Multilateralism resilient

This proposal rests on a fundamental confusion. The institutions and treaties Mr. Pompeo scourged were constructed, and are still maintained, by nation-states. International institutions do not abrogate national sovereignty, for the simple reason that dissatisfied states have the right to leave them. Whether sensible or misguided, Brexit represents a straightforward exercise of national self-determination, the legitimacy of which is acknowledged explicitly in the EU’s founding documents.

“Our mission is to reassert our sovereignty,” says Mr. Pompeo, as though anyone had ever denied it. But it is one thing to assert America’s right to act unilaterally, without permission from others, and quite another to coerce other sovereign states to go along with us. President George W. Bush went to war against Iraq with a coalition of the willing. President Trump wants to enforce sanctions on Iran with a coalition of the unwilling—European countries and companies bludgeoned into submission by the threat of losing access to the U.S.-dominated international financial system. This approach tacitly acknowledges the need for concerted international action, but denies other countries the right to make their own choices.

Two questions arise for those concerned by the White House’s vision. First, how best to contain the growing resentment from overseas toward U.S. unilateralism? And more important, what will be left of postwar internationalism once President Trump leaves the scene?

Optimists like me believe that the events of recent years have been a wake-up call rather than a death knell. Political leaders have been reminded that most people judge political institutions, international as well as domestic, by their propensity to produce security and prosperity. They have waited too long to address some of the weaknesses within global institutions, such as inattention to China’s harmful trade practices. But it isn’t too late. The will to crack down on abuses is growing world-wide, and the next U.S. administration can work with allies to reform international trade rules rather than face down China alone.

The pessimists, many located on the other side of the Atlantic, argue that confidence in the U.S. has been eroded beyond repair. For three generations Europeans could count on the continuity of America’s core foreign policy, regardless of which party controlled the White House. The U.S. might go it alone from time to time, but always within the context of support for treaties and international institutions. Relationships among the world’s democracies reflected national self-interest but also transcended it. A shared notion of human rights shaped policies of friendship and mutual support.