 2018). The realist anarchist application of this approach will be outlined in more detail in the following section.

Secondly, realist anarchists endorse reforms that can have a direct effect on alleviating suffering and hardship. They argue that anarchist opposition to all forms of oppression demands support for efforts towards the effective amelioration of its effects, even if by means of reforms that originate from or are implemented by ultimately illegitimate institutions (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 472–473). This position also rejects the ‘worse is better’ stance of crude radicalism which accepts inaction against suffering in the hope that it will lead to a crisis that precipitates widespread revolution (Chomsky, 2005: 213). For realist anarchists then the directive that political thought should be ‘concrete, and oriented towards action’ counters radical theory focused on articulating alternative social models without considering their implementation, or which counsels inaction in anticipation of a prophesied perfect moment for enacting a total, final revolution. As we will see in the following section, these positions have particular relevance to the realist anarchist approach to managing the tension between extremely radical goals and realistic strategy and analysis.

The directive that we should recognise the importance of history, contingency and context in political thought (Baderin, 2014: 144; Rossi and Sleat, 2014: 7) also has particular radical interpretations and implications. The acceptance that ‘politics is historically located’ (Geuss, 2008: 13) might inspire recognition of moments of historical rupture – of reform, revolt and revolution – and serve as a reminder of the constancy of social change, the ubiquity of resistance against illegitimate authority and that society could be radically otherwise (Chomsky, 1996: 85–86). This perspective on historical contingency is also relevant to one of the most longstanding disagreements in revolutionary thought. Anarchists have long opposed the teleological view of history associated with orthodox Marxism, and contemporary anarchists especially reaffirm the contingency of historical processes, and that history does not unfold according to a predetermined schedule (Wigger, 2016: 134). For realist anarchists this means that radicals must act – they must recognise their agency in history and that there is nothing necessary about the currently dominant social, political and economic forms, nor anything inevitable about revolutionary change.

This action, however, must recognise and respond to context. Realist anarchists ‘cannot impose an iron-clad program or method on the future’ but must ‘leave posterity to develop its own particular systems, in harmony with its needs’ (Goldman, 1969: 49). There cannot be a single revolutionary strategy or utopian model that is generally applicable regardless of political, economic, historical and cultural contexts. Radical action and efforts towards social change must conform to particular, contingent requirements (Malatesta, 2014 [1924]b: 453). For those committed to radically democratic and generally emancipatory politics, this implies that the details of radical actions and organisational models that apply in particular contexts that action must conform to are not merely to be determined by elites, but by the democratic self-determination of the peoples within those contexts (Chomsky, 2005: 221–222; Turcato, 2015: 217–218). So for a realist anarchist the recognition of context also calls radicals to humility – to the acceptance that the detailed construction of universal models of (even radical) democracy by intellectual elites goes beyond the legitimate set of tasks that a radical political theorist can undertake.

One tenet within the recent re-articulation of realism in political theory might appear an insurmountable obstacle to the reconciliation of anarchist radicalism and the realist disposition. Both radical and liberal realists in the recent realist discourse argue against an ‘ethics-first’ approach to political theory (Geuss, 2008: 9; Williams, 2005). An ethics-first approach to political theory is described as the view that ‘politics is applied ethics’ – where a priori ethical principles are first determined and politics subsequently framed as the application of those principles. Those familiar with standard representations of anarchism would be forgiven for assuming that all forms of anarchism are based on just such an ethics-first approach. Anarchism is often defined as the application of the principle that all authority is illegitimate (e.g. Newman, 2015: 1–2). Many anarchists also advocate a purist application of this position which equates to the implementation of the implicit principle ‘never engage with, or endorse with cooperation, any illegitimate institution’ which is clearly a non-realist moralistic principle on the order of Kant’s ‘never lie even to save a life’ (Kant in Geuss, 2008: 8). This position is indeed prevalent in contemporary anarchism. It is associated with the stance suggested above by the non-realist perspectives that realist anarchist positions are often levelled against (i.e. the anarchist tendency which aims for a conflict-free utopia through universalist strategies that neglect considerations of power, history and context).

Realist anarchism, however, is not the application of a moral belief that all coercion is immoral or that all authority is illegitimate, nor does it proceed from an a priori moral principle of any kind. Instead, realist anarchism is based on a sceptical stance towards all authority based on a realist appreciation of one of the qualities that humans appear to exhibit across history and independent of culture. That is, that people generally do not seem to accept being controlled, dominated and oppressed, and history suggests that the attempt to do so will usually draw some form of resistance and, in time, be seen as an illegitimate form of authority. Rather than a moral or ethical principle, this is a realist observation much like that which sees humans as driven not only by rational calculation, and this insight is similarly derived from the interpretations of the central tenets of a realist disposition described above. Attention to history, the actual realities that drive people to political action, the ubiquity of resistance, struggle and change, lead realist anarchists to see it as a realistic and pragmatic stance to be sceptical towards all forms of authority11 (Chomsky, 1970: viii). Though they may seem similar, complete opposition is importantly distinct in its implications when compared with scepticism towards all forms of authority. Scepticism entails that the onus of proof should be placed on those that see unequal power relations as legitimate, and no form of authority should be considered immune from the requirement to justify its necessity on the terms of those subject to it. It also entails, however, the recognition that some forms of authority can indeed be accepted as legitimate, and beyond this, that even illegitimate institutions and practices can, under some circumstances, be considered relatively acceptable when compared with other currently available alternatives (Chomsky, 1996: 73–74).

This scepticism is levelled not at one form of authority, such as the state, but at all forms, and it is combined with a concrete, action-orientated realist perspective which, in its radical iteration, entails immediate opposition to oppression rather than awaiting a teleological unfolding of history or the idea that ‘the worse, the better’ for radical politics (Chomsky, 2005: 213). Therefore, the realist anarchist perspective recognises the unavoidable tension in radical positions which oppose various forms of illegitimate authority simultaneously. Rather than proceeding according to the application of a moralistic principle such as ‘never engage with an illegitimate institution’, the realist anarchist must compare and balance tensions between their oppositions to different forms of illegitimate authority according to the particular historical and political contexts. This weighing of relative priority between opposition to different forms of illegitimate authority, for example those associated with capitalism and the state, leads realist anarchists to perhaps their most controversial and challenged stance – a nuanced and pragmatic approach to the state. As noted, there are anarchists who advocate the complete withdrawal and disengagement from formal political institutions, and propose a future radical alternative based on absolutely no formal political structures. Realist anarchism is not one of these forms of radical thought. The nuanced realist anarchist stance towards political institutions and engagement with them is, as we will see in the next section, central to understanding realist anarchism as an actually-existing form of realism that is based on both an unflinchingly realistic attitude to political thought and action, as well as a far-reaching, utopian radicalism that calls for social change that appears, in current contexts, to be patently impossible.

Demanding the impossible while being realistic: Anarchism within the state

In my view, the state is an illegitimate institution. But it does not follow from that that you should not support the state. (Chomsky, 2005: 212)

While anarchism is sometimes portrayed as little more than an uncompromising opposition to the state (e.g. Wolff, 1970), a nuanced approach to the state is the most contentious element of the tendency that I have been referring to as realist anarchism. It is implicitly affirmed by some (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473; Shantz, 2010: 85–86), and explicitly but without emphasis by others (Gordon, 2007: 154–155). However, those who have openly and defiantly stated this position (Chomsky, 1996) or have been perceived as doing so (Bookchin, 1998) have courted denunciation and ‘excommunication’ by other anarchists.12 This approach to formal political institutions, and the state in particular, is drawn from a fairly obvious logical extrapolation of opposition to all forms of oppression including both the state and capitalism, and the insistence that oppression must be actively resisted rather than ignored in the hope that a teleological process will deliver emancipation. Simply then, the realist anarchist does not consider the state to be a legitimate institution, yet still holds that some actions of the state can be positive when they are directed at preventing a relatively greater oppression imposed by another form of illegitimate authority. The primary way that the realist anarchist argues that the state can sometimes be considered relatively legitimate (or at least a ‘lesser evil’) is in relation to the tension between opposing both contemporary capitalism and the state simultaneously. There are two main ways that realist anarchists argue this tension can lead to anarchist engagement with, and support for, the state: for protecting people from pressing negative social effects of capitalism (Rai, 2015: 180); and to reform current social, political and economic institutions in accordance with radical goals, or to position radical movements to move further towards radical goals in the most realistic manner possible (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]b: 433).

Anarchist involvement in local social organising has imbued the contemporary milieu with a keen awareness of the relatively positive effect of state-based social services considering the increase in suffering created by their withdrawal. Therefore, in recent decades under widespread neoliberal political and ideological hegemony, anarchists have often opposed privatisation of public services and other state-owned enterprises (Shantz, 2010: 85–88). Their sensitivity to social issues also leads many contemporary anarchist groups to enter into alliances with nonanarchist radical and non-radical community and activist groups, including single-issue reformist campaigns that call directly on the state for social provisions, in order to more effectively tackle issues of marginalisation, inequality and hardship (Gordon, 2007: 58–59). In fact, in the context of several decades of leftist retreat and defeat, including the privatisation of essential industries and social services, some anarchist organisations openly support re-nationalisation efforts (MacSimoin, 2007; Van Der Walt, 1996). Realist anarchists then prefer state control of means of production when the alternative is private ownership and, in the wake of decades of privatisation, support re-nationalisation as they see publiclyowned industries as more advantageous sites from which to agitate for direct worker control – a long-held anarchist organisational goal (Marshall, 2010: 7–9).

In contrast to the stereotypical depiction of anarchism, then, realist anarchists avoid simplistic slogans like ‘smashing the state’ and emphasise the replacement of illegitimate institutions rather than their simple destruction – ‘we must not destroy anything that satisfies human need, however badly – until we have something better to put in its place’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473). This position entails efforts towards the prefigurative construction of such alternatives, and indeed much of the energy of contemporary anarchist movements is dedicated to such efforts (see e.g. Shantz, 2010). However, it also recognises the relatively positive use of state power that many anarchists are reluctant to admit explicitly but that realist anarchists openly acknowledge (Bookchin, 1979: 29; Chomsky, 2002: 344; Gordon, 2007: 154). So, their recognition of the tension between opposing the oppression and suffering induced by capitalism while simultaneously opposing the state drives realist anarchists away from purist disengagement with the state and towards acceptance of the need to support reformist measures against oppression and suffering.

This engagement with the state is not only accepted in order to combat the social symptoms of capitalism in a passive form of harm-minimisation that has given up on the possibility of far-reaching radical social change, but it is also endorsed as a method to pursue such change. So while realist anarchists argue that state control of social services is preferable when the alternative is neoliberal privatisation and for-profit services, they also see a flawed but somewhat democratic state system as a better platform for achieving their revolutionary goals of social, political and economic re-organisation, including the long-term goal of state transformation and replacement, than a state weakened in its social and economic roles, and dominated by corporate capitalism (Chomsky, 2005: 213; Shantz, 2010: 86).

While realist anarchists, as anarchists, do not advocate establishing ‘anarchist parties’ or directly pursuing state control, they do recognise the pluralism of the radical milieu and accept that other radicals will indeed pursue party-based political control. However, when they can contribute to either diminishing a currently pressing form of oppression, delivering ‘radical reforms’ or positioning radical movements for further gains, realist anarchists advocate supporting radical party-based efforts (Malatesta, [2014 [1924]a: 420, 426–427). Therefore, realist anarchist recognition of the tension between radical opposition to intersecting and even competing forms of oppression extends to support for an activity usually considered wholly contrary to the anarchist position: engagement with representative electoral politics through voting (Chomsky, 2005: 241; Gordon, 2007: 120). This does not mean, however, that realist anarchists forego their opposition to the state. They maintain their philosophical objection to, and rejection of, the state, and also maintain the seemingly impossible demand for its replacement as the primary unit of large-scale political organisation.

Despite this uncompromised goal, however, realist anarchists recognise the need to engage with current political realities, such as dominant institutions, in pursuit of radical change. Therefore, they attempt to devise strategies that can employ the state in efforts towards its own replacement with alternate forms of democratic organisation (Shantz, 2010: 85–88). These strategies, of course, are not universal but conform to contingent and particular political, historical, and cultural contexts. For example, a revolutionary movement in ‘Rojava’, Northern Syria, is currently pursuing one such strategy in the midst of the Syrian civil war.13 The revolutionary reorganisation of the Middle East called ‘democratic confederalism’ proposed by Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK (Partiya € Karkereˆn Kurdistaneˆ – Kurdistan Workers’ Party), is an adaptation of the anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin’s14 approach to radical strategy (Biehl, 2015: 315–317). Ocalan argues that radical movements in the Middle East should organise into federated autonomous enclaves within the shells of already internationally recognised nation-states, and use the legislative and constitutive power of the state to ratify and legalise these federated structures of radically democratic, feminist and eco-socialist enclaves (Stanchev, 2016). In the long term, the strategy aims towards the expansion of this model to neighbouring states, at which point these allied national federated structures could further integrate into a regional bloc of democratic self-organisation that has replaced the state form (Ocalan, 2011).

Other strategies are suggested in other contexts. Chomsky, for instance, advocates a democratic approach to radical change, in part due to his appraisal that modern western societies have such overwhelmingly powerful and violently repressive state apparatuses that armed revolution is not a realistic strategy within them (Chomsky in Rai, 2015: 177). Instead, he endorses Andre´ Gorz’s ‘non-reformist reform’ approach in which certain reforms are considered potential paths to further radical change (Edgley, 2015: 8). The implementation of workplace and/or community democracy through direct action at the site in question, combined with support from democratic legislative and constitutional control, is given as an example of non-reformist reform (Gorz, 1967: 8n, 60–62). Realist anarchists see this approach as capable of being extended further, to the radicalisation and democratisation of the institutions of democratic organisation and decisionmaking, to the point where the state is democratically transformed into some other form of large-scale political entity15 (Chomsky, 1996: 75). Realist anarchists do not see this as a short-term strategy that can be achieved in a single step, and neither do they suggest that it could or should be accomplished by anarchists alone (realist or otherwise), but by a broad, diverse, radical milieu with largely shared goals. Within such a ‘movement of movements’, constituted by a respect for internal difference and disagreement, realist anarchists can advance their case for a realistic democratic strategy for the achievement of radical ends (Gordon, 2007: 59; Malatesta,2014 [1925]b: 466–467).

These are obviously not direct and immediate, or guaranteed, paths to an anarchist future, and that is the point. Realist anarchists do not hold to a detailed vision of a particular radical alternative, nor to one particular strategy to achieve it, but instead move as realistically as possible from current conditions towards a seemingly impossible radical goal that by necessity must become fully defined in its realisation (Rai, 2015: 179). So, in contrast with the stereotypical image of anarchist destruction of the state, realist anarchists wish to replace the state through its radical democratisation, supported, ratified and generalised by democratic control of the state and its re-constitutive powers. Therefore, rather than the typical pessimism associated with realism, realist anarchism implies a comparatively optimistic stance towards the possibility of radical change. And in contrast to the pessimism suggested by radicals who maintain their ideological purity through inaction and uncompromising disengagement, realist anarchists are optimistic enough about the possibility of actually achieving seemingly impossible radical goals that they endeavour to be realistic about what it would take to move towards those goals from current conditions.