The perm is just securitization --- they make responding to true existential threats and atrocities impossible

All this could hold true for a just securitization theory. Not only does such a theory promise to morally constrain securitization, making its occurrence less likely, but also general knowledge of such a theory could help to democratize the process of securitization itself. Both results are desirable because, like war – and regardless of what analysts might wish – securitizations are a recurrent feature of international relations, and the abnegation of moral reflection on securitization is simply not an option (see Rengger, 2002: 363). With this in mind, I will now discuss my three criteria in detail.

Objective existential threats

Objective existential threats are threats to the existence of actors and orders regardless of whether anyone has realized this. To give an example, suppose I am exposed to lethal levels of radiation in an area where radiation levels are not normally checked, which leaves my exposure undetected. Given that I can neither smell nor see radiation, I am unlikely to be aware of it, yet my obliviousness is not going to save my life.

Objective existential threats become matters of security, and therefore ‘security threats’, only when a powerful actor frames and responds to them as such. Importantly, not all objective existential threats become security issues: Some are treated as health issues, others as police matters, and some may well be ignored. The reverse also holds, and not everything that is securitized necessarily refers to an objective existential threat; some security threats refer to perceived threats only.

Securitization can be justified as the right thing to do only if it refers to an objective existential threat. This is because the killing of innocent persons (directly or as ‘collateral damage’) that might well be an extraordinary measure resulting from securitization cannot be morally justified unless there is an objective existential threat. Once again, the storm that has erupted over the 2003 Iraq invasion is a case in point. Here, precisely the fact that lies about the existence of weapons of mass destruction artificially heightened the acuteness of the threat renders the whole endeavour and its consequences morally untenable.

How, then, can we find out whether a securitization refers to an objective existential threat or merely to a perceived threat? First, we need to figure out whether the aggressor really intends to destroy a given referent object. Second, we need to examine whether or not the aggressor has the means (capability) to do so.4 It should be clear that both of these conditions will have to be met at the same time.5 In the absence of any intention to harm A, the capabilities of B pose no danger to A. And the absence or lack of capabilities amounts to the same as insincerity. Insincerity in turn renders the threat non-objective.

In line with my revision of securitization theory, outlined above, I propose that just as we can get at the intentions of securitizing actors, we can get at the intentions of aggressors by comparing what they say with what they do. And, by ‘doing’ I mean a relevant behavioural change made by the aggressor, or by some entity instructed by the aggressor, in response to the threat. Discrepancies between what aggressors say and the actions they subsequently take to follow through on a threat are vital, as they suggest insincerity.

Having assessed the intentions of aggressors, we need to continue by assessing their capabilities. Within a state-centric context, traditionalists have made advances that are instructive for our purposes. Zeev Moaz (2009), for example, assesses capabilities by examining the level of manpower an aggressor has available for military service, along with its weapons capability, military budget, population size and political capacity to mobilize for national security. Capability assessment is easier in the context of the state, where data are more freely available, including from independent sources. In a non-state context, however, the analyst will have to try to figure out things such as the size of the aggressor (how many people subscribe to the cause), what the aggressor has done in the past, what kinds of states/organizations it is friendly with, and what we know about the latter.

To illustrate how we might proceed, let us consider the case of Al-Qaeda and whether it poses an objective existential threat to civilians in the West. Like most terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda’s leadership has never made a secret of its intentions, having called on all Muslims to kill all Americans and their allies in order to liberate Islamic countries (Bin Laden, 2006: 296). A series of bombings/attacks provides conclusive evidence that they are sincere, as their words are matched by actions. These attacks also leave us with ideas about the organization’s capabilities: not only do they show ingenuity insofar as Al-Qaeda has transformed conventional means (passenger airplanes) into weapons, they also show that the organization’s biggest capability consists of human beings prepared to die for the cause. To summarize, as long as Al-Qaeda’s intentions do not change and as long as they are able to recruit new potential suicide bombers, they constitute an objective existential threat to at least some civilians in the West.

Objective existential threat analysis is not easy. Importantly, discourse analysis of publically available texts alone may not suffice here; instead, researchers might have to conduct interviews with relevant people and, if possible, analyse documents that are not in the public domain.6 Given this, it will be much easier to judge the morality of securitizations with hindsight, when information tends to be more freely available.

Legitimate referent objects

My second requirement for moral securitizations is that the referent object of security is morally legitimate (hereafter legitimate). Inspired by consequentialism, I hold that a referent object of security is legitimate only if it is conducive to human well-being.7 This is based on the humanistic principle that holds ‘that the explanation and justification of the goodness or badness of anything derives ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and its quality’ (Raz, 1986: 194).

Note that rather than subjective levels of ‘happiness’ or ‘life satisfaction’, I am interested in objective levels of well-being. In Amartya Sen’s terminology, my concern is with a person’s freedom (capabilities), which leaves them in a position ‘to promote or achieve objectives they value’ (functionings) (Alkire, 2002: 4). What matters, in short, is the capability to flourish.

There is, however, no consensus among the many people who have devised lists of capabilities/ human needs/human values (see Alkire, 2002: 78–84). But, it seems to me that different human needs (the term I prefer) are either more or less basic to well-being. Among the most basic of all human needs is the one that enables us to function as humans (Doyal and Gough, 1991). But, what is it to be human? James Griffin (2008: 32) offers a convincing answer when he suggests that what makes us human, and thus different from other sentient creatures, is the ability to make autonomous decisions: Human life is different from the life of other animals. We humans have a conception of ourselves and our past and future. We reflect and assess. We form pictures of what the good life would be…. And we try to realise these pictures. [Our status as human beings] centres on our being agents – deliberating, assessing, choosing, and acting to make what we see as a good life for ourselves.

Importantly, however, autonomy is not exclusively internal to the agent. Rather, different political regimes and structures are more or less good at encouraging and fostering autonomous behaviour (Doyal and Gough, 1991). Joseph Raz (1986: 391) puts it as follows: a person lives autonomously if he conducts himself in a certain way … and lives in a certain environment, an environment which respects the condition of independence, and furnishes him with an adequate range of options.

In other words, in the absence of the necessary options I cannot lead an autonomous life, which is why autonomy is not only what makes us human but simultaneously a basic human need that must be satisfied if the objective is well-being.

The two ideas that have contributed most to providing individuals with options and therefore autonomy are liberal democracy and human rights. The latter foster autonomy by their very nature: they are based on the principle of the equality of all people, which entails that everyone is entitled to live a life of their own choosing, provided of course that this life does not infringe upon anyone else’s life choices (Donnelly, 1998: 44). It is also widely acknowledged that liberal democracy is intimately connected with autonomy, as liberal democracies are inseparable from certain individual liberties, including the right to free speech and the right to vote (Waldron, 2002; see also Dahl, 1998; Raz, 1986).

Such normative arguments are backed by empirical evidence, as it has been conclusively shown that liberal democracies generally do better than non-democracies in terms of providing people with the conditions and options that foster autonomy, including education, physical security, meaningful employment and economic security (Przeworski et al., 2000; Doyal and Gough, 1991). It is, hence, possible to argue, for example, that none of the North African states experiencing popular uprisings in the spring of 2011 qualifies as a legitimate referent object of security, precisely because those uprisings have been based on demands for democracy, economic security and respect for human rights.

To summarize, the moral rightness of securitization is in part a function of the legitimacy of the referent object, and legitimacy in turn is a function of the referent object being conducive to human well-being. Well-being is highest and most sustainably ensured in liberal democracies and when actors endorse human rights. The presence of liberal democracy and the honouring of human rights therefore serve as helpful indicators of human well-being in any given context.

Appropriateness of response

The distinguishing characteristic of securitization is that it justifies the breaking of established rules and regulations in an effort to ensure the referent object’s survival. To achieve the desired goal, the emergency measures taken may even be extraordinary in nature. If our concern is with the morality of securitization, however, even the response to objective existential threats is not free from requirements. There are two such requirements: The first is that the degree of response must be measured to the threat in question. Not even the existence of objective existential threats automatically justifies a response that is equal to the action of the aggressor in both means and degree. A response is measured if it takes account of the capabilities of the aggressor. Depending on those capabilities, a measured response could be either more severe than the initial attack/threat or less so. One example of a measured response was Operation ‘Deny Flight’, when the UN Security Council imposed and NATO enforced a no-fly zone to protect civilians from aerial bombings during the Bosnian war (1992–5).

The second requirement is that the response must genuinely aim at addressing the threat. The securitizing actor must seriously intend to secure the referent object they themselves identified. Securitization does not necessarily benefit the referent object but can instead benefit the agent, as when the securitizing actor uses securitization to further his or her own ends with no intention of safeguarding the referent object of security (Floyd, 2010). We can test for the intentions of securitizing actors by examining whether or not a securitization is consistent in its own terms. This is done by comparing and contrasting what a securitizing actor says about a particular threat (securitizing move) with what they do in response to that threat (security practice). The securitizing actor is sincere only if the response matches the securitizing move. An example where this was not the case is provided by US environmental security policy under the Clinton administrations. The administrations indentified environmental security threats as acute, yet what was done in the name of environmental security barely addressed any of the threats. Indeed, the real beneficiary of such policies was the US national security establishment, not the American people, which was the stated referent object of security (Floyd, 2010: 118).

Objections to a normative extension of securitization theory

In this section, I will address five objections that could be raised against what is attempted in this article. Objection (1), which is inspired by the just war literature, holds that: a ‘just securitization theory’ moralizes securitization, making its ill-effects more widespread. The remaining four objections are as follows: (2) the criterion ‘morally legitimate referent object’ is untenable because there are no universal values; (3) discursive legitimation offers a better strategy for devising the ‘morally legitimate referent object’ criterion; (4) a normative extension confuses the aim of analytical securitization theory; and, finally, (5) desecuritization is an appropriate normative strategy. In the following, I will address each of these objections in turn. In the process, I make the case for a just securitization theory.

Objection 1: A ‘just securitization theory’ moralizes securitization, making its ill-effects more widespread

Just war theory has attracted both endorsement and criticism. One of the most pertinent criticisms is that it moralizes war, making it easier to fight. In the light of the ‘war on terror’, Anthony Burke (2004: 330), for example, has argued that ‘moral discourses [including just war theory] are part of the warrior’s political armoury; they are part of war’s machinery, not a rod in its wheels’. A similar objection could conceivably be advanced against a just securitization theory. It might be argued that such a theory moralizes securitization, making it easier to exclude and marginalize minorities and control populations. Some scholars already hold that securitization is a process of deliberate ‘insecuritization’. Didier Bigo (2001: 111), for example, has argued that

security is in no sense a reflection of an increase of threats in the contemporary epoch – it is a lowering of the level of acceptability of the other; it is an attempt at insecuritization of daily life by the security professionals and an increase in the strengths of police potential for action.

I hold against this first objection that my criteria are robust enough to protect against the abuse of securitization. Note that the insecuritization argument has largely been advanced with a view to migrants in the European Union (Bigo and Guild, 2005; Huysmans, 2006); yet, crucially, under my framework even high levels of migration do not qualify as objective existential threats because the element of intentionality is missing. In the case of migration, we are not even dealing with a collective actor, but with lots of different people and their individual decisions. Intentionality would come into consideration only in the highly unlikely event that one state, perhaps after failing to provide for its own people, would urge or perhaps even pay its own people to emigrate en masse to another state. Under such circumstances, immigration might then become an objective existential threat to the receiving state.

Objection 2: The criterion ‘morally legitimate referent object’ is untenable because there are no universal values

My criterion of a morally legitimate referent object invites the usual criticism post-structuralists voice against universalism, and they would be certain to point out that there are no such things as universal values, suggesting that autonomy, human rights and liberal democracy are Western concepts. This could be taken further, and I could be accused of securitizing the hegemony of Western values.

Suffice it to say that this objection only holds if one subscribes to the idea that language has securitizing force. Let me turn to the issue of universalism. On the relationship between universalism and the West, Tim Mulgan is instructive. Mulgan separates the moral realm into two separate domains: ‘the realm of reciprocity’ and ‘the realm of necessity’. The former is dominated by goals, the latter by needs. Needs refer to ‘biologically determined necessities of life, such as food, oxygen, or shelter [while] goals are our chosen pursuits, projects, and endeavours, which give life much of its meaning and purpose’ (Mulgan, 2001: 173). The former are quite obviously not tied to cultural boundaries but rather arise by virtue of being human. And, while the particulars of certain goals may indeed be culturally specific, the mechanisms that make goals meaningful (autonomy, choice, etc.) are not.8 The reason why some may nonetheless associate these mechanisms solely with Western culture is because they are not honoured or indeed promoted equally in all types of cultures/societies, and it is within a ‘liberal system of non-interference’ (Mulgan, 2001: 201) that the recognition of these mechanisms is strongest.

Objection 3: Discursive legitimation offers a better strategy for devising the ‘morally legitimate referent object’ criterion

Although the Copenhagen School does not devise criteria that determine the referent object’s legitimacy, even from the standpoint of the School it is not impossible to do so. One approach that is much more akin to that of the Copenhagen School than my own suggestion, and could therefore be seen as offering a better strategy, is ‘discursive legitimation’, most famously promoted by Jürgen Habermas.9 Discursive legitimation is the idea that legitimacy arises from rational deliberation, which is to say from the rational exchange of both open and intelligible arguments communicated to the widest possible audience. Legitimacy rests with the concluding argument, ‘which all parties concerned could have assented to in principle’ (Steffek, 2003: 263).

The Copenhagen School makes use of discursive legitimation to a degree10 already when its members argue that the audience is the legitimizing entity of securitization (Williams, 2003). In this same vein, it is possible to suggest that the referent object of security is made legitimate – either by itself or by another securitizing actor – through ‘the authority of reason’ (Steffek, 2003: 263). Following this logic, Jens Steffek (2003: 265) suggests that the UN General Assembly is more legitimate than small in-clubs such as the G-8 because its arguments are inclusive and are delivered to the widest possible audience.

I hold against discursive legitimation that it leaves the analyst without any concrete ideas of what determines a referent object’s legitimacy; instead, it only describes the process through which a referent object becomes legitimized. As such it leaves the analyst without much of an idea regarding whether the referent object is morally good. The fact is that even majorities can get it wrong, and the pursuit of joint values can be fatal (see Buzan, 2004: 85, 131).

Moreover, if we actually examine at the empirical level what renders international actors legitimate, we will soon discover that – at the Western core of international society at least – legitimacy rests on (a) an actor’s human rights record and (b) its adherence to the values of liberal democracy. This has gone so far that Ian Clark (2005: 26–9) suggests that a state cannot be a member of international society unless it upholds these ‘rules of rightful conduct’, while Jack Donnelly (1998: 1–23) argues that human rights render regimes legitimate and that human rights have become ‘the new standard of civilization’ in international society. This suggests that both liberal democracy and human rights can be expected to play important roles in the legitimacy of referent objects of security. The reason why this is the case, however, is found outside of discourse, and in the fact that both ideas are conducive to human well-being, defined as satisfaction of human needs. It is at this point that we have arrived back at my criteria for a morally legitimate referent object of security.

Objection 4: A normative extension confuses the aim of analytical securitization theory

Another more general critique that could be advanced against what is proposed here is that a normative extension of securitization theory confuses the aim of original securitization theory, which is to enable analysts to examine how securitization plays out in practice. While the latter is indeed quite different from what I am trying to achieve here, it is also the case that my argument sits neatly within a wider ‘securitization studies’, the realm wherein the securitization theorist can move from merely observing what is going on to making normative recommendations (Taureck, 2006: 59–60).

The latter is desirable because it may not always be satisfying to end one’s analysis without a word regarding the moral rightness of the securitization one has spent (often considerable) time researching. In any case, having an informed opinion on the rightness of a political decision is better than silence, which could be mistaken for approval.

There are reasons to believe that the Copenhagen School would concur with such a view. This is most clearly evinced by the fact that they do not feel obliged to agree with all or any securitization. Indeed, ‘one of the purposes of [the securitization] approach should be that it becomes possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). This suggests that although the School’s view of security politics is considered ‘neutral’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 38), normative evaluation is considered desirable, even necessary, and indeed a normative preference can be found in most of its members’ writings.

A key reason why this is the case is that under securitization theory language is believed to have securitizing force, which is to say that the securitization analyst simply by writing or speaking about security brings about securitization (Huysmans, 1999). The latter is problematic for the analyst, given that securitization can be abused by ethically undesirable groups. It is only natural that the securitization analyst will want to distance him- or herself from furthering the causes of such groups, and that can be done only by making a normative statement about the securitization in question. Members of the Copenhagen School do this by challenging all securitizations as negative developments, because in their view securitization leads to de-democratization and potentially a multiplication of the number of security dilemmas found in the world. In response to such negative developments, the securitization analyst is meant to point out that securitization is always a political choice and that actors should solve their differences by ordinary political means. In short, the School advocates desecuritization, the process whereby formerly securitized issues move back into the sphere of normal politics, where they are dealt with by ordinary measures once more.

Objection 5: Desecuritization is an appropriate normative strategy

The Copenhagen School’s preference for desecuritization, however, is somewhat more nuanced than the previous section might suggest. After all, its members hold that desecuritization is better only ‘if all other things are equal’, while they also recognize that this is not often the case and that the mobilization power inherent in securitization can be used for good ends (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Nevertheless, these important qualifications do not change the fact that on a level playing field desecuritization is the School’s preferred option.

I take issue with the claim that desecuritization is better in principle for two reasons: first, desecuritization does not necessarily lead to politicization (Floyd, 2010: 57); second, from a moral point of view, ‘desecuritization as politicization’ is not necessarily preferable to ‘desecuritization as depoliticization’ (Floyd, 2007: 343n56).

Desecuritization as a normative strategy is problematic for yet a third reason. Informed by the observation that there are no objective security threats, desecuritization as a normative strategy works by depriving securitizing actors of the ability to ‘hide behind the claim that anything in itself constitutes a security issue’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). Accordingly, why should actors be allowed to turn anything into a security issue if it can be shown that there are no security threats per se, and that all security threats exist in the securitizing actor’s own head (and, later, in the heads of the relevant audience)? The Copenhagen School’s preoccupation with security operating in this way and no other, however, has left its members blind to the fact that while there may be no objective security threats, there still exist objective existential threats (see Balzacq, 2005: 181). Consequently, they cannot see that a securitization that refers to an objective existential threat is distinct from one that refers to a perceived threat only, and that some such threats are best addressed in security mode.

Conclusion

It has been the aim of this article to develop securitization theory in such a way that securitization analysts can normatively evaluate securitizations without assuming the role of the securitizing actor and without postulating what we should be worried about. I have argued that setting criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization is akin to the Copenhagen School setting criteria that determine both the existence of securitization and its success.

I have further argued that the strict confines of the Copenhagen School’s version of securitization theory necessitate a move away from this original securitization theory to a revised version that holds that securitization = securitizing move (existential threat justification that amounts to no more than a warning or a promise) + security practice (a change of relevant behaviour by a relevant agent that is justified by this agent with reference to the declared threat). The revision was necessary because, in order to examine the moral rightness of securitization, the analyst must: (1) establish whether or not existential threats are objectively present; (2) examine both the intentions of aggressors and those of securitizing actors; and (3) identify universal values that determine the referent object’s moral legitimacy. Members of the Copenhagen School would be deeply uncomfortable with all parts of this analysis, as they go against some of the fundamental principles and beliefs underlying original securitization theory, as well as some of the intellectual ancestors of the theory (see Floyd, 2010: 9–23).

I have also argued that a just securitization theory of the kind proposed here renders securitization theory more policy relevant, and that such a theory has the potential to democratize the process of securitization. But one look at the many writings and further theorizations of the role and nature of the audience suggests that such democratization is deemed desirable by many scholars working on securitization theory.