Considering alternative futures is key.

The desire to anticipate what the future holds is not new. The Delphic oracle in the eighth century BC held a prestigious and authoritative position in the Greek world, providing predictions and guidance to both city-states and individuals. In 1555, Nostradamus’ Les Propheties attracted an enthusiastic following, and even today many credit him with predicting many major world events. During the Cold War, techniques designed to anticipate the future were instrumental in informing strategic decisions. Analysts at the RAND Corporation, for example, pioneered the development of foresight methods such as scenario development to predict the Soviet Union’s nuclear strategy during the Cold War in their seminal 1988 report, “How Nuclear War Might Start”. However, just as the Cold War ended, so too did the close relationship between foresight and nuclear weapons. Other sectors utilized and expanded upon futures methods in their work. The most well-known example is the use of scenario planning at Royal Dutch Shell, which has been in use since the 1970s to better prepare for an eventful decade of oil crises and economic turmoil. The objective of Shell-style scenario planning is breaking the habit of assuming that the future will look much like the present. Today, many parts of the private and public sectors increasingly use strategic foresight to explore the future as part of their decision-making process. In comparison, futures methods are no longer in the mainstream of nuclear policy making, even though nuclear risks are rising. This dearth of strategic foresight in nuclear policy making is dangerous, but fortunately there are some easy remedies. A fundamental challenge faces nuclear policy makers and scholars today: It is now more important than ever to anticipate what the future might hold due to the uncertainty surrounding tomorrow’s strategic environment. Moreover, the inherent—and growing—complexity of systems and new actors has made it increasingly difficult to predict the future simply by extrapolating from the past. Futures methods provide the tools to address this challenge, along with a good dose of humility about how much we can control our world. These methods can help develop foresight—insight into how and why the future could be different than today—which, in turn, helps to improve policy, planning, and decision making, all of which play an integral part in a world with nuclear weapons. We talk about futures in the plural because the objective is not to predict a single future, but to explore alternative futures. By envisioning alternative futures, we can better sense, shape, and adapt to the one that is emerging. Singapore’s foresight practice is an excellent example of how foresight readies us for change. For over 40 years, foresight has helped the Singapore government go beyond prevailing assumptions, better manage risk and uncertainty, and develop greater resilience to possible shocks. Futures methods also help to engender ‘knowledge humility’, where instead of seeking to deny or eliminate uncertainty, we learn to live with it through reflexive governance.