Tech is overrated

For others, technical change plays a central role in the innovation process, usually in conjunction with organizational change. McIntyre notes that innovation requires a synthesis between novel technology and the doctrinal and organizational changes required to “create a revolutionary effect” on the battlefield.33 In other words, technological innovation alone does not have the “self-sustaining momentum” to produce an effective military innovation.34 Goldman and Eliason argue that there is a relationship between hardware and software. Hardware refers to the technology used to fight, such as artillery and bombers, and software refers to “the organizational or human application component of an innovation or technology,” such as doctrine, tactics, recruitment, and training.35

However, while technological change often accompanies innovation, alone it is rarely enough.36 As the distinction between the invention of the tank and the adoption of combined arms warfare illustrates, often it is the non-technical components of change that are especially salient in military innovation.37 For Adamsky, technology, or “hardware,” often serves as an important initial condition, but innovation depends on the “confluence of weaponry, concept of operations, organization, and the vision of future war.”38 This relationship is one between the object (the technology) and its context (the broader military organization).