Global South rejects China — exploitation redirects their allegiance

So, is it “game over” for America in the Global South? Not quite. What has gone generally unrecognized is how dramatically the relationship between China and the Global South is changing, and how those changes—and Beijing’s fumbled response to them—are hampering Chinese ambitions to lead the nations of the developing world and capitalize on their support to remake the global order. The growing difficulties, disputes, and disparities between China and much of the rest of the Global South are opening up new opportunities for Washington and its partners to reassert their influence in the developing world and push back against China’s growing power. The game over influence in the Global South is really just beginning. China is also generating ill will in the Global South by abusing these countries’ natural resources. In the days of Western imperialism, European countries enriched themselves by siphoning off the wealth of their colonies, whether spices or silver. Modern China may not be capturing these riches through conquest, but it is exploiting them, nonetheless. Natural resources are the top target of Chinese overseas investment. Data from the American Enterprise Institute shows that more than 40 percent of Chinese outbound direct investment—or some $600 billion—has been plowed into energy and metals since 2005.35 A current point of contention between China and some developing countries is aggressive fishing practices. Chinese trawlers have been accused of stripping fishing grounds off the coast of West Africa, shoving aside the smaller, less advanced craft of local fishermen. “They are stealing what should be ours,” one aggrieved Ghanaian told The Telegraph.36 The Philippines in recent years had tried to forge stronger relations with China, but now, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has swerved firmly back into the US camp. One sensitivity between Manila and Beijing has been fishing rights in the contested waters of the South China Sea, where Chinese fleets have muscled out their rivals. “I explained to President Xi that last year was the first year in the entire history of the Philippines where we had to import fish, which is a ridiculous situation for a country that consists of 7,100-plus islands,” Marcos said, adding that he had told President Xi, [37]”Perhaps we can take the little step of allowing, once again, our fishermen to ply their trade.”

Such self-interested behavior has left Beijing open to criticism on other fronts, including climate change. Beijing has been an advocate for the developing world in climate forums for some time and has earned significant support on this issue from the Global South. But its position has come under pressure as China’s economy has developed. China has been the largest emitter of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere since 2006,38 and despite Beijing’s pledges to attain carbon neutrality, those emissions are still increasing. China’s leaders, however, have taken the position that they are not responsible for the damage done to poor countries by global warming, and though they have offered to aid them in certain ways, they have refused to contribute funds to compensate them for losses. That has made China an outlier on this point since the United States and other industrialized countries agreed to create such a fund at last year’s UN climate summit, COP27.  That refusal has not gone down well with some developing countries. Small island nations called on Beijing to financially compensate poor countries for damage and loss due to global warming at the summit.39 Chinese officials “are always seeking language that would protect them, give them less responsibilities, no obligations for developing countries,” one former climate negotiator from the Global South grumbled to The Washington Post.40 The widespread and enduring support for democracy flies in the face of Beijing’s claims to speak for the Global South and may act as a barrier to the expansion of Chinese influence. In January, a new, democratically elected government in Fiji scrapped an agreement that the previous administration had made with China to train the Pacific island’s police force, citing a divergence of political values. “There’s no need for us to continue; our systems are different,” Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka explained to The Fiji Times. “Our system of democracy and justice systems are different so we will go back to those that have similar systems with us,” by which he meant Australia and New Zealand.56

Global South are not drawn in — hedging is best alternative

Shea 23 — [Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defense, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security Challenges at the NATO, (“Winning back the Global South: difficult but not impossible”). Friends of Europe, 6-2-23,), Available at https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-winning-back-the-global-south-difficult-but-not-impossible//.)]

At the same time, the countries of the Global South have discovered the advantages of sitting on the fence and not taking sides. This is not China and Russia supplanting the United States or the EU, as is often claimed by some analysts particularly when it comes to the Middle East. The US still has its extensive network of military bases and is the principal security provider to many countries in the region. Yet the increased presence and activism of China and Russia, whether it is in the form of Confucius Institutes or Wagner mercenaries, now gives the Global South more options and the sense that it can pick and choose. The US produces the best weapons and gives the most explicit and reliable security guarantees. China is much more vague in this regard. Yet Beijing gives infrastructure finance with no strings attached and no criticism of poor governance or human rights abuses at a time when many countries of the Global South have lapsed into rigid authoritarianism. Russia is prepared to intervene to support dictators against their opponents either using its own forces or mercenaries and proxies. It is willing to put its diplomatic heft behind its Global South partners in the UN or other international bodies, shielding them from intrusive investigations or criticism. Türkiye can be in NATO but also have a foot in the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It contracts with Rosatom for its nuclear power stations but also sends its Bayraktar drones to Ukraine. India can be a member of the Western QUAD grouping in the Indo-Pacific but also participates in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and will join Russia and China in South Africa for the upcoming BRICS summit. India relies on Russian weapons to defend itself against China but China has now become its largest trading partner. Indeed, Beijing is now the largest trading partner of 120 countries across the globe. Egypt is the third largest recipient of US military aid but imports much of its grain for its 100mn plus population from Russia. A recently leaked Pentagon paper claimed that Cairo was secretly planning to ship 40,000 missiles to Russia. Hedging has become the preferred strategy for scores of countries in the Global South, as a way of always putting their immediate national interests first and minimising the need for painful concessions or quid pro quos from their superpower patrons. Having seen the way in which countries of the then ‘Third World’ were forced into the Western or Eastern camps during the Cold War and caught up in the grinder of US-Soviet confrontation, from which few emerged more secure or prosperous, they see hedging as a way to diversify their risks and increase their influence on the international stage. A perception of US or European hypocrisy makes it easier for them to justify sitting on the fence in the face of the obvious imperfections of the Chinese or Russian models. Freedom House in Washington, for instance, has pointed out that of the 50 dictatorships on its list, 33 receive US military aid every year.