No first strike---complexity and internal divisions.

If you were only familiar with the main story over the past few weeks and didn't know the operational plans or intelligence reports, you could unequivocally conclude that Benjamin Netanyahu has no intention of knocking out Iran’s nuclear facilities. The prime minister has based a long career around this issue; he is identified with it more than any other leader and declared it one of his four major goals when his current term began. But these are empty words.

The head of the National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, predicted just before he took office that Netanyahu's main task this term would be to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations. In an interview with Channel 12’s Friday night news program, he said: “If there's anything that could become acute and critical in the coming months, it’s Iran’s nuclear program. If the negotiations don’t end with an agreement and the United States doesn't take independent action, Prime Minister Netanyahu – and I believe this fire has been burning in him for 25 years – will take action to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.”

An attack on Iran is unlike anything the air force and the wider military have ever done. This isn't a single site, as was the case with the nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. It's multiple sites posing huge risks, both direct and indirect.

The destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facilities wasn't preceded by any buildup. One morning we woke up to find that the Iraqis were building a nuclear reactor, and then it was gone. Now, for 15 years, we've been waking up every morning to warnings, threats, pressure and lots of noise. All this has subsided in the past two and a half months as another threat takes over our lives – Netanyahu's attack on the judiciary.

Operational capabilities are just part of the decision on whether to attack Iran. For this to happen, complete coordination with the United States is required, as is the general consent of the public and great trust between the political and military leaders. Social cohesion and steadfastness are needed if a war with Hezbollah ensues, as is a total focus by the air force and Military Intelligence.

But all this has deteriorated since the Netanyahu government took over in late December as it rushes to overhaul the judiciary. This ruins the credibility of the threat to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Anyone placing the Iranian issue at the top of the agenda wouldn't erode Israel’s social fabric in weeks, pressure the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, the air force chief and the police commissioner, make them commit errors (and then apologize), make the military reservists declare they won't serve a dictatorial regime, drive away high-tech entrepreneurs (critical people for Israel’s economy) and create a toxic and gloomy environment.

You can't blather about unity and “brotherhood” while half the country feels it's being trampled by a rapacious government that doesn't stop with the power the voters awarded it. Instead it demands more powers as it destroys the judiciary.

MK Gadi Eisenkot, a former IDF chief of staff, said at the protest in Herzliya on Saturday night that “Israel is in its most gave security situation since the Yom Kippur War” – he cited Iran’s progress in its nuclear project, its strategic alliance with Russia and the arming of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Eisenkot has spent many hours discussing defense issues with Netanyahu, and until recently he only praised the prime minister’s prudence, analytical skills and clear-headed thinking.

No more. Under these circumstances, promoting a change to Israel's constitutional structure is “illogical and irrational behavior,” Eisenkot said.

If Israel truly had a military option of wiping out Iran’s nuclear facilities, Netanyahu’s performance shows that it has dissipated. The Iran danger remains, but a new one has been added: the constitutional changes being pushed through.