State interactions are determined by discourses of masculinity

Structural gender hierarchy and wars A feminist understanding of gender hierarchy as a structural feature of global politics suggests some suppositions about war and about war(s), discussed here in narrative form for economy of space. One hypothesis might be that the content and salience of the hegemonic/ideal-typical masculinity in states would be expected to be a predictor of their relative tendency to go to war. In a gender hierarchical international system, relative material or symbolic equality between states would be expected to breed conflict, while conflicts between states with vastly different functions or capabilities would be expected to be less frequent. Still, asymmetric conflicts would be expected to occur when a conflict between states’ claims to masculinity and/or states’ insults to each others’ masculinities occurs. Put differently, (state) gender relations would be expected to be an intervening variable in how power parity influences aggression. States with elements of hypermasculinity (Nayak 2006; Heeg Maruska 2010) in their nationalist discourses would be expected to be more aggressive, while states with elements of gender equity in their nationalist discourses (state feminists) would be less likely to be aggressive (see Mazur and Stetson 1995; Mazur 2001; Lovenduski and Baudino 2005). This is not because of any inherent property of the state but instead because of where the (perceived or actual) properties of the state place it on a gender hierarchy among states. The relative frequency of wars would be expected to vary with the relative intensity of gendered competition between states, which would be expected to vary with the relative aggressiveness of the ideal-typical masculinity in the international system. Gendered elements of state identities (like honor, protection, chivalry, and aggression) would be expected to determine ‘centers of gravity’ (Clausewitz 1830) that cause war, while gender hierarchy among states would be expected to be a permissive cause of war. A dominant hypermasculinity in the international system structure would lead states to approximate hypermasculinity in their functions, search for capabilities, and interaction with each other. Such an international arena would be expected to be conflictual and competitive. A dominant chivalric masculinity would produce different results, emphasizing values like ‘the responsibility to protect’ and incentivizing states to function and relate in ways that maintain toughness and tenderness. This can be expected to be manifested across states, not only in individual ones, using Waltzian logic.